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1. Introduction  
The world is experiencing an uptrend in the frequency and intensity of reported natural 
disasters; over the past three decades, the numbers have dramatically increased with 
devastating consequences for affected populations and their livelihoods (EMDAT 
20.09.2013). Just in the last decade, we have seen examples of extreme weather-related events 
responsible for destructive natural disasters: 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, 2010 Pakistan 
floods, 2010 Haiti earthquake, 2013 Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, and more relevant to 
this research, Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar and the Atlantic hurricane season’s impact on Haiti 
– both in 2008. While the increase in natural disasters may be attributable to improvements in 
information access and better reporting mechanisms, the scale and intensity of these recent 
natural disasters is difficult to deny. And while worldwide death tolls from natural disasters 
appear to be decreasing, a larger share of the world’s population is still affected by natural 
disasters due to rising global populations. Thus, natural disasters can be seen upon as a global 
problem and of contemporary interest to the well-being of human security.   
 
The sudden onset nature of disasters pose considerable challenges to local and national 
coordination during the initial emergency response; relief work is often hindered by resource 
constraints and enormous damages to existing infrastructure, while affected governments face 
pressure from the international community to receive aid from an immediate flood of NGO’s 
and international agencies. In such cases where natural disasters overwhelm affected 
governments’ response capacities to properly address immediate needs, they may request 
international humanitarian assistance - whereby the United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) serves as the focal UN agency on 
complex emergencies and natural disasters. The OCHA’s “Cluster Approach” groups 
humanitarian actors (UN and non-UN) to work multilaterally between their respective sectors 
to organize a coordinated emergency response that mitigates gaps and duplications in the 
aftermath of disasters. The major structural aspect of the cluster approach entails 
strengthening coordination through 11 specialized sectors that address humanitarian-related 
action, in addition to enhancing predictability, accountability and partnerships (HR 1 
10.09.2012). Since its first implementation in 2005, the cluster approach has been activated in 
over 30 countries. 
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While the cluster approach attempts to standardize international emergency response, there is 
expected variation in its formal organization and operationalization due to the varying 
contexts it operates under: contrasting organizational perspectives of members within the 
cluster system and fluctuations in disaster-response management that accounts for locale and 
intensity of disaster. This thesis will focus specifically on two cases where the cluster 
approach has been applied: Myanmar, where Cyclone Nargis struck in 2008, and in Haiti of 
2008, which faced the detrimental effects of the Atlantic hurricane and storm season. The 
empirical focus of this study on the cluster approach will be on specialization, coordination, 
leadership and accountability. Taking into account the contrasting physical disaster-response 
challenges between Myanmar and Haiti - in addition to their distinct historical backgrounds - 
it can be of subsequent interest to study the cluster approach between both crisis contexts in 
terms of its operationalization and potential impact on the formal organization of the cluster 
approach itself. 
 
The focus on the cluster approach takes on added value and interest due to the minimal 
attention found in literature on how to analyze the system structures of emergency response 
and how to understand them as organizational networks in emergency response operations 
(Moore & Daniel 2005, Lund 2011). Existing evaluations and reports can indicate that the 
cluster approach may vary in formal and practice during emergency response (Steets et al. 
2010). Lack of strong governance and coordination in a country where disaster occurs can 
lead to situations where vulnerable people do not receive the basic humanitarian assistance 
they require. This is exhibited by the broad number of humanitarian-related organizations and 
actors working in the field of humanitarian assistance in the aftermath of disaster; said parties 
maintain varying levels of diverse resources (financial and human), specializations, and 
organizational mandates. As a result, humanitarian relief in a disaster setting may vary from 
crisis to crisis. Using an organizational theoretical framework, therefore, will help to describe 
the cluster approach and explain possible variations in specialization, coordination, leadership 
and accountability in the formal organization and operation of the cluster approach in 
Myanmar and Haiti. 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
1.1 Research Question 
Based on the theme of this thesis, the research question poses the following: 
1) How is the formal cluster approach organized and how does it work in practice 
after natural disasters in Myanmar and Haiti, with a focus on specialization, 
coordination, leadership and accountability? 2) How can possible variations in the 
formal organization of the cluster approach and how it works in practice be 
explained? 
 
The research question is two-fold and consists of 1) a descriptive part, which will describe 
how the literature illustrates the cluster approach both in theory and practice, and 2) an 
explanatory part, which will explain possible variations between theory and practice with 
respect to cluster coordination in the aftermath of natural disasters in Myanmar and Haiti. The 
descriptive part of the research question is rested on governance and multi-level governance 
literature in order to describe the formal organization of the cluster approach with an 
empirical focus on specialization, coordination, leadership and accountability. Additionally to 
describe how the cluster approach was realized in Haiti 2008 and Myanmar in 2008. 
 
The explanatory portion of the research question attempts to identify and explain any 
variations -if they exist- between the formal organization of the cluster approach and its actual 
implementation in Haiti and Myanmar. Such an observation will attempt to discover if the 
organizational structure has adapted any features from the crisis context it is operating under. 
It is expected that variations do exist between how the formal organization of the cluster 
approach is compared to how it is implemented and realized in practice. Myanmar and Haiti 
will be used as empirical examples of cluster approach realization and will not be 
systematically compared. In order to operationalize the research question, the empirical focus 
is on specialization, coordination, leadership and accountability; given that these are the main 
elements in the cluster approach.  
 
To answer the explanatory part of the research question, two aspects of organizational theory 
are applied: instrumental and institutional perspectives. From an instrumental perspective, the 
cluster approach members are viewed as rational actors - the cluster approach is a means to 
reach the goals, and change is possible through rational adaption (Christensen et al. 2004). 
The instrumental perspective may lead to the reasoning that there is a tight coupling between 
the formal organization of the cluster approach and how it works in practice. On the other 
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hand, in terms of institutional perspective, three elements prove crucial: the logic of 
appropriateness, focus on discovering goals, and change is challenging due to historical 
inefficiency (ibid). In contrast, the institutional perspective may lead to the reasoning that 
there is a loose coupling of the formal organization and how it is in practice. These aspects of 
organizational theory will be further discussed in the theoretical framework of chapter 4.   
 
According to King, Keohane and Verba (1994) all research projects in social sciences should 
answer on two meaningful criteria: “A research project should pose a question that is 
“important” in the real world…[and] should make a specific contribution to an identifiable 
scholarly literature by increasing our collective ability to construct verified scientific 
explanations of some aspect of the world” (:15). There is a research gap on understanding the 
cluster approach as a network system,”[n]etworks clearly have wide-ranging applications in 
the humanitarian sector, yet surprisingly little has been written on the strategic development 
and management of networks with the humanitarian sector in mind” (Ramalingam et al. 
2008:1). As it is plausible to believe that organization theory on coordination, specialization, 
leadership and accountability have not been properly used in order to understand the 
challenges of managing networks in the humanitarian sector, these variables may help to 
ensure a better understanding of the challenges facing humanitarian response efforts. 
 
Qualitative case study as a methodological research design with data triangulation is utilized 
as an appropriate tool in order to answer the research question. In this case, as no 
organizational theoretical research exists, in order to understand the cluster approach as a 
network system, data for the qualitative study is based on relevant academic articles and 
journals, case studies of best practices, cluster approach evaluations, operational guidelines 
and handbooks, and terms of references, supplemented with interviews of relevant actors and 
observation at OCHA.  It is apparent more research on this field is needed in order to 
contribute to a better understanding of the cluster approach – an approach based on 
organizational theory and the core elements in the network relationships of specialization, 
coordination, leadership and accountability in an international emergency setting. This thesis 
will, therefore, strive to provide an improved understanding of the cluster approach as a 
network with a special focus on specialization, coordination, leadership and accountability. 
The contribution to existing literature may consequently be to offer new casual explanations 
on possible variations with organizing the cluster approach after a natural disaster using both 
the instrumental and institutional perspectives in the organizational literature.   
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1.2 Cluster Approach in Disasters 
As clusters in the cluster coordination system are activated in response to a sudden onset 
emergency or disaster, a central element to this approach is in the nature of the crisis or 
disaster. What happens to be perceived or defined as a crisis may vary, but examining the 
diverse meanings of the term ‘crisis,’ there appears to be a common understanding that it  
includes some form of system failure in organizations, social structures or communities’ 
norms as a whole (Perry 2007). Boin et al. (2005:2) defines crisis as “a serious threat to the 
basic structures or the fundamental values and norms of a system, which under time pressure 
and highly uncertain circumstances necessitates making vital decisions.” Therefore, a crisis 
poses serious threats to fundamental societal structures and human security. Moreover, large-
scale crisis are often trans-boundary, spreading across local organizations and borders. As a 
result, there are actors from multi-level organizations and sectors coordinating to minimize 
crisis; we will observe the cluster approach give grounds for coordination across levels – both 
horizontal and vertical – in the empirical chapter of this thesis. 
 
In this thesis, the attention to crisis is shifted towards situations where crisis has had a deeper 
societal meaning, and developed into that of a disaster, which will have subsequent immediate 
impact on governance and coordination. According to Boin et al (2005b:163), simply put, a 
“disaster is a crisis with a bad ending.” A disaster concerns the outcome of an accident, often 
involving that of a negative outcome (Boin 2006). Smith (2006) sees a disaster as an outcome 
of one single factor, often as a process by nature - for example a natural disaster. It is, 
therefore, not the threat which is the determining factor of a disaster, but the actual outcome 
of the crisis itself. OCHA’s definition of disaster which usually requires international 
assistance and coordination of emergency response is “[a] serious disruption of the 
functioning of a community or a society causing widespread , material, economic or 
environmental losses which exceed the ability of the affected community or society to cope 
using its own resources” (OCHA 1 2006:54). The cluster approach can be implemented in 
disasters which require large-scale international emergency relief to natural disasters and/or 
complex emergencies. Complex emergencies are human generated disasters and can be 
political, internal conflicts or wars; however, as complex emergencies are not of subject to 
this thesis, it will therefore not be further discussed. Instead, this research will focus attention 
on natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes, droughts, hurricanes, cyclones and landslides. 
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1.3 Thesis Structure 
The remaining structure of this thesis is outlined as follows: 
Chapter 2 presents the thematic and empirical context of the cluster approach. The chapter 
will introduce the background of the cluster approach, role and responsibility of the affected 
state after a disaster, criteria for activation of the cluster approach and give an empirical 
introduction of the case studies involving Myanmar and Haiti.  
 
Chapter 3 describes and discusses the methodological design applied for this research paper. 
The chapter focuses on the use of case study as research design, and will thereupon describe 
the selection of data elements, in addition to criteria for collecting and analyze data. The 
chapter will conclude with a discussion on data quality and the possibility of generalization. 
 
Chapter 4 introduces the theoretical framework that will be used in order to describe and 
analyze the formal organization of the cluster approach and how it works in practice. The 
focus is on multi-level governance theory with respect to specialization, coordination, 
leadership and accountability. In order to explain possible variations of variables the 
instrumental and institutional perspectives are introduced. 
 
Chapter 5 describes the empirical data on the formal organization of the cluster approach, 
based on the variables specialization, coordination, leadership and accountability.   
 
Chapter 6 presents the empirical data on the cluster approach applied in practice during the 
aftermath of cyclone Nargis in Myanmar and the hurricane and tropical storm season in Haiti 
- both occurring in 2008. The chapter will also include a section on common findings of the 
cluster approach in practice. 
 
Chapter 7 sums up the main findings in the empirical data and theoretical framework. 
Additionally, the empirical findings will be discussed in the instrumental and institutional 
perspectives in order to try to explain possible variations. 
 
Chapter 8 firstly discusses the main findings in the thesis and gives an answer to the research 
question. Secondly, places the findings in the literature on the field. Thirdly, discusses 
possible theoretical and empirical implications and introduces suggestions for future studies.  
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2. Context 
In order to understand the cluster approach one need to look at how some of the dimensions 
may effect how it is organized. In this section, the background of the cluster approach, the 
role of the affected state, the activation of the clusters, and the case studies of Myanmar and 
Haiti, will be examined. The first part will describe the background of why the cluster 
approach was developed. The second part will describe the minimum criteria for emergency 
response, which may describe the responsibilities of the cluster approach based on a Human 
Rights perspective in natural disasters. The third part will define the role of the affected state. 
Defining the role, will also define the role the cluster approach does not take. The fourth part 
will define what activates the clusters. The fifth and last part will introduce the case studies, 
Myanmar and Haiti. Since the instrumental and institutional perspectives are the explanatory 
theoretical frameworks in this thesis, the institutional structures for emergency response in 
Myanmar and Haiti may have an effect on how the cluster approach was organized.  
 
 
2.1 Background of the Cluster Approach  
Examining the background of the cluster approach is useful to know because we learn how 
the formal organization came to form based on previous experiences. In the early 1990s 
efforts were been made for the UN agencies to be more cohesive and integrated in 
emergencies.  General Assembly resolution 46/182 (A/RES/46/182) has been called the 
founding instrument of the UN’s humanitarian role – “which tasked the UN system to provide 
leadership and coordinate efforts to support disaster- and emergency-affected countries” 
(Kent 2004:219). Four reforms were introduced; the first reform was the creation of the 
Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), led by an under-secretariat general in New York 
(A/RES/46/182). The second of these reforms gives ECOSOC an oversight over the policy, 
budget and management of the large funds and programs. The third reform was to encourage 
a greater degree of information sharing, joint policy and strategy development, and overall 
management among the under-secretary generals in charge of political, military and 
humanitarian functions during complex emergencies.  
 
The fourth and perhaps most interesting innovation in these reforms was the creation of the 
Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) in 1992. IASC is a coordinating mechanism and is 
chaired by the UN under-secretary-general for Humanitarian Affairs (Natsios 1995:414-415). 
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As a part of the 1997 reform of Secretary-General Annan, the DHA was replaced with the 
Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which had a more streamlined 
mandate focusing on coordination, advocacy and policy development (Reindorp & Wiles 
2001). The UN General Assembly reaffirmed and reinforced the importance of the inter-
agency coordination mechanism with the passing of Resolution 48/57, which strengthened the 
coordination of humanitarian assistance in emergencies (A/RES/48/57). IASC’s main 
objectives are humanitarian dialogue, policy development by giving system-wide policies and 
humanitarian guidelines for humanitarian operations, advocacy through a platform for the 
humanitarian community to advocate collectively for common principles and values and 
lastly, operational discussions and decision-making by articulating crisis-specific strategies 
(IASC 9 2011). 
 
The IASC is divided into the IASC Principals, the IASC Working Group, IASC Subsidiary 
Bodies and the IASC Secretariat.  The IASC Principals are the heads of the organizations that 
form the IASC; the IASC Principals are the executive level and the meetings are chaired by 
the ERC. They meet twice per year, along with ad hoc meetings. The members consist of 
representatives at the Secretary-level and the Presidential level of the IASC members of 
humanitarian organizations. The IASC working group consists of emergency directors, 
directors or senior representatives of the humanitarian organizations and is chaired by the 
director of OCHA Geneva. The working group meets 3 times per year, and if necessary, has 
ad-hoc meetings. Essentially, their role is to discuss and identify emerging issues in 
emergency operations, discuss field mechanisms and tools, and also provide policy support to 
the Principals on field needs and realities (IASC 9 2011).  The subsidiary bodies, such as sub-
working groups, address ongoing priority issues depending on the critical needs in the 
humanitarian community. There was an IASC task team working specifically on the cluster 
approach up to the end of year 2011. This team was upgraded to an IASC sub-working group 
in 2011. The sub-working group on the cluster approach provides a forum for the global 
cluster coordinators to meet and to discuss critical and vital operational issues. 
 
According to Stephenson (2005), there is a lack in the number of institutions that are 
responsible for humanitarian coordination. Previous emergency relief response can be 
characterized as a loose juncture, with no leading agency (Stephenson 2005). Organizations 
were working on different mandates and governance structures, which made it difficult to 
attain correct facts of the disaster and mistakes easily occurred. This can also be illustrated in 
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a quote from Evaluation of Humanitarian Coordination by Reindop and Wiles (2001:i): “'The 
United Nations did not respond as a system but rather as a series of separate and largely 
autonomous agencies. Each had its own institutional dynamics, formulated its own priorities, 
and moved according to a timetable of its own devising.” In order to improve humanitarian 
assistance and answer to these challenges, the Humanitarian Reform was introduced in 2005 
by key organizations
1
. The Humanitarian Reform seeks to improve the effectiveness of 
emergency response by ensuring predictability, accountability and partnership (One Response 
1 22.02.2011). The reform was an ambitious effort by the international humanitarian 
community to reach more beneficiaries with more comprehensive needs-based relief and 
protection in a more effective and timely manner (One Response 1 22.02.2011). However, the 
Humanitarian Reform has been critiqued by NGOs for lacking accountability mechanisms 
towards affected populations. It has also been criticized for focusing too much on 
international humanitarian actors and not enough on national and local actors (HRP 2009).  
 
The Humanitarian Reform consists of four pillars: 1) to strengthen coordination and 
predictable leadership, which has been known as the cluster approach. The cluster approach 
has been said to be a major innovation, and the most far-reaching article in the reform, though 
it is not so radical as to create a new UN agency. The cluster approach is intended to improve 
sectorial coordination at the country level, as well as increasing the effectiveness of 
emergency response (Holmes 2007:5); 2) to prepare the Emergency Managers of the future by 
strengthening the Humanitarian Coordinator System. OCHA emphasized the role of the 
Humanitarian Coordinator for successful emergency response operations (OCHA 7 2006:2). 
The Humanitarian Reform focuses on the skills and understanding required for the 
Humanitarian Coordinators through education. To better prepare for future disasters the 
Humanitarian Coordinators (either they are from the UN or another NGO) are better educated; 
3) is an adequate, flexible and predictable humanitarian financing system. One of the most 
important tools for the Humanitarian Coordinator is the Central Emergency Relief Fund 
(CERF). CERF gives the opportunity for a flexible and predictable financing system, which 
can be used for a sudden disaster or when an existing crisis is rapidly exacerbated; 4) this 
element was introduced in 2007. The fourth element was on building partnerships, and on 
more effective partnership among humanitarian actors. This pillar aims to gather the right 
                                                 
1
 Such as UN agencies, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and the NGO community, along with the 
IASC.  
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people around the table to discuss and to make vital decisions critical to humanitarian 
response (OCHA 7 2006).  
 
 
2.2 Rights and Responsibilities  
The rights of the affected population may explain the cluster approach’s role and the duty 
bearer’s role. It is the affected government’s main responsibility of ensuring the rights of its 
population, as we will see next in chapter 2.3. The minimum rights of the affected population 
are founded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The citizens of a state that has 
signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are entitled to protection as stated in the 
Declaration in times of natural disaster. It is mainly the affected government and its 
administration that are the main duty bearers because they are responsible for the protection 
of the rights of its population (IASC 3 2006:10). Challenges for people affected by natural 
disasters may include unequal assistance, discrimination in aid, loss of documentation, unsafe 
or involuntary return or resettlement and issues of property restitution. “Protection is not 
limited to securing the survival and physical security of those affected by natural disasters” 
(ibid), therefore the affected government’s role is to ensure; a) physical security and integrity 
rights (e.g protection from assaults), b) necessities of life rights (e.g food, water), c) 
economic, social and cultural rights (e.g education), and d) civil and political rights (e.g 
freedom of discrimination) (IASC 3 2006:10-11).  
 
In addition to the humanitarian community perspective, a few standardized initiatives were 
created in order to draw agreement on some common rules and guidelines in emergency 
response. One of them is the Code of Conduct; this is a voluntary code that states the 
standards of behavior (James 2008). Another is the Sphere Project, which is a “multi-
organizational effort that developed the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in 
which organizations commit to qualify and accountability” (James 2008:16). The minimum 
standards are in five key sectors: water supply and sanitation, nutrition, food aid, shelter and 
health services. The basic principles in the humanitarian charter are the right to life with 
dignity, right to receive humanitarian assistance, and protection and security. To ensure that 
the minimum requirement, such as provision of adequate food, water and sanitation, shelter, 
clothing and essential health services is given to the people in need, it is pointed out in the 
Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards  for the organizations to cooperate (James 
2008). Also, a relevant initiative is the Humanitarian Accountability Project (HAP). HAP’s 
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initiative strengthens accountability of organizations to the affected population. Its framework 
is based on the questions, who is accountable, to whom, for what, how and for which outcome 
(HAP 2010).  
 
 
2.3 The Role of the Affected State in Disaster Response 
When a disaster strikes, it is each state’s responsibility to take care of the victims involved in 
its territory.  In a typical emergency, the affected government and voluntary sector would 
respond first, and they would be followed by international assistance that had been agreed 
upon prior (James 2008). The role of the affected state is clearly recognized in international 
law and key statements. The UN Humanitarian Resolution 46/182 of 1991 states clearly that 
the affected state has the “primary role in the initiation, organization, coordination, and 
implementation of humanitarian assistance within its territory” (A/RES/46/182). The role of 
the state is also reaffirmed and acknowledged by the Sphere guidelines (The Sphere Project 
2011). The affected state is  responsible for “calling a crisis and inviting international aid; 
they provide assistance and protection themselves; they are responsible for monitoring and 
coordinating external assistance; and they set the regulatory and legal frameworks governing 
assistance” (Harvey 2009:2). These responsibilities are crucial in initiating and coordinating 
emergency response. As we will see in the case of Myanmar, the importance of the 
government’s consent to international humanitarian response is vital.  
 
However, when a disaster strikes, a range of international organizations and stakeholders seek 
to help the affected state. These include governments, the United Nations system, 
international and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the Red Cross/Red 
Crescent movement. They also include specialists in the different aspects of humanitarian 
response, such as search-and-rescue operations. In the aftermath of a disaster, it is the state 
that calls upon to facilitate the work of the UN and NGOs in implementing humanitarian 
assistance to the population in need (OCHA 3 2008). It is expected that the international 
emergency relief workers will respect the sovereignty of the national authority, and that they 
have a good relationship (Cahill 1999:3).  The role of the NGOs is to support the already 
existing structures in the different phases of response (James 2008). 
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2.4 Activation of the Clusters 
In order to activate the cluster approach, the IASC Principals has listed broad criteria. It was 
agreed by the IASC Principals that the cluster approach should be implemented in countries 
where the emergency relief is insufficient or where there are gaps to be filled. There are three 
criteria, or possible elements that can activate the cluster approach, these are:   
 
1) In response to dramatic events or disasters;  
2) To fill major gaps in humanitarian needs, identified by the agencies and by the hosting 
Government; and  
3) By initiative and guidance of the concerned Humanitarian Coordinators/Resident 
Coordinators (HC/RCs) in consultation with the Country Team members (OCHA 2 2006:6).   
 
In principle, the cluster approach can be activated at the request of any IASC agency (UN as 
well as non UN) in the field or in the Headquarters of the United Nations.   
 
The decision is made between the local level and the headquarters level and normally a 
configuration will be proposed at the local level by the RC, it would be unusual that there 
would be a humanitarian coordinator in place before you have a cluster system in place 
(Informant 2). 
 
The cluster approach is being implemented in “humanitarian crises which are beyond the 
scope of any one agency’s mandate and where the needs are of sufficient scale and 
complexity to justify a multi-sectoral response with the engagement of a wide range of 
humanitarian actors” (IASC 4 2006:2). The clusters are to work together for a common 
objective through designated leadership; “[a] cluster is a group of agencies that gather to work 
together towards common objectives within a particular sector of emergency response” 
(WHO 2013). The cluster system is complex and includes various sectors of emergency relief, 
service provisions to peer clusters and crosscutting issues.  Also, the cluster approach is bi-
level (global and country) which makes it an even more comprehensive and complex 
structure. However, this will be further described in chapters 5 and 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
2.5 Presenting the Two Case Studies 
 
Myanmar 
Myanmar is the largest country on the mainland of South East Asia
2
. Its population is 
estimated 51,5 million people (TCG 2008).  Historically, Myanmar has been prone to various 
hazards such as urban fires, floods, storms and others (Recovery Status Report 2008). Prior to 
the Cyclone Nargis, there was the 2003 earthquake, the 2004 tsunami, and the 2005 and 2006 
landslides (Recovery Status Report 2008:1). Myanmar is considered to be among the world’s 
poorest, mostly due to its political and military history of conflict. Also, the government’s 
violations of human rights are regarded by human rights organizations to be the most severe 
in the world (SNL Myanmar 18.03.2013).  Haiti performs particularly poorly, ranking twelfth 
out of 177 countries in the Failed States Index (Fund for Peace 2008 18.09.2013). Starting 
from 1962 Myanmar was under military rule, and Myanmar was led to a period that has been 
characterized by isolation and socialist politics. Myanmar’s constitution came into force in 
1974 and was suspended following a military coup in 1988. “The country was subsequently 
ruled by a military junta between 1997 and 2011, as the State Peace and Development 
Council” (Britannica 2 11.3.2013). National League for Democracy was elected in 1990, but 
was never acknowledged by the military government (SNL Myanmar 18.03.2013). The 
country is divided into seven states based on ethnicity. Each of the states mentioned above are 
subdivided into townships, urban wards and village tracts (Britannica 2 11.3.2013). 
 
The Natural Disaster Preparedness Central Committee (NDPCC), constituted in 2005, is “the 
main body at the national level responsible for the formulation off policy and the provision on 
disaster preparedness in the country. The Central Committee is further sub-divided into ten 
Sub-committees, headed by Senior Ministers and reporting directly to the Central Committee” 
(Recovery Status Report 2008:4). At the ministerial and departmental levels the extent of 
involvement will vary depending on each department. “The Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief 
and Resettlement is the principal agency that oversees relief operations during an emergency, 
in particular are its Department of Fire Services and Department of Relief and Resettlement” 
(Recovery Status Report 2008:5). Also there are institutional arrangements on the sub-
national and township levels. 
 
                                                 
2
 See Appendix II for a map of Myanmar.  
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Under the circumstance that a hazardous event occurs, the above mentioned agencies will be 
responsible for relief and recovery with very little or no external assistance. In the Nargis 
relief and recovery phase, they have been actively participating in collaboration with their 
international counterparts (Recovery Status Report 2008:5). 
 
The worst natural disaster Myanmar has experienced was tropical cyclone Nargis that struck 
on May 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 in 2008. Nargis had a wind speed up to 200 km/h and was accompanied by 
heavy rain and storm surge in certain areas of Myanmar (Recovery Status Report 2008). The 
disaster affected five states/regions (Britannica 2 11.3.2013). The tropical cyclone was first 
formed in the Bay of Bengal and grew to be a category 3 storm (TCG 2008). Nargis made 
landfall and affected people living in the Ayeyarwady (delta region) and Yangoon (Rangoon) 
areas, and a total of 50 townships in Myanmar was significantly affected (TCG 2008). The 
most devastated region was the delta region; an estimated 95% of all the housings were 
destroyed (OCHA 3 2008). It was projected that 2,4 million people were affected by Nargis, 
the official number of dead and missing were 130.000 (Kauffmann & Krüger 2010:16). The 
massive devastation included the destruction of houses, critical infrastructure, water systems, 
fuel systems and electricity; it also included damages on food stocks (Kauffmann & Krüger 
2010:20). “Eleven clusters were activated by the end of June 2009, when they merged into a 
new coordination mechanism, namely Delta Recovery Groups” (Kauffmann & Krüger 
2010:8). 
 
 
Haiti 
Haiti is an island state in the Caribbean
3
. Haiti received its independence from French rule in 
the early 19
th
 century. “The country has been checkered by decades of political instability, 
foreign intervention, dictatorship and exposure to natural disasters” (Binder & Grünewald 
2010:13). Over the centuries, economic, political and social difficulties, as well as a history of 
natural disasters have plagued Haiti with chronic poverty (Britannica 1 11.3.2013). Haiti 
suffers from weak governance structure, organized crime, and environmental degradation 
(Binder & Grünewald 2010:7). “According to several indexes measuring states’ fragility, 
Haiti performs particularly poorly, ranking fourteenth out of 177 countries in the Failed States 
Index (Fund for Peace 2008 18.09.2013) and 129th of 141 countries according to the Index of 
State Weakness in the Developing World” (ALNAP 2010:8). The climate is warm and humid 
                                                 
3
 See Appendix III for a map of Haiti. 
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tropical climate
4
, which makes it prone to natural hazards. The southern part of the peninsula 
is more vulnerable to hurricanes (tropical cyclones), however all parts of the country may be 
hit. A normal season in the Atlantic sector can include 7-14 tropical storms in the area per 
year and 4-8 hurricanes per year (NWSCP 20.09.2013). 
 
More than two thirds of Haiti’s population lives in the rural areas. “The administration of 
local governance is carried out in three main divisions. The largest of these are départements, 
which are divided into arrondissements and, further, into communes. The effectiveness of 
an arrondissement’s administration varies considerably with its location; the closer it is to 
the département capital and the more urban it is, the more likely it is to function effectively as 
an administrative entity” (Britannica 1 11.3.2013).  
 
The Haitian government is the main actor responsible for coordinating emergency relief 
efforts. Since 1999 the disaster coordination preparedness and response has been coordinated 
through a national system for risk and disaster management: Systeme National de Gestion des 
Risques et des Désastres (SNGRD), which is a permanent secretariat (Binder & Grünewald 
2010). This national system consists of 26 both governmental and NGOs and institutions. 
However, the Ministry of Interior, through the Direction Générale and the Direction de la 
Protection Civile (DPC) has the final say in policy development, decision-making 
responsibility, and operational coordination for risk and disaster management (ibid). The 
cendre d’Opération d’Urgence (COU) is responsible for bringing together both members of 
SNGRD’s secretariat and the DPC in a disaster response (Binder & Grünewald 2010:16). 
However, the national system has weaknesses.  
 
National coordination is often hampered by weak capacities and capabilities as well as 
conflicting political loyalties, particularly at the municipal level. While some members of the 
administration are loyal to the national structures, others are loyal to the mayor and his 
networks (Binder & Grünewald 2010:16). 
 
Coordination among between the national and international actors is by the Groupe d’Appui 
del la Coopération Internationale (GACI), which is a group within SNGRD. They bring 
together UN agencies, MINUSTAH, international development agencies, embassies, donors 
and NGOs (Binder & Grünewald 2010:16). Their mandate is to “coordinate international 
actors involved in disaster preparedness and response activities, mobilize funds and ensure 
                                                 
4
 Temperature and climate is different depending on elevation. 
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technical cooperation” (Binder & Grünewald 2010:16). They also share information, 
assessments, integrate action plan
5
, and provide reports. The cluster approach was formally 
introduced in Haiti in 2006-2007, however the clusters were not activated and neither OCHA 
nor IASC were present until after the sudden onset of the natural disaster.  
 
Haiti is affected by hurricanes and tropical storms year after year, but the combined impact of 
the tropical storm Fay (15 August. 2008), hurricane Gustav (25 August. 2008), hurricane 
Hanna (28 August. 2008) and hurricane Ike (4 September. 2008) were enormous. It has been 
stated that the hurricane season of 2008 was probably the most serious catastrophe in Haiti 
since the beginning of the 20
th
 century
6
. The disasters impacted nine out of ten regions of 
Haiti. The tropical storms and hurricanes produced heavy rainfall and winds. The hurricane 
season of 2008 left hundreds of people dead and tens of thousands homeless.  The hardest hit 
areas were the departments of Sud, Sud-Est, Artibonite (Gonaïves) and the northern coast 
(Reliefweb 14.09.2009). The city of Gonaïves was isolated for days before the humanitarian 
organizations managed to get through (IFRC 2008). Numbers from evaluation phase II, Haiti, 
states “the extreme weather caused over 800 deaths, injuring 548 people and affecting a total 
of about 800,000 Haitians” (Binder & Grünewald 2010:13). The storms and hurricanes 
destroyed houses and parts of the country’s infrastructure were either destroyed or damaged.  
 
 
2.6 Summary of Chapter 2 
In this chapter the empirical context of the cluster approach has been presented. The 
background of the cluster approach gives a deeper understanding of how and why the formal 
cluster approach was organized. The affected country plays a crucial role in order for the 
cluster approach to be implemented and is also the main entity responsible in the aftermath of 
a disaster. The different responsibilities of the affected state, gives a framework for the cluster 
approach in its organizing. Additionally, the two case studies were introduced by their 
empirical context. The institutional and cultural context may have an impact on how the 
cluster approach is working in practice, and may contribute to explain variations in cluster 
approach implementation. 
 
                                                 
5
 Made by the Haitian government in coordination with the UN. 
6
 This excludes the Haiti 2010 earthquake. 
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3. Methodological Design 
A qualitative case study research design with data triangulation has been seen as most 
appropriate in order to answer this research question.  Since the cluster approach has not yet 
been subject to much research in the academic field, an in-depth knowledge using different 
data might highlight the features of its organization. This chapter will introduce the 
methodological design and discuss the opportunities and challenges the methodological 
design might face. It will also report how the data was collected and processed, the validity, 
reliability and possibility of generalization will be discussed later in the chapter. First, it will 
start with case study as a research design.  
 
   
3.1 Case Study as a Research Design 
Gerrings (2004:342) argues that the case study research method is best defined as “an 
intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) 
unit”, in other words, to generalize across a larger set of units. Yin’s definition from 1989 
depicts the explanation and its use, and helps us to understand case studies, but it also 
distinguishes case study research strategies from other research strategies and might therefore 
be a more correct definition to use while designing a method for collecting and processing 
data on the cluster approach.  
 
A case study is an empirical inquiry that; investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident; and in which multiple of sources of evidence are used (Yin 1989:23).  
 
This method is relevant since the research question requires an “in-depth” description of the 
cluster approach and also tries to explain possible variations. This leads to one of the strengths 
by using case study research methods because it is more useful for forming descriptive 
inferences
7
 (Gerrings 2004:346). Some advantages are the case studies’ accessibility, the 
possibility to see through the researcher’s eyes, and lastly it will decrease the defensiveness 
and resistance to learning (Donmoyer 2004:61-65). It allows the researcher to deal with a full 
variety of evidence – documents, artifacts, interviews and observations. This openness of data 
triangulation allows going in depth and answering the descriptive and explanatory factor of 
                                                 
7
 Descriptive inference is defined by King, Keohane and Verba (1994) as “the process of understanding an 
unobserved phenomenon on the basis of a set of observation” (:55). 
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the research question. The descriptive factor is -how- how to describe the formal cluster 
approach organization and how it works in practice in the aftermath of natural disasters. The 
research question will then satisfy Yin’s explanation dimension. In order to answer the 
research question, it’s been decided to examine two natural disasters in depth where the 
cluster approach was implemented, Myanmar and Haiti. Both were struck by a natural disaster 
in 2008. The cluster approach’s functionality is dependent on how it operates in the context of 
a disaster, therefore it is necessary to study the cluster approach in its context because we then 
get context-dependent knowledge. Flyvbjerg (2006:223) argues that case study research is 
especially well suited to produce this type of context-dependent knowledge.  
 
 
3.2 Selection Process: Case  
In order to see how the cluster approach is in practice, more than a single case must be studied 
and to make the study more robust. The research question is answered by using two cases in 
order to draw some kind of conclusion about how the cluster approach is used in practice 
during times of natural disaster. The two cases allow the researcher to go into depth in each 
case, but also allow the researcher to say something general about the cluster approach and 
how it is functions. If something works similar in both cases it might be applicable to all 
natural disaster response. Additionally, choosing two case studies allow looking for possible 
variations and seeing what is unique in the cluster approach.  
 
Choosing two case studies opens up a possibility of comparative case study research. In 
comparative case study research designs where there are few country units, the focus tends to 
be on similarities and differences among the countries in order to uncover what is common to 
each country (Landmann 2003:29). There are two system designs: most similar system 
designs (MSSD) and most different system designs (MDSD) (ibid).  MSSD identifies “key 
features that are different among similar countries and which account for the observed 
political outcome” (Landmann 2003:29). On the other hand, MDSD identifies similar key 
explanatory factors among countries that do not share the same features (ibid). Such a 
categorizing comparative case study design is useful when the comparison is being done 
systematically. This thesis’ research design may be seen as a hybrid between the MSSD and 
the MDSD as will be shown in the selection of the two case study countries.  
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The selection strategy for the two cases were based on 7 criteria, which were 1) 
implementation of the cluster approach due to a natural disaster; 2) availability of 
information, extensive evaluations and reports; 3) both are the same type of disaster – both are 
natural disasters, which makes it easier to draw similarities in both cases; 4) same year, which 
means the cluster approach is in the same “stage of development”; 5) different institutional 
and historical context; 6) geographical spread – the disasters are in two different countries; 7) 
are not a part of a pilot-project of the cluster approach.  When the cluster approach was 
implemented in 2005 there were few guides or handbooks on the cluster approach; this led to 
challenges in the implementation of the cluster approach in some countries. Therefore, 
choosing a pilot country could thus created challenges for any comparisons and 
generalizations. 
 
There were multiple natural disasters to choose from. Based on the cluster evaluation phase 
II
8
, the criteria lead to two natural disasters: Haiti and Myanmar. Both cases meet all the 
criteria above. The availability of information has been extensive with evaluations, reports 
and articles, which can either verify or falsify data. Both Myanmar and Haiti have had the 
cluster approach implemented due to a massive natural disaster, which can highlight the 
various features of the organization of emergency relief in a hard hit disaster area. The natural 
disasters also happened the same year, therefore the criteria for being in the same 
development stage has been met. The countries have different institutional and historical 
context, they are spread over two different continents and they were not a part of a pilot 
program for the cluster approach. As we see from the selection of Myanmar and Haiti, they 
both have similar features of being a developing country that was faced with an enormous 
sudden natural disaster where the cluster approach was implemented. This meets the criteria 
for MSSD. On the other hand they have different cultural and institutional compounds and are 
coming from different geographical region of the world, which meet the criteria for MDSD. 
The selection of case studies may therefore be a hybrid between the MSSD and the MDSD.  
 
However, even though the case study selection is a hybrid of MSSD and MDSD, in analyzing 
the cluster approach in practice in Myanmar and Haiti, a systematical comparison is not 
intended. The intention is to highlight the specific features of the different countries and to 
                                                 
8
 Cluster approach evaluation phase II (2010) focuses on the outcomes that is generated by the cluster approach 
in five countries: Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Myanmar, occupied Palestinian territory and 
Uganda. Additionally there is a synthesis report.   
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highlight the scope of the cluster approach in a specific disaster context under scrutiny. 
Myanmar and Haiti will therefore be used as examples in the variables for how the cluster 
approach is working in practice, rather than a strict systematic comparison of the two 
countries.  
 
 
3.3 Multiple Sources of Evidence 
Data triangulation may increase the validity and reliability since it can address a broader 
range of issues in order to answer the research question, which could be both historical and 
behavioral. Data triangulation may also allow the researcher in either contributing new data or 
verifying or falsifying already existing data. The collected data is complementing and 
strengthening each other, however all data may have weaknesses. All data that has been 
collected will be presented: documentation, interviews and observation.  
 
 
3.3.1 Documents 
The main documents that have been used are evaluations, reports, handbooks, administrative 
documents and guidelines. In addition web sites such as un.org, unocha.org, reliefweb.org, 
have been extensively used in order to extract general information about the cluster approach. 
The documents will be complemented with interviews and observation.  Some strengths for 
using documents as a source of evidence are stability and they cover a broad range of topics. 
These characteristics speak in favor of using document analysis and qualitative methods. The 
documents in this thesis can be frequently reviewed. They contain a lot of detailed 
information and references and they can allow the reader to see through the “eyes” of the 
researcher. The guidelines and handbooks are official UN documents and give exact and 
official description of the cluster approach, what the rules, expectations and goals are. Using 
documents as a main source also include risks such as the need to be read with a critical point 
of view, e.g retrievability, biased selectivity (if collection is incomplete), reporting bias 
(unknown bias), and access to documents (Yin 2009:102). What’s important while reviewing 
any document is that the researcher understands the document and its purpose. All the 
documents that have been used in this thesis have been written with another purpose that the 
research question in this thesis. Most of the guidelines and handbooks that are used describing 
the formal organizations of the cluster approach are dating from 2005 and 2006, however 
there are a few handbooks dated from 2010, this is in the cases where the content did not have 
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any direct consequence for how the cluster approach is in practice, rather give a general 
description of the cluster organization. There is also a risk that the documents that have been 
selected are not the best documents to represent the cluster approach, or that the information 
in the given documents are incorrect. However, data triangulation will help minimize risks 
since it can either disprove or verify information. In addition to documents, reports and 
evaluations both from the UN and non-UN actors have been used in order to support or not 
support the main empirical data.  
 
 
Selection and Analytic Process: Documents   
In order to systematize the data collection, it was set some criteria for the collection. The 
criteria were; (1) description of the cluster approach; (2) its purpose, function and 
implementation; (3) specialization, coordination, leadership and accountability in the cluster 
approach; (4) emergency relief operations in Myanmar and Haiti 2008; (5) institutional 
background for emergency response in both Myanmar and Haiti (2008). 
 
Prior to field observation, documents were collected by using internet; the documents were 
collected mainly through un.org, reliefweb.org, unocha.org, google scholar, google search, the 
affected state’s official websites and using main humanitarian actors’ web sites, such as The 
international Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent website: ifrc.org. There are risks 
in using the internet as a research source. The internet may give invaluable data, but if the 
researcher is aware of this, the internet can provide information to be conducted as 
convenient. The main meta data search words were: cluster approach, emergency relief 
operations cyclone Nargis 2008, emergency relief operations Haiti tropical storm 2008, Haiti 
hurricane 2008, UNOCHA Haiti, UNOCHA Myanmar, and cluster approach guidelines. 
These searches gave mixed result; searching for the cluster approach led mostly to UN web 
sites, while searching for Cyclone Nargis gave a varied list of results with different NGO’s 
reports, UN websites, articles, news, etc. The UN has a web page for minute meetings, 
proposals and reports from meetings. Internal records were not available to the public it is 
therefore not used as information in this thesis.  Additional data that has been collected 
includes archival records that are official documents from the UN web pages: this includes 
survey data, public use files, organizational records, maps and charts of the geographical 
place. All the data has been collected and is available on the UN web pages. The five criteria 
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that were set were helpful in systematizing, categorizing and minimizing the search on the 
Internet.  
 
Documents were, in addition to the internet, collected at the UN headquarter New York in 
2012. As an intern for OCHA in New York, the researcher had access to internal reports, 
evaluations, guidelines, reference guides, and manuals, in addition to access to summaries of 
meetings, meeting documents of principals and working group. These helped for a greater 
understanding of the cluster approach, however, only official documents have been used in 
this thesis. Also, being an intern for the OCHA, the researcher had access to the UN library, 
IASC library, UN bookshop, UN and OCHA internal web sites and intranet and e-mail 
correspondence on UN.org’s e-mail. These documents would be harder to obtain standing 
outside of the UN system. In total there was a massive amount of collected data, which 
needed to be categorized and systematized in order to answer the research question. The data 
was categorized and systematized according to the theoretical framework in chapter 4, and the 
empirical data will be presented in two chapters. The first chapter will present the formal 
organization of the cluster approach and the second chapter will discuss how the cluster 
approach operated in practice in Myanmar and Haiti.  
  
Evaluation as Data Material 
Cluster approach evaluation phase II, which took place in 2010, was based on the cluster 
evaluation in 2007. To understand the evaluations in 2010, it is necessary to know some facts 
about the evaluation in 2007.  When IASC initiated the cluster approach in 2005, an 
evaluation was commissioned after two years to see if the cluster approach had led to “any 
measurable improvements in the capacity, coverage and predictability of humanitarian 
response” (Stoddard et al 2007:1). The evaluation was based on field research in countries 
where the cluster approach was implemented: Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Somalia and Uganda. The progress of the clusters was uneven across the countries, but data 
showed that the clusters did in some cases improve the coordination of humanitarian 
response. In most of the cases the clusters did improve in the field with little or no support 
from the global clusters.  The main findings on leadership and accountability were that the 
cluster approach did help to foster a stronger and more predictable leadership over sectors. 
The lead agencies were attentive to the needs of the entire sector. But there was no observable 
increase in ultimate accountability over sectors. When a cluster performed poorly or failed to 
add value, this was generally due to weak leadership. The engagement of the host states was 
23 
 
mixed “and overall has suffered from insufficient emphasis and strategic focus” (Stoddard et 
al 2007:2).  
 
By using evaluations as the data for case study research, it is important to acknowledge 
evaluations as an ideological tool. Giving the attention to discuss the political dimensions of 
the policy analysis may improve the external validity and reliability.  According to Palumbo 
(1987), politics and evaluation are closely related to each other. Evaluators have a great 
impact on the analysis being made. Evaluation is defined by a four-part definition by Lincoln 
and Guba (1986:8, see in Palumbo 1987:15). The evaluations are used to determine 
congruence between performance and objectives, to obtain information on decision 
alternatives, to compare effects with needs, and lastly, “critically describing and appraising an 
evaluation through connoisseurship” (Palumbo 1987:15). 
 
The evaluators are to understand how to improve the program that is being evaluated. At the 
same time they are to find facts and knowledge about the program, even if they are negative. 
“…value-neutral research is not possible nor desirable. Values inevitably are a part of any 
evaluation” (Palumbo 1987:32). This means that the evaluators will bring with them values, 
while it is the decision makers who decide the goal, which dimensions to evaluate in the 
program and what indicators they want to find out.  Evaluation is an important tool and a 
routine function for OCHA, both in learning and in key management. The main functions of 
evaluation are to evaluate efficiency, appropriateness, relevance, value-added, effectiveness, 
impact of OCHA’s services in humanitarian intervention, as well as to document lessons 
learned in the humanitarian coordination.  This may, according to OCHA, lead to a greater 
institutional learning and knowledge sharing, and be used as a tool to provide accountability 
in humanitarian coordination to enhance the effectiveness in the future. In addition to using 
evaluation as a tool for assessing its own coordination activities, it also functions as a “direct 
support to the international humanitarian community through the application of a system-wide 
and joint evaluation processes at the request of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), 
the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) or the United Nations General Assembly (OCHA 8 
2010).  
OCHA’s Evaluation and Studies Section usually manages the evaluations at OCHA, but are 
also conducted by external consultants (OCHA 5 10.09.2012). The consultants that are 
evaluating should not have taken part or been involved in the designing or the implementation 
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process of the activity being evaluated. In this way the evaluations must be credible, 
transparent, fair, independent, and public. The evaluations for the cluster approach were an 
externally mandated evaluation. Evaluations of the cluster approach prior to 2010 have been 
the Inter-agency real-time evaluation of the cluster approach in the Pakistan Earthquake in 
2006 and the cluster approach evaluation 2007, which was been the foundation of the second 
phase evaluation. Two publications were published prior to the phase II evaluation: Indicators 
and Inception Report in 2009.  
 
 
3.3.2 Interview  
Interviews have been used as a supplement to documents.  Interviews are great as a strategy 
for collecting case study evidence because it shows the world from the interviewees’ 
perspectives (Kvale & Brinkman 2009:21). For this thesis the 4 interviewees set the cluster 
approach in a context seen in the view of people working with the cluster approach in the 
field, OCHA headquarter and Global Public Policy Institute
9
. Well-informed interviewees can 
provide important insights into specific affairs or events, such as history and identify other 
sources. The informal interviews are seen here as guided conversations between researcher 
and interviewee, rather than a structured questionnaire. Two essential tasks during the 
qualitative interview are to (a) “follow your own line of inquiry, as reflected by your case 
study protocol, and (b) to ask your actual (conversational) questions in an unbiased manner 
that also serves the needs of you line of inquiry” (Yin 2009:106).    
 
When using interviews as a source of evidence, there is the risk that the amount of interviews 
conducted is either too many or not enough both of which would challenge the researcher. 
Not having enough interviews might make it harder to generalize and to test hypothesis 
between groups. On the other hand, if there are too many interviews, this might make it harder 
to conduct an in-depth analysis (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009:129). Standard critic against 
qualitative interviews is that they are not; “1) scientific; 2) quantitative, they are only 
qualitative; 3) objective; 4) scientific hypothesis testing; 5) a scientific method; 6) credible; 7) 
reliable; 8) intersubjective meanings; 9) valid, since interviews are based on subjective 
impressions; and finally 10) generalizable, there are few people being interviewed” (Kvale & 
Brinkmann 2009:179). Kvale and Brinkmann (2009:181) answer this critique by the quality 
                                                 
9
Global Public Policy Institute was together with Urgence réhabilitation développement the evaluation team of 
the cluster approach evaluation phase II.  
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and skills of the researcher. Validity of the research will then be based on the researcher’s 
skills to control, problematize and interpret the results theoretically. Also, it is not about the 
amount of people being interviewed, but the purpose of the study. It is possible to apply some 
knowledge from one situation to another with the focus on the social science’s context and 
heterogeneity instead of focusing on the universal generalization. 
  
Selection, Interviewing and Analytic Processes  
The interviewees were chosen based on their knowledge about the cluster approach, Haiti and 
Myanmar, and how the cluster approach had been implemented in the different countries. The 
interviewees were recommended from the IASC and OCHA Secretariat while having informal 
conversations with people working there. The interviewees were either contacted by e-mail or 
in person. In total there were 4 scheduled interviews. The interviewees were persons working 
with Myanmar and Haiti at the desk office in headquarter of OCHA, New York, OCHA field 
personnel and a person working for Global Public Policy Institute.  All interviewees were 
asked in the beginning of the interview if a recorder could be used during the interview, and 
they were told that the recording would be deleted after the thesis was finished. All 
interviewees agreed to be recorded. Recordings from interviews using videoconference on 
Skype caused some delays in the interview, which might have affected the interview process 
and the interviewee.  
 
Prior to the interview it was written an interview guide
10
 which highlighted the empirical 
focus. The interviews were held as informal conversations between the interviewer and the 
interviewee, although the interview guide allowed a structure for the interview process. The 
questions were open-ended and it was up to the interviewee in how they wanted to respond. 
Follow up questions were asked when needed. The interview process included risks, such as 
whether the interviewer had poorly articulated questions (Yin 2009) or whether the follow up 
questions were unclear. A challenge during the interview process was that the interviews were 
conducted in English; English is not the first language for the interviewer, nor is it for the 
interviewees. This might lead to misunderstandings. It was therefore important that the 
questions that were asked were clear and accurate. Having an interview guide allowed the 
researcher to write down and prepare the questions prior to the interview, which minimized 
the risk of inaccurate and irrelevant questions. Another risk is that the interviewee will give 
                                                 
10
 Interview guides are available in; appendix VI for Global Public Policy Institute, appendix VII for OCHA 
personnel in Myanmar, and appendix VIII for OCHA personnel in Haiti.  
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answers the interviewer wants to hear (Yin 2009:102) or that the reply does not reflect the real 
event. A challenge in this study was that the natural disasters in Myanmar and Haiti occurred 
in 2008, which means that the interviews were conducted 4 years after the disaster occurred 
and insights were therefore, reflected in time and might have been influenced by events 
during that period. Also, some of the interviewees in OCHA were not working in OCHA 
during the disaster, but after, and may therefore not have the specific knowledge, but an 
overall general knowledge.  
 
One of the interviews took place at the offices in OCHA, New York. The rest of the 
interviews were held on Skype, either by telephone or videoconference. The program allows 
the researcher to see the other person on a webcam and allows the researcher to register body 
language. Skype creates a distance between the interviewer and the interviewee, since they are 
not able to be in the same room. The interviewees spoke openly and directly. They also 
responded freely to the questions that were asked. It varied to the extent how deep they would 
go into some of the issues either because they did not have sufficient knowledge or because 
they felt that they had already answered the question. The length of the interview varied 
between 40 minutes and 1 hour and 15 minutes. The length of the interviews had been agreed 
upon previously. The interviews were done over a period of 2 months and all interviews had 
been scheduled for the same week, but due to Hurricane Sandy, which struck Haiti in October 
2012, the interviews on Haiti needed to be rescheduled. The interviewees were given the 
chance to ask questions during the interview if there was anything that was unclear with the 
question or if it was something they wanted to ask. The interviewees were also asked in the 
end if there was anything they wanted to add that was not asked about during the interview. 
However, only one responded adding an element regarding the issue between humanitarian 
aid and development.  
 
After the interviews, the recordings were transcribed; the transcriptions were word by word. 
The transcription of the interviews minimized the risk of any misinterpretations. The quotes 
were sent to the interviewees in order for the quotes to either be corrected or proof read before 
being published. The interviewees had 14 days to comment.  All of the quotes were approved 
for being published with only minor grammatical changes.  
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3.3.3 Observation  
Using observation as a research method provides both opportunities and threats. Observation 
in OCHA as an intern gave access to an “inside view” and information about closed groups, 
meetings and organizations. It gave an in-depth understanding of OCHA, the IASC 
Secretariat, an overview of the cluster approach and how it functions in real life. On the other 
hand, being a part of the subject you want to study may also include some risks. One relevant 
risk argued by Yin (2009:102) is “selectivity – broad coverage difficult without a team of 
observers”. OCHA and IASC Secretariat is divided in two, there is one Secretariat in New 
York and one in Geneva. Doing observations only in one place might lead to one-sided data, 
where not all perspectives are being accounted for. Another risk is that the researcher was 
taking part in what is being studied, which may challenge the “researcher role”. However, the 
field notes have been written in the “eyes of the researcher” and not as a representative of an 
organization. Also, the notes have been thoroughly examined in the aftermath of the 
internship with a critical eye to what has been written and it was selected only relevant and 
neutral information.  
 
Process Observation  
Being an intern from June 2012-December 2012 in the IASC Secretariat in New York gave 
useful insights on how the OCHA and IASC Secretariat is organized, functions, and insights 
about how the cluster approach functions. The research question and selection criteria for 
cases and data collection were formed prior to the internship. The internship has therefore, not 
affected the choice of research question or criteria for data selection.  
 
The researcher was allowed to observe relevant IASC meetings on global levels, such as 
Principal meeting (November 2012), Working Group meeting (June 2012) and Sub Working 
Group meeting on gender (October 2012). The high-level global meetings gave important 
insights that would be difficult to interpret in any documents. High-level meetings are usually 
only referred to by action points, and not discussions. It was therefore useful to follow 
discussions on for example, activation and de-activation of clusters, level of catastrophe, and 
the concept of accountability. These high-level discussions have been essential in order to 
fully understand the cluster approach, how it is operating and how it is being discussed and 
lead on the global level. Along with weekly OCHA and IASC meetings, it was attended Crisis 
Response Division meetings, Policy Development and Studies Branch meetings and IASC 
Weekly meetings. By attending these meetings and having informal conversations with the 
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people working in OCHA, IASC and the IASC humanitarian organizations, the researcher got 
a good overview, in-depth understanding and useful overall insights on the coordination of 
emergency relief work. In all meetings there were written field notes. All field notes are raw 
data have been re-written in order to use them as data in this thesis.  
 
 
3.4 Data Quality  
King, Keohane and Verba (1994:23-27) present five guidelines in improving data quality. The 
five guidelines will cover both the data validity and data reliability in qualitative data research 
methods. These guidelines have been used in order to report the data quality in this research. 
No research methods are without limitations. Addressing the limitations and sharing the 
process of the research may make future studies on the cluster approach easier. 
 
The first guideline is to “report the process by which the data are generated” (King, Keohane 
and Verba 1994:23). This chapter has documented all the steps in the collection of data, stated 
the criteria, interpreted and analyzed the data. This will give the reader an understanding of all 
the choices that have been made during the research and will increase the chances that if the 
research is to be duplicated by another researcher, the same results will show. By 
documenting every step and by presenting the risks and strengths, allows the reader to 
consider whether any of the information collected was biased in any way.  
 
The second guideline is “in order to better evaluate a theory, collect data on as many of its 
observative implications as possible” (:24). To improve the data validity, is has been used 
several different collecting methods such as a variety of documents, conducting interviews 
and direct observation at the Secretariat of OCHA and IASC in New York. Because the 
documents that are being collected are secondary data, it is important that the information 
comes from different sources and that the sources are reliable. This may give the attempt to 
investigate if major rival statements have been made. The methods that have been used were 
complementary, also the multiple source of evidence have either validated or disproved 
collected data. Field observations in Haiti and Myanmar were desirable, but due to resource 
restraints this could not be carried out. On any future research on the topic, field observations 
are highly recommended. The evaluations of 2010 are based on numerous field visits to both 
Haiti and Myanmar where thorough interviews and observations had been executed; the 
evaluations can therefore be compensation for field observations and field interviews in this 
29 
 
research. In other words, collecting data from many contexts and sources of evidence help 
improve the certainty of inferences to some degree in this thesis.    
 
The third guideline is to “maximize the validity of our measurements” (King, Keohane & 
Verba 1994:25:25). Validity refers to measuring what we think we are measuring (ibid). This 
study has been problem driven, it has employed methods that seemed best for a given problem 
in order to best answer the research questions at hand. It has tried to a high degree to produce 
the results or inferences that are valid to the research question in the study, and have tried to 
not allow unobserved or immeasurable concepts to get in the way during the time of data 
collection and the analytical process.  
 
The fourth guideline is to “ensure that data-collection methods are reliable” (King, Keohane 
& Verba 1994:25). This means that if this research was done in the same procedure and using 
the same methods, the same results would occur. The goal of this study is not to produce a 
standardized set of results, rather it is to “produce a coherent and illuminating description of 
and perspective on a situation that is based on and consistent with detailed study of that 
situation” (Schofield 2004:71). Using the same theory and empirical data would then produce 
the same results. However, one must take into account that the cluster approach might have 
changed if there is a long pause in research, if the interviewees’ perceptions change even 
although the question guide remains the same and if different field data is provided from 
observing at the UNOCHA and IASC Secretariat.   
 
The last guideline from King, Keohane and Verba (1994) is that “all data and analyses should, 
insofar as possible, be replicable” (:26). As mentioned earlier, by reporting the study in 
sufficient detail, it is possible to evaluate all the steps, procedures and methods that have been 
used. Since replications of a research project assumes that the same data is being used, but in 
a different time period, the replication may not be perfect. One way to test it is for another 
researcher to read and interpret the available transcripts and field notes in order to see if the 
same results are concluded. 
 
To sum up, the validity and reliability of this study has been verified by documenting all the 
steps in the research process, from thematize to the interpretation of data and verifications and 
analyzing process. By using multiple sources of evidence, the data can be verified or 
disproven and the validity may therefore, be increased. Methods have been described, 
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documented and discussed. The limitations of the study have also been presented. The same 
results may therefore, be highly likely to be produced again if another researcher at another 
time conducts the same research. It may therefore, be argued that this study has a high level of 
validity and reliability. 
 
 
3.5 Case Study and Generalization 
Instead of using case studies as a method of generalization, one can use case studies for 
stating examples. In this research the relevant question is not whether one can generalize 
based on a statistical generalization, rather, the purpose is to increase the understanding of a 
complex structure as the cluster approach, and to understand how it operates in natural 
disasters and to see how one may explain possible variations. Therefore, one may argue that 
there will always be a variation in context and situations, and it will change over time. This 
research is based on an inductive research model, meaning that we are building up a 
theoretical understanding from the empirical analysis that is being executed (Andersen 1997). 
Andersen (1997:22) argues that inductive case studies aim to extract a point of the complex 
coherences without necessarily verifying one case with a similar case. In other words, the 
cluster approach is not working in a vacuum. For example, it may operate differently 
depending on the effect of disasters and the institutional environment that the cluster approach 
works in. There are varieties in empirical observation even though the organizational system 
and disaster is the same. This will therefore, make it difficult to generalize about all the 
natural disasters that have utilized the cluster approach. Instead of generalizing about multiple 
cases, the goal in this study is to use the theory in the field to explain the concepts and the 
complex relationships and coherences in the cluster approach. 
 
 
3.6 Summary of Chapter 3 
In this chapter the methodology has been presented. The methodological design is a 
qualitative case study research design. The data consists of official documents, interviews 
from relevant actors, and observations at the UN headquarter level. The validity and reliability 
in this methodological design has been found to be of high quality in order to best answer the 
research question and present elements that the researcher finds relevant to the research 
question. 
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4. Theoretical framework 
The intention of this chapter is to present a theoretical framework, in order to be able to 
describe and explain the variation of the phenomenon and the empirical relations.  Roness 
(1997:11-13) defines a theory as a relatively systematic set of notions on the relations 
between various phenomenon. This chapter will be divided in two: first is the classifying 
theoretical frame, for which a multi-level governance approach and network governance 
literature will be utilized. This first-half section of the chapter will also present the four 
dimensions operating in network governance: specialization, coordination, accountability and 
leadership. The second part of the chapter will present the explanatory perspectives, 
consisting of the instrumental and institutional perspectives with following empirical 
expectations. 
 
 
4.1 Multi-level Governance 
Due to the lack of consensus regarding governance-theory, governance is deemed to imply to 
a broad context - ranging from the economy, social geography, to politics (Kjær 2004). 
Rhodes (1997:15) states that governance refers to “self-organizing, inter-organizational 
networks characterized by interdependence, resource exchange, rules of the game, and 
significant autonomy from the state.” These networks can be inter-state or inter-organizational 
(Kjær 2004:3). Further, Sørensen and Torfing (2005), in accordance with Rhodes’ definition 
(2000:22), defines governance as a designation for a polity, which will increase its 
fragmentation and differentiation, and therefore will transform into a diversity of public, half-
public and private participants and authorities, cooperating across borders. 
 
According to Sørensen and Torfing (2005:15), governance usually has organizations as 
members; however the borderline between those respective organizations are often dynamic 
and fluid. Governance may fluctuate depending on the actors involved and the networks’ 
objectives within their resource constraints. The aforementioned definition of governance by 
Sørensen and Torfing is exemplified in the description of the cluster approach - both in their 
formal organization and examination of its actual practice in the cases of Myanmar and Haiti. 
There are five principle characteristics of governance that can be applied to describe the 
cluster approach: 
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First, the heterogeneous networks within governance require stronger coordination 
mechanisms (Sørensen & Torfing 2005:16). This can either be on a commission or junction 
which sets the standard for participation and interaction (Strand 2007:305). Second, actors 
play influentional roles through negotiations; such negotiations are characterized by either 
open or closed power struggles, which will seldom lead to a full agreement, but instead to a 
“rough consensus” (Sørensen & Torfing 2005:16).  Third, the negotiations are taking place 
within the framework of institutionalized community, whereby regulative, normative, 
cognitive and imaginary aspects exist (ibid). The regulative aspects can be rules, roles and 
procedures. The normative aspects include norms, values and normalizing standards. 
Cognitive aspects can involve social codes and concepts, while imaginary aspects evolve 
around common identity, visions and narratives. Fourth, the institutionalized governance is 
believed to be self-regulating - the network will not be steered by a hierarchical structure or 
by the market (ibid). This degree of centralization within institutional governance is perceived 
to be a central element in all social systems, indicating that the network has a decision-making 
centre that provides stability to uphold the network amidst members’ transitions. Fifth, it is 
decisive that governance will, in the broadest meaning, contribute to guidance in public policy 
steering (Sørensen & Torfing 2005:17). This is not necessarily on implementing regulations, 
but contributing to the understanding of problems, values, visions, institutions through 
concrete suggestions for problem-solving. Networks which are not contributing to the public 
steering, is according to Sørensen and Torfing (2005:17), not to be seen as governance.   
 
The characteristic of governance theory is that the steering is horizontal; the network actors 
negotiate through contracts without a clear hierarchical division. While according to 
Røyseland and Vabo (2008), there is a form of hierarchy in traditional political institutions, 
that of horizontal governance – through mutual dependency of actors – minimizes the impact 
of political institutional instruments. In effect, this represent a shifting away from traditional 
“governing” which typically includes a form of top-down steering and control, and towards 
“new governance” which involves steering through horizontal networks (Peters 2000). The 
hierarchical structures have not necessarily disappeared, but rather shifted, in governance 
practices (Kjær 2004:108). Governance has transferred national steering to a situation where 
many actors are involved in order to reach a common public goal (Kjær 2004:109). The 
networks consist of independent actors who are often in horizontal relations with each other. 
Thereby, it is a broad understanding of a network with stable patterns of social relations 
between mutually dependent actors, evolving their efforts around a policy problems or/and 
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policy programs (Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan 1999:6). Rhodes (1996:658) argues that 
“[g]overnance as self-organizing networks is as distinct a governing structure as markets and 
hierarchies. A key challenge for government is to enable these networks and to seek out new 
forms of co-operations” (Rhodes 1996:666). Rhodes places the concept of governance on 
equal terms as network steering. Network and hierarchy can therefore co-exist, side-by-side, 
even overlapping (Kjær 2004). 
 
Multi-level governance is a model where the competences of decision-makers are fragmented 
and take upon a multilateral approach (Kjær 2004). Peters and Pierre (2005) emphasize that 
multi-level governance needs to be seen as a supplement to the traditional form of steering, 
requesting an examination of the possibility for these two to work together. Governance can 
be a useful instrument to study the interaction between the different levels of organizations, 
both horizontal and vertical. A focus on the dynamic features of actors horizontally can be 
useful in the studies of crisis, where rapid organization of multiple parties is required under 
intense time pressures. Studying multi-level governance includes the relationship between 
sub-national, national and supranational actors, without the presumption that states are the 
dominant actors (Kjær 2004:109).  
 
The aforementioned view on multi-level governance includes the relationship between the 
public and NGOs on the same level – NGO’s operate as lobbying and advocacy groups at the 
local, as well as the international level, while also operating as contractors and independent 
service organizations (Belgrad & Nachmias 1997). This is all the more relevant as the number 
and scale of operations by NGO’s working in disaster areas has continued to increase 
(Hilhorst 1993). The diversity of NGO’s involved in humanitarian activities is reflective in 
their broad range of operations – specializations in activities such as food distribution, shelter, 
water, sanitation, and medical care – from “pure humanitarian” NGOs to development 
organizations (ibid). How these NGOs are then governed obviously affects their work in the 
field (Natsios 1995). Most NGO’s are governed by boards and directors from the affected 
country, which may account for the local culture, history and mandate of the organization – 
such an approach is believed to better account for needs of the affected population (Ebrahim 
2003). 
 
There are numerous advantages of governance in humanitarian-related activities. First, is the 
ability to identify problems at an early stage and find solutions. Second, to advance political 
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decisions, since actors in the network can provide important first-hand information and data 
from the field with direct assessments. Third, to provide a frame for consensus or conflict 
management. Fourth, governance can contribute to reducing the resistance to implementation 
by creating a common responsibility for new political measures. Fifth, it can be inclusive of 
relevant and affected parties, contributing to increasing legitimacy (Sørensen & Torfing 2005 
29-30).  The main disadvantage, however, is that all the above-mentioned factors need to be 
present for governance to be well-functioning. While conflict of interest remains a challenge 
to effective governance, a good and flexible network leadership can reduce these risks 
(Sørensen & Torfing 2005:30). In order to operationalize governance theory, four operational 
variables have been selected: specialization, coordination, accountability and leadership. 
These variables will provide descriptives on how multi-level governance is operating within 
the cluster approach. 
 
 
4.2 The Dependent Variables 
  
4.2.1 Specialization 
As the organization grows in scale and scope, there will be increasing need for division of 
responsibilities based on specialization of different tasks. Depending on the specialized areas, 
the organization may be divided into departments, professions or jurisdictions. Specialization 
may form the foundation for competence and efficiency in organizations. Absent sectoral 
specializations in emergency response, operations would be characterized with chaos and 
inefficiency; additionally, it would prove more difficult to identify gaps and duplications since 
the coordination process would remain informal and unstructured. The crisis is often in a 
context where multiple actors are cooperating with various specializations on different levels 
and where accidents happen within a compressed timeline. Thus, building up a special 
competence in each field is, according to Hatch (2001), a more efficient way of utilizing 
resources. In the case of the cluster approach, the representative central actors are UN 
agencies, governmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). 
 
Horizontal specialization describes how different tasks are divided at one level with the use of 
organizational structure (Christensen et al 2004: 35). Gulick (1937) states that specialization 
can be divided into four different principles: task, process, client and place/location. The first 
principle is task, whereby the division of work will depend on the case and tasks of the issue 
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at hand. This principle of task may be of particular interest describing cluster specializations, 
as those specializations are divided based on professions such as health. The second principle 
is process, where the division of work will depend on the methods or types of process the 
organization decides upon to achieve the goal. Third is client, involving the gathering of 
specific groups of the population into one organizational unit in order to obtain a holistic 
perspective of the organization. Fourth is place/location, where the organizational structure 
mirrors the territorial divisions of society. 
 
Different forms of specialization and coordination may impact the performance of 
organizations (Christensen et al. 2004). Specializations lead to the requirement of balanced 
coordination: too much specialization may hinder effective coordination, while too much 
coordination may limit productive specializations. The two principles are partly contradictive, 
and together they form a tension (Christensen & Lægreid 2008). The relation between 
specialization and coordination may, therefore, lead to a stimulus-response reaction 
(Bouchhaert, Peters & Verhoest 2010). Thus, different types of specializations require distinct 
forms of coordination. Effective coordination and good communication are critical elements 
to evade the danger of specialized units working independently of their own interests, instead 
of towards that of macro-level common goals. Specialized competency clusters have been one 
of the key points of the cluster approach. However, the idea of a single purposed cluster, with 
non –overlapping roles and functions, narrow focus, and self-centered authority, may cause 
more fragmentation then integration, hindering effective inter-cluster coordination 
(Christensen, Fimreite & Lægreid 2013) ; such an outcome is also known as the “silo effect,” 
where entities have adopted an overly narrow approach based on individual goals, lacking 
attention on cross-cutting issues. 
 
 
4.2.2 Coordination  
Coordination has many synonyms such as cooperation, integration and collaboration (Lægreid 
et al. 2013). However, a broad definition of coordination implies the process of different units 
working together towards a common goal. Different units may here refer to persons, 
organizations or activities, such as cluster meetings discussing common plans and cluster 
activity implementation. In the humanitarian context - in accordance with the definition above 
- coordination entails a synchronization of “people or organizations working together towards 
a common objective” (James 2008:351); moreover, it entails minimizing the duplication of 
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humanitarian services - whether by filling gaps or preventing overlap - and thereby enabling a 
more coherent, effective, and efficient response (James 2008: 351-2). 
 
Coordination in the organization theory can be seen as both as a process, such as specific 
coordination practices, and coordination as a result (Boucharert, Peters & Verhoest 2010). As 
crisis may be sudden and on-set, those situations may cause challenges to coordination due to 
time pressures and required cooperation amongst units that may lack practice in cooperation 
under normal circumstances. The scale of the crisis will define the number and types of 
organizations that will eventually contribute. Kettl (2003) argues that during a crisis there will 
be particular coordinating issues, which requires “contingent coordination” (Kettl 2003). 
Problems rarely appear in a routine fashion (Kettl 2003:256). Therefore, each incident 
requires a special tailored response befetting the special needs of the affected population it 
presents (Kettl 2003:256). One response is through the organizational structure, another is to 
form an efficient learning system and using those experiences from previous crises for 
improvements in current response. 
 
There are different components in coordination; the definition implies an interaction between 
actors/organizations. A way of describing coordination in the cluster approach is to see if it is 
vertical or horizontal. Inter-organizational coordination “can be achieved by using 
hierarchical mechanisms, market incentives, contracts, network-like bargaining mechanisms 
and multi-level governance approaches” (Lægreid et al. 2013:6, Bouchaert, Peters & Verhoest 
2010). Vertical coordination is managing units on different administrative levels (Fimreite & 
Lægreid 2005) and will be based on a hierarchical structure (Christensen & Lægreid 2007); 
the goals being established in a top-down process. Here, the cluster approach may be seen as 
centralized, hierarchical and a unified system which is dominated by influential organizations 
and agencies. Horizontal coordination, on the other hand, is managing different units on the 
same level (Fimreite & Lægreid 2005); this type of coordination is founded on a governance 
structure (Christensen & Lægreid 2007). Horizontal coordination often requires a 
participatory process in order to reach a mutual understanding of the overall common goal.  
 
Both horizontal and vertical coordination can relate to multi-level governance (Fimreite & 
Lægreid 2005). Multi-level governance may create challenges for coordination, especially in 
crisis where coordination is crucial. Organizations work under high uncertainty and fast 
decision-making, where mistakes can lead to worsening of the crisis-at-hand. The 
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coordination may also vary in intensity, being tight coupled within intense coordination 
structures, or loosely coupled within less intense coordination structures (Boston & Gill 
2011). 
 
There are various mechanisms for coordination such as rules, orders and instructions. 
Mintzberg (1979) claims that there are five coordinating mechanisms which “seem to explain 
the fundamental ways in which organizations coordinate their work: mutual adjustment, direct 
supervision, standardization of work processes, standardization of work outputs, and 
standardization of worker skills. These should be considered the most basic elements of 
structure - the glue that holds organizations together” (:3). The key element of Mintzbergs 
(1979) five coordinating mechanisms is standardization. Here, standardization is applied to 
examples such as those of goals, results, skills and competence. Bouchaert, Peters and 
Verhoest (2010) refer to positive and negative coordination. In negative coordination, actors 
are only concerned with the contract that has been agreed upon. Scharpf (1994) defines 
negative coordination as minimum steering, or in other words, minimization of conflict. In 
contrast, positive coordination relates with correlations, rather than minimizing conflicts.  
Positive coordination is harder to achieve than negative coordination, as actors may have to 
give up some of their policy goals in order to attain the joint goal (Bouckhaert, Peters & 
Verhoest 2010:20). Coordination is an important element in the cluster approach. 
Coordination of the humanitarian relief organizations is crucial to optimize the float of 
resources between the organizations, increase accountability, the effects, and the 
accountability to the population (Rey 1999, More, Eng & Daniel 2003:305). Challenges 
among the organizations will mainly be the difference in organizational goals, profession, 
hierarchy, and in which level the organizations wishes to maximize the self-autonomy in the 
network (Tierney 1985). In fact, Peters (1998) refers to coordination as “the holy grail” of 
organizations, as efficient coordination of specialized units has for long been a recurring topic 
for public organizations. 
 
 
4.2.3 Leadership 
Leadership during a crisis will vary depending on the threat and type of crisis or disaster. 
Regardless, leadership during such difficulties entails proper disaster response, political 
guidance and societal management. During a crisis, the population will look upon its leaders, 
as it’s expected of these leaders to lead the population out of the crisis. Good crisis 
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management, according to Quarantelli (1988,) is that the leaders make tactical decision, which 
is particularly relevant to the insecurity of the crisis. The biggest problem of a catastrophe is 
not necessary the victims, but the organizations that face the catastrophe (Quarantelli 
1988:46). Dealing with complex issues, such as major disasters, demands multilateral 
coordination with some type of formal organization in place for networks.  
 
Provan and Kenis (2007:234-236) identifies three “ideal” forms of network governance and 
management of networks: 1) participant-governed networks, 2) lead organization and 3) 
network administrative networks. Participant networks is highly decentralized and can also be 
known as shared participant networks. In such a network, there is interaction and accessibility 
between every organization within the network; further, this network is self-governed by its 
network members. The governance can be through formal structures such as regular meetings, 
designated organizations, or it can even be informally uncoordinated efforts. The governance 
depends on the commitment and involvement of all members, of which there are typically few 
participants. The decision making process is collective and the power balance is symmetrical -  
there is a shared responsibility and accountability in the network.  
 
While participant-governed networks is highly decentralized, the lead organization network is 
more centralized.  Lead organization networks often occurs in vertical relationships, 
especially when “there is a single powerful, often large, buyer/supplier/funder and several 
weaker and smaller supplier/buyer/resource recipients firms” (Provan & Kenis 2007:235). 
However, these lead organization can also occur in horizontal multilateral networks, most 
often “when one organization has sufficient resources and legitimacy to play a lead role” 
(:235). In lead organization networks, major activities and key decisions are coordinated by a 
single participant member. The lead organization is also usually responsible in providing 
sufficient administration and facilitation of activities in order to reach the network goals. A 
potential conflict of interest in said networks is that lead organizations may have their own 
agenda to promote and can unduly influence other members. The role of the lead organization 
comes from the members themselves, but often there is an asymmetrical power balance in the 
network. The lead agency network model is also introduced by Boin, Busuioc and Groenleer 
(2013), which identifies the lead agency network model as one out of two administrative 
network models in managing trans-boundary crises. This model is often thought to “facilitate 
a decisive response to large scale disasters as it limits the numbers of actors that have a final 
say over the use of capacities” (:6).  
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The third and final governance model of Provan and Kenis (2007) is the network 
administrative organization (NAO). In this type of governance there is a separate 
administrative entity to govern, coordinate and sustain the network and its activities. The 
NAO administrative entity is external; it can be a person or an organization. The network 
members interact amongst each other and the model is perceived to be highly centralized.   
 
 
4.2.4 Accountability  
Demand for a more efficient and transparent emergency operation is necessary due to 
increasing frequency and scale of catastrophes, scarce resources, donor competitions and the 
need for accountability (Beamon & Balzic 2008). Accountability may have many synonyms, 
and it “often serves as a conceptual umbrella that covers various other distinct concepts, such 
as transparency, equity, democracy, efficiency, responsiveness, responsibility and integrity” 
(Bovens 2007:449). Managing network forms of governance encounters problems on 
clarifying the lines of accountability (Pollitt 2003:72). A dimension that is relevant to the 
research question is vertical (hierarchical) and horizontal accountability. Vertical 
accountability refers to where a person or an organization is directly to be held accountable to 
a superior person/organization for the performance of an activity. Horizontal accountability 
refers to shared authority in the network, but where one person/organization holds another 
person/organization accountable for their actions. Horizontal accountability, according to 
Boston and Gill (2011), can arise in two ways: sole or joint. “Joint working can either be 
governed by a lead organization that assumes sole accountability for the activity and its 
results, or governance and accountability can be jointly shared by the participants” (:220).  
 
Accountability in the humanitarian context is “the means through which power is used 
responsibly. It is a process of taking into account the views of, and being held accountable by, 
different stakeholders, and primarily the people affected by authority or power” (HAP 
2010:1). Additionally, the accountability is three-fold “accountability to the donor (upward 
accountability), accountability to cluster members (lateral accountability), and accountability 
to the affected population (downward accountability) (Humphries 2013). The lateral 
accountability may bear a resemblance to what Boston and Gill (2011) presents as “shared 
accountabilities” which may cause many problems in joint working arrangements and inter-
agency collaborations. There, “the lines of accountability may be unclear. The opportunities 
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for blame-shifting are increased. Sanctions for poor performance may be difficult to apply” 
(:213). Confusion of who is responsible may cause challenges, and this may lead to failure in 
understanding the nature of responsibilities, to distinguish responsibility and blame, and 
eventually locating blame and applying sanctions (Boston & Gill 2011:222).  
 
Bovens (2007:447) defines accountability as “a relationship between an actor and a forum, in 
which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum, can 
pose questions and pass judgments, and the actor may face consequences”. Accountability is 
then a person or organization rendering account to someone else, for his or hers actions. The 
questions to be asked according to this definition then is who will be held to account to 
whom, for what and how will they be held accountable, to what standards and with what 
effect (Boston & Gill 2011).   
 
Bovens (2007:454-5) presents four different questions in similarity with Boston and Gill 
(2011) which are important to answer when it comes to accountability. The first question is, to 
whom is account to be rendered? This can also relate to the expression, many eyes, to account 
for transparency to many stakeholders. In the first question, Bovens divides into different 
types of accountabilities, these are: political accountability (elected representatives, political 
parties, voters, media), legal accountability (courts), administrative accountability (auditors, 
inspectors and controllers), professional accountability (professional peers) and social 
accountability (interest groups, charities and other stakeholders). The second question is, who 
should render account? In other words, who are the actors? This can relate to the expression, 
many hands, (Thompson 1980) as there are a broad range of actors in the process. Again, 
Bovens divides this into different types of accountabilities: corporative accountability (the 
organization as actor), hierarchical accountability (one for all), collective accountability (all 
for one) and individual accountability (each for himself). “[T]he problem of many hands often 
turns the quest for responsibility into a quest for the Holy Grail” (Bovens 1998:4). The third 
question Bovens asks is, about what is account to be rendered? Here, this is the action the 
actor is responsible for - certain aspects of the actions, financial, procedural, results to name a 
few.. The fourth and last question is, why the actor feels compelled to render account? 
(Bovens 2007: 454-460). 
 
According to Bovens (2007:451) accountability is a social relation between an actor and a 
forum. The relationships usually consists of three elements or stages (Bovens 2007:451). The 
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first stage is that the “actor is obliged to inform the forum about his or her conduct, by 
providing various sorts of data about the performance of tasks, about outcomes or about 
procedures” (Bovens 2007:451). The second stage is that “there needs to be a possibility for 
the forum to interrogate the actor and to question the adequacy of the information or the 
legitimacy of the conduct (ibid). Lastly, the forum “may pass judgment on the conduct of the 
actor. It may approve of an annual account, denounce a policy, or publicly condemn the 
behavior of an official or an agency” (ibid). The possibility of sanctions is embedded as a 
constitutive element in Bovens’ (2007) definition of accountability. Sanctions or 
consequences may be formalized such as penalties, fines or disciplinary measures, but also 
based on unwritten rules (Bovens 2007:452).  
 
Further on, the cluster approach defines not only accountabilities, but also responsibilities. 
“Accountability is typically external imposed; hence, it usually involves other parties. By 
contrast, responsibility can be (and often is) internally imposed; it involves a felt obligation or 
duty – generally, but not always, to others” (Boston & Gill 2011:221). Also, responsibility 
does not imply that a person/organization is answerable for their actions, in other words “… a 
person can be responsible for something, without necessary being responsible to anyone for 
it” (Boston & Gill 2011:221).  
 
 
4.3 Theoretical Perspectives and Expectations 
In order to analyze and explain possible variations between the formal organization of the 
cluster approach and how it works in practice two theoretical perspectives have been chosen; 
instrumental and institutional perspective. These theories are not meant to be competitive 
theories, rather they are meant to give the researcher different “goggles” to view the 
organization from varying perspectives. This is in order to get a deeper insight and 
understanding of how the cluster approach is working. Since Myanmar and Haiti will be used 
as example of the dependent variables on how the cluster approach works in practice, the 
countries will not be systematically compared. The different theories will capture multiple 
observations and together they will increase the understanding, rather than if they were used 
alone (Roness 1997). The instrumental perspective will increase our understanding on the 
structural use of the cluster approach in emergency response, while the institutional 
perspective will help us understand how the contextual culture and environment shape and 
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influence how the cluster approach works in practice. These perspectives will be presented, 
followed by expectations on what is anticipated to be found in the empirical data.  
 
 
4.3.1 Instrumental Perspective  
Three elements are important in order to describe the instrumental perspective: 1) decisions 
and actions based upon consequences and results, 2) the view of the organization as a means 
in order to reach goals, and 3) as possibilities for change through rational adaption 
(Christensen et al. 2004). The instrumental perspective also includes two variations: 
hierarchical and negotiations. Goals, means and rationality are central elements in both 
variations.   
 
In the hierarchical orientation there is a unified structural-instrumental approach on 
organizations, where the organizations are used as instruments in order to reach certain goals.  
It is also the organization that promotes members’ self-interest by setting behaviors through 
establishing norms and values (Christensen et al. 2004). Power and authority are centered on 
leadership with clearly defined structures and roles in place (Christensen et al. 2004). 
Rationality of the members limits the ability of individuals actions in the organization; the 
ideal concept of rationality denoting that decisions are being made by the knowing of all 
factual information, all alternative solutions and subsequent consequences (Christensen et al. 
2004, Scott 1998). 
 
In the negotiation orientation, the organization is compiled of different units and positions, 
whereby those members or organizations have divergent goals and interests. This may lead to 
negotiations, power struggles and compromises among those actors. As those organizations 
are heterogeneous, pluralism is a central element. While negotiations may be based on setting 
goals, this is also dependent on the resources of the organization. The negotiation orientation 
may be of most interest to analyze the cluster approach. Due to the expectation on describing 
the cluster approach as a governance structure with respect to negotiations, it may also explain 
the cluster approach consisting of loose coupled units (the specialized clusters and various 
organizations) who will negotiate and compromise in order to reach their respective goals.  
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General Empirical Implications  
A general empirical implication of using the hierarchical orientation may be to expect that the 
formal cluster approach organization and how it operates in practice is tightly coupled. One 
may anticipate minimal or non-existing variations in how the structure of the cluster approach 
has been intended to be implemented and how it is actually realized in both Myanmar and 
Haiti. In social control, it is expected that the cluster leadership is in control of the cluster 
participants through the formal structures. Thus, there is an expectancy to find insignificant 
variations between Myanmar and Haiti due to the fact that the context is of less significance.  
 
From a negotiation orientation, it is probable a stronger network coupling exists between the 
formal organization and how it works in practice. One may expect few variations due to the 
participants in the networks; however, those variations depend on the relative strengths of the 
participants where the units will negotiate and compromise in order to reach their goals. The 
lead agency or the organization with the most resources are likely to be in positions of power. 
 
 
Specialization   
According to Scott (1998), rationality can be created through formalization of the 
organization. It can be expected that the cluster specializations in the formal organization of 
the cluster approach is based on rationality - according to the most likely potential needs of 
the affected population. Even though the formal organizational structure lacks input on how 
the actual behavior of the members is within an organization, it can still lead us to understand 
how the tasks are being performed (Christensen et al. 2004:41-42). From this perspective, the 
goals are set by the leaders of the organization; therefore, it can be anticipated that the cluster 
approach in practice will be organized by the rationale of the formal organizational structure, 
in order to best help those in need.  
 
In the negotiation it is anticipated that the formal organization of the cluster approach remains 
flexible from crisis-to-crisis. From this negotiation perspective, it may also be expected that 
the specialization in practice will be more fragmented and heterogenic, rather than similar to 
the formal organization. In that regard, cluster specializations will be based on the coalitions 
that take place in the cluster approach, grounded on common interests and goals. The 
specialized clusters will, therefore, be a collective of all organizations that work within a 
common interest and field topic. This is especially important to bear in mind when it comes to 
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selecting principles of specialization, as the selection decision will duly impact how the 
organization operates and impacts their outcome. 
 
Coordination  
Coordination in the hierarchical orientation is understood as the various structures, routines 
and rules within the organization, which can both open and limit decision-making in the 
organization. Thus, participation in this network will be defined by hierarchy or other formal 
rules for participations, being highly regulated. Using coordination by hierarchy, one may 
expect that coordination in the formal organization of the cluster approach will be used as an 
instrument to reach the organization’s goal as a steering mechanism.  
 
From a negotiation orientation, coordination will be dominated by conflict between the cluster 
members. It will, then be expected to find coalitions among cluster members based on goals 
and interests, thereby attempting to gain leverage through influencing other members. In order 
to handle these tensions, there may exist a dominated coalition, compromises or a sequential 
attention towards goals (Christensen et al. 2004). Therefore, in the formal cluster 
organizations, it’s probable to find decision-making forums to address such tensions or 
conflicts.   
 
Leadership 
The hierarchical orientation focus is on power, authority, and leadership through clear 
structures and roles (Christensen et al. 2004). This process of decision-making is expected in 
the formal organization of the cluster approach to be agreed upon, since decisions are based 
on the organization’s goals and by rationality. The leaders in practice are expected to make 
rational calculations where the cluster members and leaders are aware of the goals with the 
cluster approach. In cases where there are no plans, routine or rule for any given problem, it is 
expected that members will have bounded rationality to handle the unpredicted problems.  
 
The negotiation orientation focuses on compromises, coalitions and negotiations between 
members (Christensen et al. 2004). It can be expected that the process of decision making in 
the formal organization is fragmented, since self-interest, compromises, and negotiations may 
be different that the overall goals. The negotiations are, therefore, anticipated to be based on 
pluralism and heterogeneity, while decisions rely on goals and means. In practice, the relative 
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strength of the cluster lead in the network will depend on the resources of the cluster 
members; the lead agency will likely have strong influence in decision-making.  
 
Accountability 
The administrative understanding of responsibility is that it is more formalized and 
controllable, including reporting systematically on how responsibilities are being managed 
(Christensen et al. 2004:134). From a hierarchical orientation, it can be expected in the formal 
organization of the cluster approach that accountability is formalized through hierarchy 
(Bovens 2007) based on routines, rules, and administrative accountability (ibid). Political 
accountability (Bovens 2007) and the chain of principal-agent relationship might also be of 
interest; delegation of authority may be utilized as instruments to influence the organizations 
through rewards or sanctions (Christensen et al. 2004:156), Mitnick 1992). This 
accountability structure is expected to be tightly coupled to the cluster approach in practice.  
 
As clusters work jointly, it’s expected there will be a small degree of control with regard to 
the negotiating orientation. Where there is an equal in authority and responsibility, it is 
probable that the formal organization will be formalized on horizontal accountability. In a 
governance-based organizational structure, a pulverization of accountability (Boston &Gill 
2011) may be a challenge since there are many leaders that are involved at the same level, 
which makes it harder to place responsibility (Christensen et al. 2004).  There is expectation 
that the cluster approach in practice will be tightly coupled to the formal organization of the 
cluster approach.  
 
 
4.3.2 Institutional Perspective 
There are many variations under the institutionalism perspective; however, they are based on 
the same notion on the importance of norms, values and rules that makeup the actions of the 
organization (Christensen et al. 2004). The focus in this study is on the cultural approach 
rather than on the myth perspective (ibid). In the cultural approach, the concepts of informal 
norms, values and path-dependency are central (Christensen et al. 2004).  
 
In respect to the instrumental and institutional perspectives, they are distinguished by three 
main elements: 1) the logic of appropriateness in the decision making process, 2) the focus for 
the organization on the process of discovering goals, and 3) the challenge to adapt due to 
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historical inefficiency, being that the institution is non-robust and slow (Christensen et al. 
2004). Organizational actions are based on a long process of history, institutional memory and 
trust that their actions are correct (March & Olsen 2006b); those actions are, therefore, a part 
of a stable institutional frame where expected behavior and outcome are the “rules of the 
game.” The norms of previous organizations may have formed a mindset and established a set 
of expectations for cluster organization. 
 
Nevertheless, institutions do not remain static, they will eventually evolve and reflect to local 
adaption (March & Olsen 2006a). By using an institutional perspective, the researcher 
portrays the institutional structures as main components of social and political life (Krasner 
1988:67), signifying that the structures of processes have intrinsic value. As the contextual 
features of a given situation will have a significant effect on institutions, understanding the 
context will offer new angles to understand continuities and variation when doing cross-
country studies: “placing the structuring factors at the center of the analysis, an institutional 
approach allows the theorists to capture the complexity of real political situation, but not at 
the expense of theoretical clarity” (Thelen & Steinmo 1992:13).  
 
General Empirical Expectations  
A general empirical implication of using the institutional perspective is to expect that the 
formal cluster approach organization and its realization in practice is loosely coupled. This 
decoupling between the organization and practice of cluster approach in Myanmar and Haiti 
by the institutional perspective diverges due to crisis-contextualization. In order to understand 
how the cluster approach operates in different large-scale disasters, the object of explanation 
cannot be isolated. Instead, it needs to be looked upon in a holistic context, with much of its 
complexities intact. Being that the informal processes are significant, the cluster approach 
constitutes a sum of its members and their experiences, culture, and norms, all of which 
affects cluster approach operationalization. The historical contexts - especially the emergency 
relief organizational structures in the Myanmar and Haiti case studies - may then have an 
impact on the implementation of the cluster approach. “Response to emergencies and 
humanitarian aid cannot be separated from the historical, economic, ethical, social and 
political forces that shape society” (James 2008:xxii). 
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Specialization 
In the institutional perspective, the institutions will try to adapt to their existing environment;  
however, these will not automatically lead to efficiency (March & Olsen 2006a). Depending 
on the characteristics of institutions, adaptation to the local environment may evolve slowly. 
In this case, it is expected in the formal organization that cluster specializations are flexible 
and not overly restricted on the cluster implementation in practice. The members acting in the 
organization are expected to follow what is the logic of appropriateness (March & Olsen 
2006b). Compatibility testing (Brunsson & Olsen 1990) would be anticipated if new cluster 
specializations are introduced; such testing regards compatibility for organizational culture 
and identity, in addition to component risks, for relevancy amongst cluster members. In either 
case, the cluster specializations in practice are expected to vary depending on the crisis 
context.  
 
Coordination 
Cluster coordination in practice is expected to be formed by the institutional environment in 
which it operates under - namely the existing governments’ structure and their emergency 
response coordination structures. Here, trust and common identities are crucial in coordination 
from an institutional perspective; this process of coordination is also based on previous 
experiences, indicating that institutions are path-dependent. Being that members in the 
organization have different institutional backgrounds, mutual adjustment is expected to be the 
anticipated reaction (Christensen et al. 2004). The coordination in these formal organization 
are expected to be loosely coupled units with less intense coordination structures in place, 
representative more of informal-like information sharing forums (Boston & Gill 2011)  
 
Leadership 
On one perspective, the institutional leader is an “expert in the promotion and protection of 
values” (Selznick 1957:28), taking into account existing traditions and norms. On the other 
hand, high-level leaders may wield power to influentially shape the organization’s cultures 
and traditions (Selznick 1957). According to Selznick (1957:143) “responsible leadership is a 
blend of commitment, understanding and determination”. It may be expected in formal 
organization that the leadership is process driven and “infused by values” (Selznick 1957). 
The cluster approach in practice is expected to have leaders who are committed and fully 
competent in understanding the cluster approach. These leaders are also expected to represent, 
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promote and defend internal cluster interests and lead cooperation with other clusters in order 
to minimize conflicts.   
 
Accountability  
An essential element for accountability is trust in leaders; the main institutional and cultural 
responsibility within the organization rests with leaders (Christensen et al. 2004). This trust is 
built around the notion that leaders will govern in the most appropriate way, establishing and 
maintaining relationships with a broad range of constituents. Moreover, leaders are expected 
to operate with high integrity, resisting undue political pressure in decision-making and 
avoiding abuse of power or authority. The proper type of leadership should model a culture 
that promotes and supports a sense of individual responsibility in the cluster approach. In the 
formal organization of the cluster approach, it is accepted that Bovens’ (2007) social and 
professional accountability will be of subject. Multiple accountabilities (Pollitt 2003:93) may 
indeed be found in the formal cluster approach organization.  
 
In inter-agency cooperation, “the ‘soft factors’ are crucial for building trust and performance 
within the group, as well as for outside legitimacy” (Boston & Gill 2011:239). These soft 
factors include: framing, initial conditions, power, leadership, path-dependency, and 
understanding of how key roles are enacted. There is an expectation from an institutional 
perspective that these factors will be prominent mechanisms for the cluster approach in 
regards to accountability in practice. 
 
 
4.4 Summary of Chapter 4 
In this chapter, the descriptive and classifying concepts and theories have been indicated. The 
focus has been on governance and multi-level governance theory. Additionally, the analytical 
theoretical framework involving instrumental and institutional perspectives has been 
represented. As the empirical focus is on specialization, coordination, leadership and 
accountability in the cluster approach - both in the classifying and analytical theoretical 
framework - it is therefore important to present and discuss these variables within a multi-
level governance framework. The empirical data of the cluster approach will be presented in 
chapter 5 and 6. 
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5. Formal Organization of the Cluster Approach 
 
The collected elements in this chapter are data that will classify the cluster approach’s formal 
organization. This description will answer the first part of the research question regarding 
how the formal organization is arranged. Providing this foundation will help to explain how 
the cluster approach is functioning in places like Myanmar and Haiti. As mentioned in the 
introduction, the research on cluster approach as a governance structure has been lacking. 
Describing it thusly may help us understand how the cluster approach will work in practice.  
 
Once the standardized model is established, it will be easier to compare it to the possible 
variations. The variables of specialization, coordination, leadership and accountability were 
defined under the theoretical framework in chapter 4. These variables will now be presented 
as originally intended by the UN in the formal organization of the cluster approach.  
 
 
5.1 Cluster Specialization  
The cluster approach, according to the UN, is intended to substantially strengthen the 
‘collaborative response’ with a predictable response in 11 specific key sectors/areas, in the 
aftermath of a disaster (OCHA 2 2006). The main factor in strengthening the collaborative 
response is improving effectiveness and predictability in establishing specialized clusters for 
key areas in humanitarian response, such as water and sanitation, nutrition, health and 
emergency shelter (IASC 2 2005). Viewing the cluster specialization in a theoretical 
framework, the cluster specializations are organized horizontally at each level (global, 
national and local) (Christensen et al. 2004). This means that the tasks are being divided at 
one level with the use of organizational structure of the cluster approach. The aim is that the 
organizations come together and try to make sure that their programs and agendas are 
complementary and fit well together. When organizations have similar activities, the aim is to 
make sure that these activities don’t duplicate each other’s work. Adversely, when gaps are 
identified, the most likely cluster is appointed to cover it.  
 
The clusters have been divided based on basic human needs, for example food (nutrition 
cluster) and clean water (water, sanitation and hygiene or WASH cluster). They also consist 
of service provisions necessary to successfully implement programming, such as emergency 
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telecommunications and logistics. According to IASC Principal Outcome (2005) the cluster 
approach will only be implemented when there is a gap in the humanitarian response (IASC 2 
2005). Since these gaps vary from crisis to crisis, the cluster approach is intentionally flexible 
to better meet the identified needs and capacities of the affected population. It’s also intended 
to adjust to already existing coordination structures in the affected country by providing 
various types of specialization depending on the existing capacity, resources, and needs of the 
affected country.  
 
The clusters in action can be visualized by the following UN model.  
 
 
Table 5.1 
 
This model also shows the steps ahead of a disaster: prevention, mitigation and preparedness. 
However, the cluster approach is implemented only after a disaster has been declared. They 
are then deactivated when the emergency phase is over and the disaster enters a recovery and 
reconstruction phase. These steps will therefore not be discussed in this thesis. The steps of 
greater importance for the research question are disaster and response. This model also 
highlights the importance of the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and the Emergency Relief 
Coordinator (ERC) as the cluster approach initiators and coordinators of all the cluster 
specializations. The model emphasizes the central role that the HC and ERC play in managing 
information across all the specializations.  
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In total there are 11 clusters that can be implemented: logistics, nutrition, emergency shelter, 
camp management and coordination, health, protection, agriculture, emergency 
telecommunication, early recovery, education and WASH. The two service clusters, 
emergency telecommunications and logistics, differ from the other clusters in the sense that 
they only provide services to the agencies and organizations in the “peer” clusters and do not 
provide service to the affected population; neither do they act as “provider of last resort” 
(Steets et al. 2010). The concept of “provider of last resort” will be further explained in 
section 5.4. Each cluster specialization consists of a network of relevant specialized 
organizations. These organizations may be UN or non-UN, humanitarian organizations, 
global, local or international NGOs or governmental organizations which are specialized in 
the specific specialization. These may be for example The Red Cross, FAO, UNHCR, IASC 
members and the national government. It will vary how many organizations that are involved 
in the cluster specialization.  
 
 
5.2 Cluster Coordination  
The UN stresses that in a sudden onset emergency, the needs of the affected population are 
overwhelming. With infrastructure and communication often destroyed, many organizations 
want to help the affected local governmental institutions. With all these players getting 
involved, giving the right humanitarian assistance at the right time can be difficult to ensure. 
Coordination is emphasized as one of the most crucial elements in emergency response, as 
seen in the way in which it is defined by the United Nations Disaster Assessment 
Coordination (UNDAC) Handbook. Coordination may be defines as 
 
intentional actions to harmonize individual responses to maximize impact and achieve synergy 
– a situation where the overall effect is greater than the sum of the parts. There can be a little 
coordination or a lot of coordination and, for the most part, the more coordination – the better 
(UNDAC 2006:1).  
 
This definition  also gives an implication on what the UN proposes to be poor coordination, 
namely gaps and duplications in the emergency response, inappropriate assistance and 
ineffective use of resources among others (UNDAC 2006:2). The definition highlights 
working relationships and sharing of information as good coordination mechanisms. OCHA 
also has a set of what they call principles to be followed in the coordination. The coordination 
process according to OCHA needs to be: participatory, impartial, transparent and useful. In 
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the cluster approach there are many stakeholders. These stakeholders range from the 
Emergency Relief Coordinator, OCHA, IASC, Humanitarian and Regional Coordinator, 
Humanitarian Country team and more.   
 
In order to understand the complexity and the comprehensiveness of the cluster approach 
system, the main stakeholders will be briefly introduced. First, the coordination architecture in 
the cluster approach will be visualized with a model made by the UN, humanitarian response 
web page (HR 2 4.9.2013).  
 
 
Table 5.2 
 
The model represents the global and country level of the cluster approach. The 11 cluster 
specializations will be organized on local and national levels under the cluster lead agencies 
and cluster coordinator. This model does not show the inter-cluster coordination, which is 
formally led by the Humanitarian Coordinator and the Humanitarian Country Team. The 
inter-cluster coordination is managed on the same level (horizontal). The horizontal and 
vertical levels of cluster coordination, including the cluster specializations, may be seen in 
Appendix I. The organizational chart of the cluster approach at country level (made by the 
researcher) shows how the cluster specializations are connected to each other horizontally, 
and how the cluster specializations are connected vertically with the cluster leadership 
through the HC/RC.    
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5.2.1 The Emergency Relief Coordinator  
The Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) is responsible for the overall humanitarian 
assistance that is required by the UN in a disaster through his/her role as the Under Secretary 
General of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 
and chair of the IASC principals (UN Department of Public Information 2008). He/she plays a 
vital role in the decision of the activation of the cluster approach. Also, the ERC may appoint 
a Humanitarian Coordinator in a new disaster which will be further discussed in section 5.2.4. 
The ERC is the primary interface between the larger humanitarian community and the 
principle organs of the UN, such as the General Assembly and the Security Council. 
Likewise, the ERC is also the interface between the UN and non-UN humanitarian 
community members through the IASC (ibid). The ERC processes Member states’ requests 
for emergency assistance and mobilizes emergency relief capacities (ibid). They can even 
initiate the cluster approach in disasters that fit the criteria. Finally the ERC conducts pooling 
and analysis of early-warning information and joint inter-agency needs assessments to 
facilitate negotiations on access for aid delivery (ibid).   
 
 
5.2.2 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs  
OCHA acts as a secretariat headed by the ERC that provides expert advice on emergency 
response. OCHA’s role is to ensure that “there is a coherent framework within which 
everyone can contribute promptly and effectively to the overall effort” (UN Department of 
Public Information 2008:267). OCHA staff in the field supports the RC, or HC in some cases, 
in the affected country–not the individual clusters. OCHA can deploy response and 
coordination specialists hours after a devastating natural disaster. The mandate of OCHA in 
natural disasters is to mobilize, direct and coordinate the international assistance and it 
operates through a network of regional and field offices, the HC, and the Humanitarian 
Country Team (ibid). To support the HC/RC in a disaster setting, OCHA establishes an 
OCHA field or regional office. The support is mainly in four key areas: “coordination, 
information management, advocacy and resource mobilization, and policy development” 
(FAO 2010:16). OCHA provides coordination of activities in the affected country and 
undertakes consultations with member states and members of the IASC, linking the field and 
the UN headquarter while determining the priorities for action (ibid). OCHA’s dual 
headquarters are based in New York and Geneva; however, OCHA is also represented with 35 
different offices around the world. 
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 OCHA in Field 
Number of Members 300 organizations 
Open or Closed Membership Closed, by invitation only 
Mission Focus Preparedness, information management 
Degree of Autonomy Low 
Organizational Level Field (operational) 
Governance Model Consensus 
Table 5.3 from Saab et al (2008:479) 
 
Saab et al.’s research shows that in 2008 the humanitarian community consists of 300 
organizations in the field. However, reports and evaluations confirm that the number of 
international and national humanitarian organizations working in the field is increasing. It is 
also stated that this is a closed membership, meaning that the agencies wishing to work in the 
clusters consists of invited organizations only. Although, reports and interviews conflict with 
this study’s conclusion that the local humanitarian community has been invited to decision 
making and information sharing platform forums. Still, this opposing evidence is on the 
operational level. At the strategic global level, the members of the decision making forums 
regarding humanitarian affairs are selected/invited by the IASC. 
 
5.2.3 Inter-Agency Standing Committee  
On the global level the IASC is the only decision making forum that includes UN agencies, 
the World Bank, IOM, ICRC, IFRC and NGOs. The humanitarian community in the field 
usually consists of IASC members, and the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) is often 
referred to as IASC Humanitarian Country Team. In other words, “IASC includes many of the 
largest humanitarian organizations that account for the majority of humanitarian assistance 
distributed”. The UN resolution, which created the IASC, states that all members must be 
organizations that operate in disaster affected areas (A/RES/46/182). Members are divided 
between "Full Members
11
" and "Standing Invitees
12
" status. “The IASC's overall objective is 
                                                 
11
 The full members are as follow: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), United Nations Office for 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United 
Nations Population Fund (UNFP), United Nations Settlements Programme (UNHABITAT), United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), World Food 
Programme (WFP) and World Health Organization (WHO).  
12
 The Standing Invitees include the follow: International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), International 
Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
(IFRC), InterAction, International Organization for Migration (IOM), Office of the High Commissioner for 
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inclusive coordination, while maintaining a relatively limited number of "members" to ensure 
functionality and focus” (OOM IASC 2011:1). This is being done by coordinating activities, 
sharing resources and sharing best practices. Members of the IASC “use the forum to agree on 
system-wide policies to achieve a better overall response while respecting organizations’ 
individual mandates” (OOM IASC 2011:1). They also “develop humanitarian policies, agree 
on a clear division of responsibility for the various aspects of humanitarian assistance, 
identify and address gaps in response, and advocates for effective application of humanitarian 
principles” (UN Department of Public Information 2008:268). 
 
At the field level the IASC members are represented in Humanitarian Country Teams, which 
will be introduced in the next paragraph. In the field the IASC plays a key role in:  
 
[P]reventing gaps and duplications in humanitarian response, with real-time evaluations and 
feedback mechanisms to improve the quality of assistance. Important decisions made by the 
Emergency Relief Coordinator, such as the designation of Humanitarian Coordinators or the 
activation of clusters, are made in consultation with the IASC. Trust between IASC 
organizations is key to the success of the humanitarian enterprise (OOM IASC 2011:2).  
 
 
5.2.4 HC /RC and Humanitarian Country Team  
The Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) /Resident Coordinator (RC) is designated as a 
representative of the Secretary General and the ERC (IASC 6 2009). The functions and 
responsibilities of the RC and HC are different, but they are often carried out by one office or 
person. The RC/HC is appointed when a country has been affected by a disaster or a conflict 
(IASC 6 2009). The RC/HC is usually the most senior United Nations official present in the 
country. In most of the cases the RC is a representative of the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP). His/hers responsibilities are to: coordinate the humanitarian effort of all the 
UN agencies, facilitate communication and cooperation between the UN and other 
humanitarian agencies, and, coordinate the overall international humanitarian assistance. The 
RC is also representing the UN system to the high level government and other liaisons and 
facilitating inter-agency/political agreements (UNDAC 2006). The RC is therefore 
accountable to the ERC and gives the ERC the report of state.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Human Rights (OHCHR), Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR), Office of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons (SR on HR on IDPs) and World Bank.  
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It is the HC who is responsible for inter-cluster coordination and the inter-sectoral coherence. 
In short, the HC ensures that the humanitarian response efforts are well organized in 
accordance with the affected government. The national authorities are primarily responsible 
for the national coordination of humanitarian assistance, but the importance of the HC/RCs in 
assisting with this coordination are stressed by the humanitarian community (OCHA 6 
20.09.2013). “If an emergency becomes significant in size and/or complexity, the ERC, in 
consultation with the UN agencies, may appoint a UN Humanitarian Coordinator (HC)” 
(UNDAC 2006:9). The RC will be appointed as the HC if he/she has the necessary skills to do 
so as determined by the ERC. If not, there will either be a new RC appointed to serve both 
functions, or a separate HC will be appointed to serve alongside the existing RC. 
 
However, when the HC role is combined with that of the Resident Coordinator (double 
hatting), or in some instances also the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General 
(triple hatting), one individual can have up to three reporting and accountability lines, and 
hence three jobs (Graves, Wheeler & Martin 2007:2).  
 
The cluster approach can be used also in countries where there is no HC but an RC is 
coordinating the international response. The HC position will phase out as the emergency or 
disaster moderates (UNDAC 2006). The HC/RC is additionally responsible for designating 
cluster leads together with the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and the ERC.  “HCs lead 
the HCT in deciding the most appropriate coordination solutions for their country, taking into 
account the local situation. Agreement must be reached on which Clusters to establish, and 
which organizations are to lead them” (HR 2 4.9.2013). 
 
The HCT
13
 is chaired and initiated by the HC/RC, and the HCT is meant to be an efficient 
application of the cluster approach. The HCT is, according to the IASC handbook of RCs and 
HCs, an “operational decision-making forum composed of operationally relevant 
humanitarian organizations (both UN and non-UN) and focus[es] on common strategic and 
policy issues related to humanitarian action in country” (IASC 8 2010:2). Also, designated 
cluster leads are expected to represent the clusters and their organizations in the HCT. Field 
coordination has different key functions. The different status and mandates are designated 
through key representatives. At all levels in the cluster approach the cluster leads are obliged 
to interact with each other. Together the cluster members are to: “(i) gather and analyze 
                                                 
13
 The HCT differs from the UN Country Team (UNCT), the UNCT only includes UN members and focus only 
on development issues.  
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information on the situation; (ii) agree on the priority problems and risks, objectives, an 
overall response strategy, standards for assistance, and who will do what where; and (iii) 
monitor overall progress” (FAO 2010:10). At policy level the cluster lead agency country 
representatives meet together. The meetings are chaired by the HC, and they have meetings 
when needed. 
 
 
5.2.5 Cluster Coordinator 
The cluster coordinator (CC) at the country level has been designated by the cluster lead 
agency at the country level. He/she is responsible for the day to day coordination of the 
clusters, in addition to, facilitate the work. (One Response 2 20.09.2013, IASC 7 2010) The 
CC also ensures coordination with other clusters when needed and is in contact with the HCT 
regarding cluster specific issues, as stated by the following informant: 
 
OCHA should do an inter cluster mechanism regularly. That is basically to identify any gaps 
that may occur between clusters, any particular challenge or issue that is being faced by old 
clusters. To be looking at the global level strategies of the ICC would be the bulk of strategic 
planning, and off course it has to be approved at a higher level. The ICC is normally, sort of, 
cluster coordinator so that would not be the head of agencies. The cluster lead agencies would 
be working for a cluster rather more than for an agency. Normally it would be turned by the 
OCHA head of office so that if anything any comment, any strategic proposal, anything, it still 
has to go through the Humanitarian Country Team at the highest level of representation in the 
international community on the humanitarian side of the operation (Informant 2). 
 
The managing and facilitation is not of a technical function, but consists of planning and 
management out of knowledge of the country and experience from previous emergencies in 
addition to planning and monitoring inter-agency responses. The CC is expected to ensure 
that cluster agencies work more effectively together to identify gaps in the humanitarian 
response, and individually maximize the benefit of the affected population. He/she is also to 
provide leadership and facilitate cluster activities along the strategic vision. They are to 
address the priority needs and risks to make sure that the appropriate standards are 
incorporated in the humanitarian assistance. The CC is accountable to the Cluster Leading 
Agency (FAO 2010). He/she is also responsible for the inter-cluster activities and cross 
cutting issues
14
, according to the Principles of Partnership (OCHA 6 20.09.2013). The cluster 
coordinators are to meet in order to discuss at the strategic and operational inter-cluster 
coordination level. These meetings are usually led by the OCHA team leader and it is 
                                                 
14
 Cross cutting issues in the cluster approach are e.g camp coordination, early recovery and protection. 
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generally in context of regular meetings of an Inter-Cluster Coordination Group (ICCG) 
(FAO 2010:12). 
 
 
5.3 Cluster Leadership 
The cluster approach is a system under which UN agencies are designated as “lead agencies” 
for all major areas of humanitarian response, meaning in each cluster there is a lead agency to 
be responsible for the cluster activities at global, country and local level. The cluster leads are 
IASC designated humanitarian organizations and can be both UN and non-UN organizations. 
According to the Terms of Reference, the cluster leads are: 
 
accountable for ensuring preparedness and response that is both adequate and predictable. It 
will work with relevant actors and agencies with expertise and capacities in that area. – At the 
field level, the clusters provide support to the Humanitarian Coordinator who [is] able to call 
upon clusters for support as requires. –The cluster lead will not carry out all of the activities 
itself, but will be responsible for ensuring that these activities are carried out and will act as 
the provider of last resort (UNDAC 2006:13).   
 
Cluster leads at the country level have, as mentioned, been designated by the RC/HC as 
cluster leads for a particular sector following consultations with the HCT (One Response 2 
20.09.2013).  The establishment and designation should be based on an assessment of needs, 
gaps and response capacities. The affected state, local authorities, local civil society, 
international humanitarian organizations and other appropriate actors are to be included in this 
assessment. The cluster leads are to report to the HC and the HCT on issues such as the 
clusters’ functioning and their activities in addition to issues that the cluster leads cannot work 
out by themselves. A cluster lead at the country level is responsible for the day to day 
operation of the cluster such as making sure activities are carried out effectively and 
organizing meetings. In a crisis the cluster leads meet regularly at country and local level; the 
frequency of the meetings depends on the intensity of the emergency. These meetings are 
designed to “share information and provide mutual feedback among members, create cluster 
strategies and work plans, contribute to the preparation of major funding appeals, such as the 
Common Appeals Process (CAP), or organize joint activities” (Steets et al. 2010:24-25). As 
mentioned, the cluster leads are responsible for joining the national and local authorities, 
institutions, and the humanitarian actors with local capacities to establish appropriate 
coordination mechanisms, emergency preparedness, and training (One Response 2 
20.09.2013).  
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Cluster lead agencies at the country level do not necessary replicate the agency at the global 
cluster lead level. Global cluster leads are, according to the IASC principals, to be established 
in nine sectors of humanitarian activity
15
. The global cluster lead agency is accountable to the 
ERC and reports back on coordination matters and specialized clusters. In addition, the global 
cluster leads are accountable to the ERC on ensuring a system-wide preparedness and 
technical capacity for them to respond to the crises (OCHA 2 2006). For example, in the early 
recovery cluster, the global cluster leads do not encourage the country level to establish a 
cluster, but rather integrate a recovery plan in all sectors of activity. When the country level 
cluster leads do not replicate the global cluster lead the IASC has stated that it’s essential for 
the country level cluster lead to consult and maintain a good communication with the global 
cluster lead. This is to ensure that there is a commonly agreed upon global standard and 
procedure that is applied. The clusters are to address the norms, policies and standards that are 
agreed upon at the global level. The global lead is to give advice on “best practices” and 
policies to the country level; this includes operational support, general guidance and trainings. 
 
At the country level NGOs are engaged in cluster leadership and management. This includes 
co-leading, coordination, co-facilitating and co-participating in strategic advisory groups. In 
some cases, e.g where regional levels have been established, such as Myanmar, some NGOs 
may act as a cluster focal point in parts of the country where they gave a comparative 
advantage or where the cluster lead has no presence. At the country level, cluster leads ensure 
that activities of humanitarian organizations are coordinated, serve as a first point of call for 
the Government and the RC or HC, and as a provider of last resort in their respective sector 
(IASC 8 2010). 
 
 
5.4 Cluster Accountability  
Actors in the humanitarian community are to respond to people in need in affected 
communities, and they are to be accounted for both decisions and actions to those they seek to 
assist. There are many actors involved when it comes to accountability in humanitarian 
response. First and foremost, all humanitarian agencies are accountable to the affected 
populations. However, they are also accountable to governing boards, members, donors and 
                                                 
15
 Paragraph 16,  12 September Outcome statement of IASC Principals. 
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governments in the countries they are operating in (HAP 2010). Each cluster or sector of the 
emergency relief has a minimum standard; these are described in the annual updated Sphere 
Handbook (The Sphere Project 2011). The minimum standards are qualitative in nature and 
describe in detail the specific minimum levels to be attained in each sector within the 
humanitarian response and come with suggested key actions. Minimum standards are also 
based on the humanitarian charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which 
were described in the context chapter.  There is also a standard for minimum commitments for 
participation in clusters which all cluster stakeholders need to sustain. These standards are not 
conventional but they are to be adapted to the local context and needs. These minimum 
standards include: 
i. A commitment to the humanitarian principles and the principles of partnership; 
ii. Participation in efforts that specifically improve accountability to affected populations; 
iii. Participation in the work to enhance the clusters collective work and contribution; 
iv. A commitment of utilization of resources and information sharing; 
v. The will to take on leadership responsibilities when needed; and 
vi. Developing and disseminating advocacy to relevant stakeholders (The Sphere Project 
2011). 
 
One of the main differences to previous emergency relief coordination is that the cluster 
approach includes a system of global lead organizations to act as “providers of last resort” 
(IASC 5 2006). The IASC explains the concept of ‘provider of last resort’ in its Guidance 
Note from November 2006 that explains the cluster leads responsibilities and accountabilities 
as follows: 
 
Where there are critical gaps in humanitarian response, it is the responsibility of cluster leads 
to call on all relevant humanitarian partners to address these. If this fails, then depending on 
the urgency, the cluster lead as ‘provider of last resort’ may need to commit itself to filling the 
gap. If, however, funds are not forthcoming for these activities, the cluster lead cannot be 
expected to implement these activities, but should continue to work with the Humanitarian 
Coordinator and donors to mobilize the necessary resources. Likewise, where the efforts of the 
cluster lead, the Humanitarian Country Team as a whole, and the Humanitarian Coordinator as 
the leader of that team are unsuccessful in gaining access to a particular location, or where 
security constraints limit the activities of humanitarian actors, the provider of last resort will 
still be expected to continue advocacy efforts and to explain the constraints to stakeholders 
(IASC 5 2006:1). 
 
According to the IASC guidelines, accountability to affected populations includes 
transparency and information sharing to the affected population. It also includes the 
61 
 
possibility for the affected population to participate in the humanitarian response efforts, and 
allows for the affected population to take part in monitoring and evaluations by coming up 
with complaints and providing feedback. There are designs, monitoring tools and mechanisms 
for the accountability to the affected populations in the field which may be used by the 
clusters to the affected populations. The Outcome Statement of IASC Principals (September 
2005) identified that “the cluster leads have mutual obligations, and are accountable to 
humanitarian coordinators (at country level), and globally to the ERC - in his or her capacity 
as chair of the IASC” (paragraph 16, 12 September Outcome Statement of IASC Principals). 
Also it was identified that the global clusters, in consultation with the HC, are held 
accountable for the assurance that there is adequate field-based arrangements in place at the 
country level.  In addition to identifing cluster obligations, the Outcome Statement of the 
IASC Principals (2005) outlines the cluster leads accountabilities: 
 
Globally, cluster leads are accountable to the ERC for ensuring predictable capacity is 
established and maintained.  At the field level, cluster leads – in addition to normal agency 
responsibilities – are accountable to HCs for ensuring effective assessments and responses in 
their respective clusters, and for acting as providers of last resort. HCs – with the support of 
OCHA – are responsible for ensuring effectiveness of humanitarian response and are 
accountable to the ERC (OCHA 2 2006:5). 
 
The HC assisted by OCHA plays a crucial role in monitoring the overall emergency response. 
The HC is also responsible for ensuring “predictable, efficient, complementary and effective 
action by all clusters. Progress in implementing the work of individual clusters remains a 
responsibility of the cluster leads that are accountable to the Humanitarian Coordinator. The 
HCs are in turn, accountable to the ERC” (ibid).  
 
 
5.5 Summary of Chapter 5 
From the empirical data the cluster approach may be seen as a generic model which can be 
adapted to different contexts and situations depending on the needs and gaps in the affected 
population. The formal organization of the cluster approach may seem to have key features of 
multi-level governance. The cluster specializations seem to be independent self-organizing 
units which negotiate in an institutionalized community through the HCT. The cluster 
specializations may be described by Gulick’s (1937) principle of task. The specializations are 
intended to be based on specific sectors of major humanitarian response. The coordination 
architecture of the cluster approach includes numerous stakeholders (UN, non-UN, 
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governmental, non-governmental) both vertically (global, national, local) and horizontally 
(inter-cluster and HCT). The empirical data indicates that the vertical coordination is based on 
a hierarchical structure, while the horizontal coordination appear to be participatory processes. 
The specialized clusters are coordinated through cluster lead agencies, and the coordination 
intensity may seem to be tight, coupled and intense coordination structures. The steering 
seems to be accordant with Provan and Kenis (2007) “lead organizations”. The steering in the 
cluster approach is horizontal, by the system of cluster leads, along with a hierarchy. There is 
one organization that has sufficient resources and legitimacy to play a lead role. The cluster 
lead responsibility is voluntarily and in addition to the organization’s own program activity. 
 
It may also seem from empirical data on the formal organization of the cluster approach that 
the accountability are both vertically (hierarchical) (Bovens 2007) and horizontal (joint 
working) (Boston & Gill 2011). Additionally the accountability seems to be both professional 
(lateral accountability) and social (downward).  The HC plays a crucial role in monitoring and 
controlling the emergency response and cluster lead agencies in order to make sure that the 
cluster leads are following up on their responsibilities. The formal organization of the cluster 
approach has been presented in this chapter. Chapter six looks at the cluster approach in 
practice by focusing on Myanmar and Haiti. 
 
The formal organization of the cluster approach may be summed up by this model:  
 
Formal Organization of the Cluster Approach 
Specialization Coordination Leadership Accountability 
1. Eleven specific key 
sectors at each level 
(global, national, local) 
horizontally organized at 
each level based on tasks 
and professions.  
1. Tight, coupled and 
intense coordination 
structures by vertical and 
horizontal coordination 
with multiple actors (e.g 
UN, non UN, 
governmental) at each 
levels.  
 
2. Formal coordination 
structures strategic 
decision making in the 
HCT and inter-cluster 
coordination.  
1. Steering of the cluster 
network is by lead 
agencies of each 
specialized sectors. The 
HC is steering all 
emergency response. 
 
2. The cluster lead 
responsibility is 
voluntarily and  in 
addition to organization’s  
own program activity.  
 
 
1. A focus on both vertical 
(hierarchical) and 
horizontal accountability 
(peer clusters and joint 
working). 
 
2. The HC has a crucial 
monitoring and 
controlling role of the 
emergency response and 
of cluster leadership. 
Table 5.4 
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6. The Cluster Approach in Practice  
The collected data presents how the cluster approach was enrolled after natural disasters in 
Myanmar and Haiti. This chapter will answer the second portion of the research question; 
namely, how does the cluster approach work in practice. It will answer the question in three 
parts: By presenting the enrollment of cluster approach in Myanmar chapter 6.1, Haiti in 
chapter 6.2 and common findings of the cluster approach in practice in chapter 6.3.  
 
The first part will address how the cluster approach was employed in Myanmar after Cyclone 
Nargis hit. The collected data from Myanmar is mainly from the cluster approach evaluation 
phase II, Tripartite Core Group post-Nargis joint assessment and from interviews with 
relevant stakeholders in the UN.  The second part of this chapter will go through how the 
cluster approach was used in Haiti after tropical storms and hurricanes in August and 
September 2008. The collected data from Haiti is mainly from the cluster evaluation phase II, 
country reports and interview with UN desk officer for Haiti. The third and final part of this 
chapter will sum up some commonalities of the cluster approach in practice and present 
findings.  
 
 
6.1 Response to Cyclone in Myanmar 
Some of the main challenges for Myanmar after the cyclone that affected the immediate 
emergency response was the devastation of infrastructure, due to the rugged terrain which 
limited access to the worst hit areas. The worst hit areas were mostly small, inhabited islands. 
The difficulties of access made it harder to assess and identify the people in need, but also to 
deliver the necessary aid to the people in need (Kauffmann & Krüger 2010). It was first and 
foremost national NGOs that were operating in the first weeks after the disaster. These were 
monks, local organizations, local businesses, national celebrities, schools and groups of 
citizens (Kauffmann & Krüger 2010:21). They collected funds in an effort to help people in 
need. It soon became evident the amount of damage and help needed for the affected 
population exceeded the national capacity to respond to the disaster. The Myanmar 
government soon allowed international relief efforts and organizations into the affected areas.  
 
The government of Myanmar was not prepared for a disaster such as Nargis and one of the 
key informants who worked in the field for OCHA in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis in 
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Myanmar stated that “I discovered a lot of gaps in plenty key areas that would play a key role 
in terms of disaster preparedness and response to any emergency, they were efficiency 
starting from zero
16” (Informant 4). In addition the government of Myanmar restricted the 
access of humanitarian aid workers. Therefore a key collaborative mechanisms in Myanmar 
was the Tripartite Core Group (TCG)
17
 (UNIC 2 2008:4), which was essentially a 
collaborative mechanism between the Government of Myanmar, the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the UN. The TCG was formed on 31 May 2008 and as a result 
of Cyclone Nargis in order to help those affected. The TCG played a crucial role in allowing 
humanitarian aid workers, regardless of nationality in to the affected areas.  The TCG were 
essential in mapping the humanitarian needs in the affected areas, and conducted three crucial 
assessments; the Village Tract Assessment
18
, Damage and Loss Assessment
19
, these two 
would be a component in to the Post Nargis Joint Assessment. According to TCG report from 
2008, it states that  
 
[D]espite the initial hurdles during the first few days following the Cyclone created by the lack 
of collective national experience and capacity in large scale disaster relief and response and 
poor coordination mechanism between various agencies, the relief aids were able to reach the 
affected population in the most remote areas with four to five weeks under the leadership of 
the Tripartite Core Group (TCG) (Recovery Status Report 2008:2). 
 
The cluster approach evaluation phase II states “the introduction of the cluster approach had a 
vital effect on the involvement of government authorities both at national and township level. 
The cluster approach added towards building response capacities for future natural disasters. ” 
(Kauffmann & Krüger 2010:44). The report was positive to the cluster approach 
implementation and the cluster approach response of Cyclone Nargis was seen as a success 
story in the eyes off the UN, ASEAN and the Government of Myanmar. However this was to 
be countered by one of the informants, “I think the reason for this was that they agreed that it 
was a success, it was useful for all the parts involved, maybe I am wrong, but the way I see it 
is that ASEAN needed a success story, the government wanted a success story, and for the 
                                                 
16
 They did not have a warning system in place, so anything that was coming would happen without the people 
knowing. Secondly, they did not have enough resources to an emergency disaster response. There were systems 
and equipments to measure hazards, by most of them had either broken down or were too old to pick up anything 
(Informant 4).  
17
 TCG is an “ASEAN-led mechanism that seeks to cultivate the trust, confidence and understanding necessary 
to facilitate relief and recovery efforts in Myanmar” (Periodic Review 2 2008:4).   
18
 This assessment was to look at the needs for relief assistance, this was an attempt to make a standardized and 
comparable assessment across all key sectors. 
19
 This assessment was to look at longer-term recovery efforts. 
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UN it was useful with a success story. So there was an agreement that it was a success, so 
maybe it was a success” (Informant 3).  
 
 
6.1.1 Cluster Specialization  
The needs of the affected people varied between the communities and the extent of damage of 
the Cyclone. It also varied to the extent of vulnerability of members of communities. There 
was also a concern over water availability through the dry season, which would then have 
ripple effects in other sectors. “Meeting the needs of those traditionally considered most 
vulnerable in a sustainable way requires rehabilitating the communities in which they live” 
(UNIC 1 2008:2). The most severe needs after the cyclone were infrastructure, health, food 
and nutrition, education, shelter and sanitation.  
 
The Government of Myanmar was hesitant handing out visas to international aid workers. In 
addition, the Government of Myanmar was also restrictive in giving access for aid workers to 
travel in to the Delta region which was one of the region that was worst hit and this created 
difficulties in organizing and coordinating the response to the cyclone. Also due to the 
restrictions there was created a parallel coordination system in Bankok (Kauffmann & Krüger 
2010). The first agreement on letting international aid workers in to Myanmar was concluded 
on 23. May 2008. ASEAN played a lead role in fostering cooperation among the international 
organizations, the UN and the Government of Myanmar (Kauffmann & Krüger 2010:21).  
 
The cluster approach was then activated: in total 11 clusters were implemented. To support 
the field operations it was set up OCHA offices, however the head of office was set up first on 
17. June 2008. Due to visa restrictions, OCHA was a late arrival to Myanmar and OCHA had 
not been present in Myanmar prior to Cyclone Nargis. Many international stakeholders were 
moving in to the most affected areas trying to respond to the needs of the population.  In order 
to support the coordination of international response, two to three months after the emergency 
response, six additional local hub OCHA offices were set up in the worst affected townships. 
These were in Yangon, Bogale, Labutta, Pyapon, Mawlamyinegyun and Pathein (Kauffmann 
& Krüger 2010:21). Numbers presented on July 6 2008, shows that there were in all more 
than 270 international UN staff, and according to Kaufmann and Krüger (2010:21) there were 
at least as many international NGO aid workers coming in the affected areas as UN staff. To 
illustrate the complexity of the cluster system in Myanmar, at one time there were 11 clusters 
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and at least 28 technical working groups in Yangon alone. In addition there were 5-6 sub 
regions with a cluster system, however there was an unequal geographic coverage of the 
humanitarian assistance at the beginning.  The eleven clusters that were activated in Myanmar 
were: agriculture (FAO), early recovery (UNDP), education (UNICEF/Save the Children), 
emergency shelter (IFRC), ETC (WFP(UNICEF), logistics (WFP), protection (UNHCR), 
health (WHO/MERLIN), nutrition (UNICEF/GOUM), WASH (UNICEF) and food (WFP) 
(Kauffmann & Krüger 2010:24). The western part of Delta was not covered as efficiently as 
the eastern Delta. The humanitarian assistance was also first given to the urban areas, and the 
accessible areas in the Delta (Kauffmann & Krüger 2010:41). The geographical disparity was 
mainly due to infrastructure and logistical constraints. Another reason was that there were a 
variety of targeting mechanisms between the aid workers (:41). However, according to the 
cluster approach evaluation phase II it was evidenced in Myanmar that overall duplications 
were eliminated and gaps were identified due to the cluster approach. The evaluation team 
found that due to this, it resulted in more efficiency and wider coverage, but even though the 
gaps were identified, it was not necessarily the cluster approach that filled the needs.  
 
 
6.1.2 Cluster Coordination 
The Government of Myanmar was responsible of coordinating the humanitarian response and 
took the lead in coordinating national efforts. It was established an Emergency Committee 
that was chaired by the Prime Minister in order to deal with the humanitarian response. The 
humanitarian response was supported by the HC and the IASC team which rolled out and 
implemented the cluster approach in order to strengthen emergency response. On 3 May the 
Myanmar Prime Minister convened a meeting of the national Natural Disaster Preparedness 
Central Committee and they were soon tasked to implement relief to the affected population 
(Myanmar Revised Appeal 2008). The Prime Minister also opened up an office in Yangoon in 
over to coordinate the relief efforts, and had earmarked Kyat 50 billion for overall relief and 
recovery efforts. The Government of Myanmar was also initiating setting up relief camps, 
field hospitals, clearing of roads and restoring basic services  (Myanmar Revised Appeal 
2008:8).   
 
Coordination of the humanitarian response after the Cyclone involved many international 
actors occurring at various levels. The most noteworthy stakeholders were the government of 
Myanmar, the TCG and the cluster approach, which will be discussed in this section. In 
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addition to the formal structures of coordination of humanitarian response it must be 
mentioned that “local faith-based organizations that ‘go humanitarian’ when a disaster strikes 
remain largely outside of the mainstream humanitarian response including the clusters and 
coordination” (Kauffmann & Krüger 2010:42). These organizations spoke the language, knew 
the culture, so they were also the first actors to have the immediate access and bring aid when 
the international humanitarian workers did not have the access. In spite of different 
circumstances for emergency response, the cluster approach evaluation phase II concluded 
that the cluster approach improved communication.  
 
For civil society activity in Myanmar there is evidence that meetings and exchange with 
international organizations and staff both provided a secure platform and contributed to 
professionalization, although the cluster approach initially was very isolationist vis-à-vis local 
actors…for the humanitarian actors, the cluster approach worked as a platform for interacting 
with the local authorities. Thanks to clusters and the cluster leads, who played an intermediary 
role between government and NGOs, humanitarian actors were able to talk with the authorities 
not on their own but as a group, and nonetheless maintain their independence while avoiding 
bilateral confrontations (Kauffmann & Krüger 2010:44-45). 
 
Informant 3, agreeing with Kauffmann and Krüger, stated that OCHA had an important role 
in Myanmar. OCHA was a mediator between the government and the international 
organizations. On the other hand, at the initial stages on the national level, it was stated that 
the coordination between the government and international community was challenging. In 
2008 when Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar, the government was militarized and everything 
went through the military ranks as we can see from the statement from Informant 3.  
 
At the time cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar, it was complicated working with the Government of 
Myanmar. It was a militarized regime, it was hard getting in contact with them, hard to get 
feedback, hard to understand who to talk with and arrange meetings with them, ect, in between 
2008-2012 we can see clear changes (Informant 3).  
 
Informant 4 confirms that in the initial stage of cluster approach implementation it was 
challenging with the coordination between the international community and the government 
of Myanmar. The government of Myanmar showed suspicion towards the international 
organizations initially, which may explain the visa and access issues and created difficulties in 
coordinating between the government of Myanmar and the international humanitarian 
response as stated by the informant 4:  
 
In the beginning it was a lot of suspicion and a lot uncertainties, the thing is, what had been 
done in the end, was that when the international community was coming in they were very 
68 
 
skeptical about them, and as much as they ended up inviting international support they were 
still skeptical and didn’t want a lot of interference, or interference in the everyday work, but at 
the same time they needed the support to get out of the problem they had fallen in to 
(Informant 4).  
 
At the national level the clusters worked together with the national structures (Kauffmann & 
Krüger 2010:45). The authorities were invited to cluster meetings. Also, special meetings 
were set up for cluster members/leads to meet with authorities (e.g health, education were 
clusters which needed strong collaboration with local authorities). The clusters and authorities 
were also collaborating on developing policies and guidelines. At township level the local 
representatives of different departments and sectors were incorporated into the clusters. The 
focal representatives for the different clusters, were identified and invited to cluster meetings. 
The local authorities had their own coordinating mechanism, parallel to the cluster approach, 
which also conducted a Township Coordination Committee for coordinating the humanitarian 
assistance. Even though there were duplication and parallel systems, the international 
humanitarian community and the local authorities were using each other for information and 
assisted one another.  
 
The response capacity within clusters evolved over time. At the initial state of implementing 
the cluster approach, there was poor attendance by local NGOS and local staff involved in the 
cluster meetings. Another issue was that the local NGOs did not have the capacity to join all 
the meetings, often the clusters are viewed to have a high meeting frequency and this was 
viewed as a barrier for them to join in the clusters (Informant 3). Also, Kauffmann and Krüger 
found evidence that the cluster meetings initially failed at coming across as wishing to 
cooperate with locals: “[c]luster meetings were perceived as an “unfriendly and isolationist 
system” designed for English speakers and expatriate staff (Kauffmann & Krüger 2010:47). 
The national NGOs and local staff gradually became more and more involved in the clusters. 
And there are numbers of evidence that can prove increasing coordination, this could be seen 
for example in the WASH cluster in Labutta, “where UNICEF argued for water distribution 
and UNDP reacted through the Protection cluster, where issues of “displaced persons”- 
although in other wording –were increasingly taken up” (Kauffmann & Krüger 2010: 41). In 
addition it was proven that the affected people received a wide range of assistance to cover 
their basic needs after the disaster. Although, it was stated in the 2010 cluster evaluation that 
the inter-cluster coordination was weak which affected the ability to cover the diversity of the 
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needs of villagers, specifically on rebuilding proper livelihoods  (Kauffmann & Krüger 
2010:42).  
 
To sum up what the Inter-Agency Real Time Evaluation (IARTE) stated in their evaluation it 
said that the cluster system had been relatively good and effective at Yangoon/central level 
and the coordination mechanisms from the central level was also seen as relatively good. This 
is also confirmed in the cluster evaluation phase II by Kauffmann and Krüger. However, in 
similarity with Kauffmann and Krüger (2010), Turner et al. (2008) say it was also stated that 
observations by the team, document review and interviews highlighted “weaknesses in terms 
of linking clusters with their counterparts in the field, outreach to beneficiaries and inter-
cluster planning and coordination” (:6-7). These statements were also supported by the 
informants in Myanmar. The IARTE further stated that “inefficiencies were observed in the 
fragmentation of discussions and subsequent lack of coherence (livelihood and 
protection/vulnerability being two examples), changes of strategic direction linked to turnover 
of cluster leads, and over-emphasis in some of the clusters on information-sharing.” (Turner et 
al. 2008:20).  Some of the challenges with the multi-level governance of the cluster approach 
in Myanmar were that:  
 
[T]here was widespread acknowledgement amongst both national and international key 
informants of weak linkages between Yangon clusters with hubs and national actors. Many 
staff in the hubs were only partially aware of the planning processes going on at Yangon level. 
This was viewed by the IARTE team as a contributory factor in limiting information flows to 
communities. Another example of the weak linkage was a geographic prioritization on more 
populated areas leaving some of the worst affected areas underserved (Turner et al. 2008:19).  
 
One of the key issues in the inter-cluster meetings was to ensure that the 3W’s: Who is doing 
What Where was updated. This also helped to discover overlapping issues among partners 
themselves. The inter-cluster coordination meetings were mainly on “information sharing and 
did not generate common analysis” (Kauffmann & Krüger 2010:35). There were a few 
challenges in the inter-cluster meetings, one of them was that few members showed up at the 
meetings as we may see from the statement in the cluster approach evaluation phase II “One 
of the reasons limiting the level of collaboration was the small number of decision-makers in 
cluster meetings, particularly at field level” (ibid). Another might be that all the inter-cluster 
meetings were taking place in Yangoon. Combined with all the clusters that were supposed to 
meet at the sub levels, this gave a high meeting frequency. This shifted the focus to the 
process and less focus on outcomes (Informant 3). “One of the key things we did not want 
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was to actually create a cultural dependency, by just may organizations that are focusing on 
the same beneficiaries, and giving more than was necessary” (Informant 4).  
 
Another challenge for Myanmar was that the HCT was more focused on development rather 
than disaster response (Informant 3). The people working in Myanmar in the beginning with 
HCT did not have a humanitarian background. Rather, their background was on long-term 
development, which is not always the most suitable approach in an emergency response. 
Since it was very hard getting access to Myanmar, the aid workers had chosen to work “under 
the radar” and to not raise hard questions to the government, which could lead to trouble for 
the aid workers. In a crisis situation hard questions must be asked, so working in an 
environment where there was only focus on development caused challenges (Informant 3). 
Prior experience shows that in countries where they have focused on development, and 
disasters have struck, it is hard to change the way the way people are working and their mind 
set (Informant 3). In addition to the personal commitment of the leadership it was mentioned 
from one of the informants that personal conflict was a possible hindrance to coordination: 
 
something so banal as a personal conflict can also affect the coordination, such as for example 
“yesterday you did not let me sit in the car with you out in the field doing assessment, so today 
I will not come to the meeting you are organizing and another banal example is “last month 
you borrowed two mobile phones from us, you still haven’t returned these, so I will not do you 
the favor with something else” (Informant 3).   
 
To sum up cluster coordination in Myanmar, the initial stages of cluster implementation saw 
challenges in cooperation between the international community and the government of 
Myanmar. However, eventually the cooperation was improved and OCHA played a vital role 
as mediator. At Yangoon level the coordination mechanisms were seen as good, however at 
the township level there were weaknesses in linking clusters with the counterparts in the field.  
 
 
6.1.3 Cluster Leadership 
Cluster leadership varied on the different cluster levels
20
 (national, sub and township). This 
depended mainly on the capability and operability of the cluster lead organizations. Many of 
the UN organizations that are cluster leads have indicated that they would love to coordinate 
but they do not have the right amount of resources to do it in terms of money and staff. This 
                                                 
20
 See Appendix IV for a list of cluster lead agencies at national level in Myanmar.  
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has been a challenge with the cluster approach (Informant 3).  It was stated in the interviews 
that is was hard getting cluster leads at the sub national level, however this was not a problem 
at the national level, 
 
because we had about five or six different sub national areas with different cluster approach 
systems running, it would mean that WHO had to be in all these five areas, which I think 
would be a burden for them, however, it is mainly a resource issue, and secondly in them for 
those that would be requested or asked to take this particular role, the cluster leadership role 
was coming in as an addition to their normal everyday work (Informant 4).  
 
There was a presence of NGO co-leading that seemed to improve leadership and continuity of 
cluster activities. Kauffman and Krüger listed the co-leading as a success factor in Myanmar. 
An example was Save the Children co-leading the education cluster. “Co-chair arrangements 
was perceived to limit potential conflict of interest, reduce problems related to frequent 
cluster leads, the possibility of spending more time in the field” (Kauffmann & Krüger 
2010:30). The evaluation phase II states there were a good commitment and activity by the 
cluster lead agencies, and that the cluster leads understood their role, but that they did not act 
as a provider of the last resort. Not all clusters were equally committed or active. Among the 
most active were “those with dedicated coordinators, such as [h]ealth, [p]rotection and 
[n]utrition and certain clusters such as [a]griculture, where the coordinator exercised a dual 
function” (Kauffmann & Krüger 2010:30). Another aspect that complicated cluster leadership 
was that  
 
Cluster members were also critical to the functioning of the approach. Beyond the provision of 
time and resources to take part in various meetings, some organizations actually ensured the 
role of cluster coordinator in the areas of the Delta where there was no presence of the 
designated UN agency cluster lead (e.g. German Agro Action held the role of cluster 
coordinator for the agricultural cluster at township level), or by seconding staff to cluster 
coordinator functions or by co-leading some clusters (Kauffmann & Krüger 2010:28).  
 
One of the main challenges that the cluster approach evaluation indicates was that the cluster 
coordinators had short-term contracts (weeks to months), which led to a high turnover of 
cluster coordinators. One example that is mentioned in the phase II evaluation is the WASH 
cluster, which had in total five different WASH cluster coordinators. “This resulted in severe 
gaps between two assignments, led to temporary situations and replacements of dedicated 
cluster coordinators with someone who assumed other tasks in parallel” (Kauffmann & 
Krüger 2010:31).  It was also stated that the necessary technical know-how to fulfill their role 
was in most cases satisfactory according to the humanitarian actors. The evaluation 
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questioned the role of some UN agencies, such as the UNDP to lead the Early Recovery and 
UNICEF leading the WASH cluster, since they are directly implementing agencies and do not 
work through implementing partners. However one of my informants stated that “most of the 
cluster leads when they came in they did not know what a cluster is, so OCHA had to start 
give them training and take them through workshops” (Informant 4). By doing this training, 
OCHA may here seem to take an important role to secure good cluster leadership in 
Myanmar.   
 
The personal commitment of the members in the cluster system is crucial. From the 
interviews it was said that the personal commitment and leadership skills of the HC/RC in 
Myanmar was crucial for the good coordination among the TCG and the HCT and could not 
be over-emphasized.  
 
Good coordination depends on the person leading the cluster. Their personal qualities and their 
experience in the field are crucial [to whether] a cluster is lead in a positive or negative way. 
The same is true of cluster participants.  For example, we can see this with Mèdecins Sans 
Frontièrs In some cases they are very active in one cluster, but in other cases they are not 
active at all. This has little to do with the policy but more with the person implementing the 
policies (Informant 3).  
 
However, good coordination may also depend on common goals and common policies in the 
cluster activity.  
 
 
6.1.4 Cluster Accountability  
According to the IARTE, the overall performance of clusters has been relatively good.  
However, interviews done with cluster leads and cluster coordinators indicated that “very few 
had received more than an hour’s orientation on the role they were expected to play, even 
though most were performing this function for the first time” (Turner et al. 2008:20). This 
was supported in the interview with one of my informants who stated, “most of the cluster 
leads did not know what a cluster was” (Informant 4). Training from OCHA was therefore, as 
mentioned, crucial for them to operate as expected in their role as cluster leads. The IARTE 
also showed that “only one of the cluster leads interviewed seemed to be familiar with his role 
of ’provider of last resort’, and none of the cluster leads had led any kind of discussion to 
clarify roles and responsibilities either within the clusters they were leading or with their 
counterparts in the field” (Turner et al. 2008:20).  
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Among the organizations themselves it was stated that there was an increased informal 
accountability among peer clusters. “Accountability was enhanced through cluster work plans 
and action points that were agreed on during meetings which assigned responsibilities and 
activities to specific organizations” (Kauffmann & Krüger 2010:38). The follow-up and 
monitoring were not systematic, however. On the other hand, while the accountability among 
cluster themselves increased, the  
 
[c]luster members generally did not feel accountable to cluster lead agencies, just as cluster 
lead agencies, did not regard overseeing members’ activities as their role, with the exception 
of cluster members who had implementing agreements with the cluster lead (Kauffmann & 
Krüger 2010:39).  
 
According to the cluster evaluation phase II, it could not be stated that the cluster members 
felt accountable toward the HC. This might be due to the fact that the accountability 
mechanisms towards the HC were limited to cluster leads reporting to him during the inter-
cluster meetings (Kauffmann & Krüger 2010:38). Since the clusters generally did not feel 
accountable to cluster lead agencies, this may have had an impact on the accountability to the 
HC. There were several attempts and initiatives to increase the accountability to the affected 
population, such as the Accountability and Learning Working Group (ALWG), which was 
considered an informal cluster in Myanmar. The ALWG was among others to give trainings, 
efforts of monitoring accountability and translate key documents into Burmese. ALWG was 
made parallel with the clusters so that they could fill the gaps with the downward 
accountability.  
 
The evaluation team found out that the clusters did not increase the communication with the 
affected population, nor “[help] to promote participatory approaches in project assessment, 
planning or monitoring” (Kauffmann & Krüger 2010:39). There was, however, evidence 
contrary to this since most of the material used and information was in English and not 
Burmese. In addition to trainings there were also accountability committees that were set up at 
each location, including each region. These committees would look into the issues of 
accountability to the affected populations based on the reporting and feedback/complaints 
system in the field, as well as drop boxes that were placed strategically in the field (Informant 
4). Still, the IARTE shows that there were resulting gaps in these accountability mechanisms. 
“Recommendations and complaints received by clusters were usually forwarded to concerned 
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agencies, but there were no mechanisms in place for monitoring follow-up, except in cases 
where agencies of the cluster leads were directly implicated” (Turner et al. 2008:20).  
 
 
6.2 The Response to Hurricanes and Tropical Storms in Haiti 
The emergency relief operations began immediately after the tropical storms and hurricanes 
hit the country in August and September of 2008, despite the challenges of access to remote 
areas. Nine out of ten regions in Haiti were affected by the disaster, but northwestern city 
Gonaïves had been particularly hard hit. Gonaïves was covered by water and mud; in some 
areas the water level rose up to two meters.  
 
During the initial response phase During the initial response phase the humanitarian actors 
were mainly concentrating on emergency needs for water, food, sanitation and health for the 
victims of the hurricanes. (OCHA 9 2008) In the second phase of emergency response, were 
focusing on people living in temporary shelters (the majority of these being in Government or 
private schools), to either return to their home or resettling (OCHA 9 2008). According to the 
cluster evaluation phase II on Haiti, the cluster approach was introduced in a “schematic and 
top-down fashion, neglecting the local context” (Binder & Grünewald 2010:34). “The 
evaluators found instances of the cluster approach actively undermining national ownership, 
e.g when cluster meetings were held at the same time as government coordination meetings” 
(ibid). Haiti has historically been a centralized system, and the government structure can be 
seen as quite chaotic in terms of disaster response. The clusters were most active in Port-au-
Prince at the capital level, partly because of the interaction with government. As shown in the 
statement from Informant 2, the cluster approach structure was reflecting the Haitian 
government structure. 
 
In term of disaster response, it is kind of [a] loose structure, and I guess what people try to do 
is to understand more what the government part [is], and try to make it a bit more systematic 
and a little bit more consistent over time or when there is an emergency or . . . One of the 
many reasons why the system in Haiti reflected the government structure as well, was the need 
to kind of engage with the government actors at the Port-au-Prince level (Informant 2). 
 
 
 
6.2.1 Cluster Specialization  
Preparedness activities had been carried out months before the hurricane season, still “[t]he 
scale of the disaster overwhelmed the local response resources” (IFRC 2008:3). Unlike 
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Myanmar, some clusters in Haiti were already ahead of the hurricane season starting to 
prepare for the season. The cluster approach had been formally introduced in Haiti in 2006; 
however, they were not formally activated by the IASC until September 2008 (Binder & 
Grünewald 2010).  
 
[H]umanitarian aid focused on Gonaïves to the detriment of other affected areas. It was only in 
later stages of the response that vulnerabilities and needs in other areas, e.g. in Jacmeel, the 
Plateau or Port de Paiz, were being addressed. Of course, Gonaïves was the hardest-hit area 
but the clusters in Port-au-Prince should have ensured a national vision to disaster response 
(Binder & Grünewald 2010:33).  
 
The clusters were activated in the capital, Port-au-Prince and at the local field level in 
Gonaïves and in Jacmel. Gonaïves had been the hardest hit by the storms and hurricanes, and 
was the epicenter of humanitarian activity (Reliefweb 14.09.2009).  
 
A significant effort from the international community is critical to responding to the 
continuing humanitarian and key early recovery needs of the Haitian population. Even though 
the loss in human lives was less than was caused by tropical storm Jeanne in 2004, the impact 
is much more significant due to the increased ecological and socio-economic vulnerability of 
the Haitian population (Reliefweb 14.09.2009).  
 
The clusters that were activated in Haiti were: agriculture (FAO), education (UNICEF), early 
recovery (UNDP), food assistance (WFP), health (WHO/PAHO), logistics (WFP), nutrition 
(UNICEF), protection (HDCS/OHCHR), shelter and non-food items (IOM), WASH 
(UNICEF) (Binder & Grünewald 2010:20).  
 
 
6.2.2 Cluster Coordination 
As we will see in the case of Haiti following the bout of tropical storms and hurricanes which 
battered the country in August and September 2008, there was a major multi-level 
coordination challenge. As stated by Binder and Grünewald (2010), “The cluster approach in 
Haiti was not set up in a coordination vacuum” (:16). Existing parallel coordination structures 
ran parallel to the cluster approach coordination structure. This multi-level coordination 
caused major challenges in Haiti where there were coordination issues between national 
governments and international actors. In addition, the clusters were not formally related to any 
of these existing coordination mechanisms. 
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…Haiti is a country where the main coordination challenge is not necessarily a lack of 
coordination, but an abundance of parallel and sometimes dysfunctional coordination 
mechanisms (Binder & Grünewald 2010:16).  
 
For example, the government of Haiti had one coordination structure while the international 
community had another coordination structure based off of the cluster approach and the “table 
approach” which will be introduced in the next paragraph. UN agencies, UN Stabilization 
Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), international development agencies, embassies, international 
NGOs and donors are all part of the Haitian government’s coordination mechanism Groupe 
d’Appui de la Coopération Internationale (GACI). GACI’s mandate was to “coordinate 
international actors involved in disaster preparedness and response activities, mobilize funds, 
and ensure technical cooperation” (Binder & Grünewald 2010:16-17). The GACI mechanism 
ensured information sharing, multi-sectoral assessments, action plans in accordance with the 
government and write up reports of activities (ibid). It is stated in the cluster approach 
evaluations that the coordination challenge in Haiti during this time was mainly between the 
national and international actors as well as pre-existing coordination structures. 
 
MINUSTAH, the integrated mission in Haiti following hurricane Jeanne in 2004, 
strengthened the coordination system with “table de concertation”, known as the “table 
approach”. The aim of the table approach was to increase the dialogue with a forum and 
exchange information to better respond to humanitarian aid by identifying problems and 
filling gaps in the response. The aim of the table approach is very similar to that of the cluster 
approach.  However, while the table approach was implemented on the provincial and local 
level, the cluster approach was implemented on the national and local level. These two 
approaches were seen as complementary; however, the link between the approaches has not 
been spelled out. According to Binder and Grünewald,  as a result of the failure to link the 
cluster approach with the table approach, “it has undermined the longer-term legitimacy of the 
clusters, a system perceived by local authorities as entirely dominated by international actors” 
(Binder & Grünewald 2010:35). The cluster approach was activated on the local level in 
Gonaïves, Haiti.  
 
Inclusiveness and good integration with hosting government may be seen as essential for good 
coordination in the cluster approach. However, in Haiti, “the lack of inclusion of government 
and donors led to duplications and hampered greater gap filling and coverage because 
bilateral aid was often not reflected in the clusters” (Binder & Grünewald 2010:33). Though, 
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there were a few clusters that managed to have a good cooperation with the governmental 
counterparts in a productive manner, this was especially true for the health and nutrition 
clusters who cooperated with the Ministry of Health on the implementation of a national 
nutrition protocol (Binder & Grünewald 2010:34). 
 
Another challenge was that the cluster approach and the main national disaster response 
coordination mechanism, the Haitian Civil Protection Unit (DPC), were not properly linked 
“(through institutionalized common meetings on the inter-cluster level), hindering national 
and international actors from developing a common understanding of the disaster situation” 
(Binder & Grünewald 2010:35). This created difficulties in strategic planning across clusters 
and different actors in the emergency response, in addition to difficulties in creating 
ownership and ensuring connectedness between the government, clusters and their lead 
agencies (ibid).   
 
At the provincial level, heavy international activity overwhelmed local authorities that were 
often strongly affected by the disaster themselves … this behavior created unnecessary 
tensions between local authorities and international humanitarian actors (Binder & Grünewald 
2010:35).   
 
The implementation of the cluster coordination was done mainly through regular meetings at 
the capital, weekly until January 2009, and local level, daily in the beginning of the crisis. 
After the end of the crisis the local level meetings became more irregular. In addition there 
were also inter-cluster meetings at both the capital and national level (Binder & Grünewald 
2010:22). There were regular cluster meetings in both cities of Port-au-Prince and Gonaïves. 
In the capital the meetings were held on a weekly basis in the first months after the disaster. 
At the end of the disaster, January 2009, the frequency of these meetings decreased. At the 
local level the meetings were held daily at the start of the emergency. However, they were 
eventually reduced to weekly and subsequently irregularly held meetings by the end of the 
disaster.  
 
In addition to cluster meetings, there were national and local level inter-cluster meetings. At 
the local level these inter-cluster meetings were held daily. Also, as already criticized “the 
clusters were not formally related to any of the existing coordination mechanism[s]” (Binder 
& Grünewald 2010:22). It was additionally found informal-cluster coordination mechanisms. 
There were also many government, cluster and table approach coordinating forums for the 
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international humanitarian activities. Due to the number of small size agencies present in 
Haiti, the same people in these forums represented their own organization as well. It was 
stated in the evaluation phase II, Haiti, that most of these coordination forums were without 
terms of references or constituencies, and were therefore prone to create inefficiency, 
frustration and meeting fatigue (Binder & Grünewald 2010:18). Mainly there were three 
different international coordination forums: the IASC, Comitétechnique de la Communauté 
International (CT), and the Humanitarian and Development Forum. IASC, chaired by the HC, 
met monthly with international organizations, UN agencies and NGOs to discuss 
humanitarian response on the strategic level. Their role was to discuss the humanitarian 
assistance on a strategic level (Binder & Grünewald 2010:18). Second the CT, chaired by 
OCHA, was composed of focal points of international organizations, UN agencies, 
MINUSTAH and NGOs. Their role was to discuss the humanitarian assistance in Haiti on a 
technical level. Finally, the Humanitarian and Development Forum was characterized as 
information meetings which dealt mainly with humanitarian issues (Binder & Grünewald 
2010:18). As phrased best by Binder & Grünewald: 
 
[T]he results of this country study clearly show that better coordination (in terms of both 
outputs and outcomes) does not automatically lead to better humanitarian assistance (effects 
on the quality of the response and the well-being of the affected population). Rather, better 
coordination is a necessary but insufficient condition for better humanitarian services and 
improved well-being of the affected population (Binder & Grünewald 2010:41).  
 
Findings from cluster approach evaluation phase II from these events in Haiti found that the 
inter-cluster coordination in Haiti was weak. It was stated that this was due to the fact that 
instead of coordinating inter-cluster meetings, the meetings instead were inter-agency 
meetings. The participants in the meetings discussed issues and challenges specific to their 
agency instead of discussing inter-cluster issues, such as how the clusters interact with each 
other and affect each other’s work. In events where the clusters did work together--shelter and 
education clusters--this was found to be reactive in nature and inefficient due to amount of 
time spent in meetings. (Binder & Grünewald 2010:26). Information management was 
mentioned as a value added to the cluster approach compared to earlier forms of emergency 
coordination. The information sharing functioned as an incentive to participate in the cluster 
meetings according to Binder & Grünewald (2010:29). 
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6.2.3 Cluster Leadership 
The emergency response was under the leadership of the HC and the HCT. OCHA had two 
fulltime staff working for the functioning and introduction of the cluster approach in Haiti. 
The tasks of the two staff members were, “information management; setup of a coordination 
framework (purpose and constituencies of different coordination meetings; rules for activation 
and deactivation of clusters, ect.); inter-cluster coordination” (Binder & Grünewald 2010:25).  
OCHA’s presence in Gonaïves during the emergency response was especially crucial as it led 
to clear “allocation of roles and responsibilities between cluster lead agencies and OCHA” 
(Binder & Grünewald 2010:25). 
 
Findings from cluster evaluation phase II Haiti, found that overall the cluster approach had 
strengthened leadership, (Binder & Grünewald 2010) “. . . [h]owever, there remains room for 
improvements concerning possible conflicts of interests for lead agencies
21
, leadership for 
cross-cutting issues and the provider of last resort role” (Binder & Grünewald 2010:27). 
There were found a number of challenges of cluster leadership in Haiti. Pre-knowledge on the 
cluster approach was weak. This was supposed to be given from the global level, and this 
formed a high level of confusion on what the cluster approach was and how it functioned. 
This lead to an understanding of the role as a cluster lead as a facilitator and service provider 
rather than a decision maker as it initially was meant to be (Binder & Grünewald 2010:27). 
The confusion of cluster lead agencies not being distinguished from cluster activities, and 
treating cluster members only as implementers may have “blurred roles and responsibilities 
and led to conflicts of interest” (Binder & Grünewald 2010:27). This was particularly true in 
the early recovery, education and shelter cluster.  
 
Also, the concept of “provider of last resort” was not systematically implemented among the 
cluster leads. It was interpreted that the lead agencies’ “responsibility to provide resources to 
fill gaps–if the lead agencies had the means to do so” (Binder & Grünewald 2010:27-28). 
Another challenge was the unclear role of MINUSTAH, which created skepticism amongst 
the leaders in the protection cluster (ibid). Although the global clusters did support the 
national cluster leads in clarifying roles and responsibilities, especially in the activation of the 
clusters (for example in the protection and shelter clusters). The global clusters also gave 
trainings to the cluster coordinators in facilitating and organizing meetings. 
                                                 
21
 See Appendix V for a list of  the cluster lead agencies at the national level in Haiti. 
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The cluster leads were committed members of the cluster system. However, there were 
agencies who tried to either get out of carrying cluster duties or close down the cluster 
altogether, even though this was evitable at that time (Informant 2). 
 
Basically if there is going to be a cluster system, they want to be involved, they want to be in 
charge of it. Probably allot of them would like to go back to the cluster lead content but only 
lead the cluster. Basically this is sort of, if we have to do it, we would like to be in charge 
please. But you know. Not that it is being said, agencies are committed and do a very good job 
(Informant 2). 
 
One of the things that did work well was the fact that the clusters in Haiti had a number of 
strong, critical and committed members. “They contributed to the functioning of the clusters, 
particularly in those cases where leadership was weak such as in the protection and nutrition 
clusters.” (Binder & Grünewald 2010:27) OCHA established NGOs and government agencies 
to lead as co-facilitators for all the clusters in September in order to strengthen the cluster 
partnership.  
 
[C]o-facilitation proved to be unpopular among non-UN actors. Neither NGOs nor the 
government (with some exemptions) wanted to co-facilitate clusters. Reasons for this 
reluctance included Haiti’s still shaky political landscape, fear of exposure to public scrutiny 
and critique, and the NGOs’ worry of decreasing their scope for advocacy vis-à-vis the United 
Nations (Binder & Grünewald 2010:30). 
 
 
 
6.2.4 Cluster Accountability 
The cluster approach evaluation, phase II, concludes that the cluster coordinators were well 
trained in order to meet their responsibilities. This led to well informed clusters on the cluster 
approach’s purpose and functioning, well organized meetings of the clusters, clarification of 
roles and responsibilities of the clusters and cluster coordinators, and a better ability to help 
cluster lead agencies to meet their responsibilities. At the same time there was a high turnover 
of staff and lack of contextual knowledge (Binder & Grünewald 2010:24). A specific 
challenge for Haiti was the high staff turnover, especially in the health cluster. This example 
indicates that cluster information could get lost along the way of the turnover, particularly if 
the handover took place within a time of little cluster activity (Binder & Grünewald 2010:24). 
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Accountability has been one of the weakest points of the cluster approach in Haiti (Binder & 
Grünewald 2010:31). Accountability to the HC does not include organizations outside the UN 
system. In Haiti, the concept of “peer” accountability was introduced. This concept introduced 
the idea that NGOs are co-facilitators that should be accountable to “peer” clusters. However, 
this type of accountability mechanism has been lacking in Haiti. Findings from the evaluation, 
phase II, shows that there was no direct interaction between the HC and the cluster leads. This 
meant that the HC was strongly dependent on the information that was provided by OCHA in 
Haiti in order to hold the cluster leads accountable for the clusters’ actions and performance. 
It was also noted that as a consequence of OCHA’s weakness during the disaster, the HC 
lacked the necessary information to hold the cluster leads accountable. Cluster leads could not 
successfully fulfill their roles as cluster leads, which negatively affected the effect of the 
clusters (Binder & Grünewald 2010:31). There were also no promotion of participatory 
approaches to the affected population; the focus was on formal mechanisms for 
accountability. 
 
One reason for this disappointing performance could be the cluster approach’s focus on formal 
mechanisms for accountability, which are difficult to implement within a system of diverse 
and independent actors. Furthermore, formal accountability mechanisms often spawn 
hierarchical behavior that might undermine the partnerships gains achieved. At the same time, 
the absence of formal and informal accountability mechanisms in Haiti contributed to the 
difficulty of improving the quality of humanitarian response (Binder & Grünewald 2010:32).  
 
 
 
6.3 Common Findings of the Cluster Approach 
Initially, the cluster approach in 2008 was seen as something fundamentally new and very 
complicated. “In the aftermath they did see the cluster approach maybe as a bit more 
complicated [than] it really was” (Informant 3).  In addition, it was stated by one of the 
informants that the mind-set of the members inside and outside of the cluster approach was 
that the cluster approach was “rocket science” in 2008. 
 
At that time it seemed like the cluster approach was very complicated, you needed to take 
courses, and read hundreds of pages. For example, if you read the cluster approach evaluations 
they are very detailed, they give the impression that this is “rocket science”; thankfully this 
view of the cluster approach has [evolved] since 2008. However, in 2008 there was still a 
rather dogmatic approach as to how cluster coordination was intended, and according to my 
opinion too rigid (Informant 3).  
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Specialization 
Since the cluster approach was introduced in 2005, the cluster approach has been the “way of 
doing business”. This means that in every disaster the all the clusters have been enrolled. 
There are a few challenges the cluster approach face in their practice, one of which is called 
the “silo effect”. There has been a tendency to have the clusters set up in their own sector 
separate from the other clusters. This is one issue that was raised by one of my informants. 
The silo effect is especially of concern when organizing inter-cluster coordination. 
 
When you set up a system that very strongly relies on sector based mechanisms, how do you 
make sure that there is enough space for these other two dimensions? In the way it is set up 
there isn’t [enough space]. [In] my mind, it is one of the bigger failure[s] of the system that 
then really manage[s] to integrate that very well (Informant 1). 
 
 
 
Coordination 
OCHA plays a vital role in inter-cluster coordination; however, in most cases it is the 
Humanitarian Coordinator that is responsible for it. Findings from the evaluation phase II 
shows that in all six countries, including Haiti and Myanmar, the inter-cluster coordination 
was weak. Mechanisms exist in order to strengthen the inter-cluster coordination; however, 
they mainly focus on information sharing “[that does] not systematically identify 
multidisciplinary issues, duplication or gaps, nor follow up on identified issues” (Steets et 
al.2010:36). 
 
In the context of the cluster approach, OCHA’s role has been poorly defined, though it and the 
Humanitarian Coordinators are customarily responsible for inter-cluster coordination. 
Effective inter-cluster coordination is necessary to ensure that multidisciplinary issues that 
cannot be tackled by individual clusters alone are addressed appropriately and that inter-
cluster duplications and gaps are eliminated (Binder & Grünewald 2008:25). 
 
What has been noticeable in the cluster evaluation phase II is that the coordination “links 
between the cluster approach and existing coordination and response mechanisms [are] weak” 
(Steets et al 2010:11). This we also saw in the case of Haiti and Myanmar where 
governmental structures were run parallel to the cluster approach system. In the case of Haiti, 
there was a noticeable top down approach to the governmental structure. Having parallel 
coordination structures might not hinder coordination, but might also be a challenge. 
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In all country cases, humanitarian actors say one of their primary concerns s that too many 
coordination meetings take too much time and are not effective enough, especially at capital 
level (Steets et al 2010:34).  
 
The clusters, through the cluster meetings, were initially thought to be negotiating with each 
other and making important decisions, but what is seen in practice is that the meetings are 
now more of a mechanism for information sharing. 
 
[T]he backbone of the clusters is that there is somebody there who calls people to a meeting, 
and then most of the time they sit around the table and a lot [of the meeting] is about telling 
each other what people are doing--of course with the hope that this information will enable 
people to have fewer duplication and address some gaps. And off course in some cases you 
also get beyond that and you do get to discussions on critical issues in the sectors, or 
sometimes you get to . . . draft something like a cluster strategy, but that is by no means the 
rule, I think, unfortunately (Informant 1). 
 
In the synthesis report of the cluster approach evaluation phase II it was acknowledged that in 
all their country studies the humanitarian actors state their concern on coordination meetings. 
It is also supported by the informants that “too many coordination meetings takes too much 
time and are not effective enough, especially when cluster exists alongside other coordination 
meetings” (Steets et al. 2010:34). 
 
Now, can it become too much? Yes it can, if you roll out all eleven or twelve clusters at the 
country level, at the regional level, at the local level, you can go absolutely bananas, and if in 
addition you have a gender working group, an environmental working group, and an inter-
cluster meeting, ect. you can easily spend your entire week coordinating. Surely that can’t be 
the purpose either. I think coordination is a really unthankful kind of job, because most people 
will recognize that yes, it is important. Nobody actually wants to spend time doing it, and so is 
there too much coordination just because you have the cluster approach? I don’t think so. You 
look at an emergency where you have several hundred organizations . . . and it is a complex 
situation to do [coordination] in the sectors. I think already when we did the global cluster 
approach evaluation a couple of years ago, . . . you could see that, and the interesting thing this 
does is that [it] creates a platform for learning, which humanitarian assistance is otherwise 
really lacking and desperately needs. It has because it’s specialized in a sector; people can go 
into technical issues and can discuss them and agree on approaches. That’s very useful 
(Informant 1). 
 
 
Leadership 
According to the synthesis evaluation, phase II, the “leadership responsibilities have not been 
sufficiently mainstreamed in cluster lead organizations” (Steets et al. 2010:12). It 
continuously states that “many clusters are not managed effectively enough and cluster 
coordinators often have no enough time, insufficient coordination skills or are too junior” 
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(ibid). The cluster leads’ lack of sufficient knowledge about the cluster approach was also 
mentioned in the earlier case of Myanmar. The evaluation also mentioned that “[m]any 
clusters have dedicated coordinators at national, but not at sub-national level, where the main 
coordination tasks arise” (Steel et al. 2010:14). Again, this is seen in the case of Myanmar as 
well.  It was also stated that “centralized decision-making can slow the pace of response” 
(ibid), meaning that the decisions regarding the clusters are mainly done at the central level, 
which is usually synonymous with the national level. On the other hand, it was affirmed in the 
cluster approach evaluation that “[t]he involvement can be counterproductive when clusters 
are involved in allocation decisions, because it can create conflicts between cluster members, 
lead to “horse trading” in proposal selections and create conflicts of interest for cluster lead 
organizations” (Steel et al. 2010:14). “Cluster leads rarely act as real ’provider of last resort’, 
yet this role would be important [to] enable clusters to fill the gaps” (Steets et al. 2010:14). 
 
[T]here is not one single actor that provides all the leadership, but in the beginning it was 
absolutely crucial that OCHA push [this] because they needed to go to the countries and 
explain what the system was supposed to be like and who is supposed to do what. Behind that 
is, off course, the critical decisions of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, and I think that if 
you didn’t have that interagency mechanism [to make] the decisions in the first place it 
wouldn’t work at all. Because now all the cluster lead agencies realize that it is quite a lot of 
work to do that, and they have not been very involved actively in developing the idea and 
accepting it. I don’t think they would play along (Informant 1). 
 
 
Accountability 
There are vertical accountability mechanisms within the UN system that can be used if it is 
found that the responsibilities are not followed up properly by the cluster leadership within 
particular partners at the country level. If there are any casualties, these issues can be brought 
up at the emergency director level (operational directors at headquarters). However, this 
would be done at the executive director level when dealing with agencies. Finally, it can also 
be brought up at the IASC principal level, chaired by the Under Secretary-General (USG
22
) 
for OCHA. If there are any issues or challenges with the clusters, they can be brought up to 
the global cluster level. A challenge in the cluster system is that the lead agencies have signed 
up to be a cluster lead voluntarily. “They have various participation in the field, so you know, 
in practice the accountability depends on the exercise [and] personality involved, in particular 
the personality of the HC” (Informant 2). It will therefore depend on the commitment of the 
HC and the HCT to impose the authority.   
                                                 
22
 Under-Secretary General for OCHA.  
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I’ve certain seen . . . situations of very good HCs, but if they are not willing to impose the 
authority, things don’t happen and agencies are not hold accounta[ble] for things that they 
should have done according to their expectations of cluster lead agencies and what things they 
have signed up to [do].  They have signed up [for] something specific. . . .  They have to 
provide the coordination and information management capacity, they have to be provider of 
last resort, they have to support their partners, etc. There is quite a lot of details they have 
signed up for as cluster leads for which they, you know, at least can be theoretically h[e[ld 
accountable for. But in practice it depends on someone doing that (Informant 2). 
 
The responses on questions on accountability to the affected people were in general centered 
on accountability mechanisms, especially feedback and complaints mechanisms, and the 
insurance that these were followed up. However, there is a general notion that this is not 
sufficient. 
 
On accountability to affected people, the short answer is that we are really bad at it. It is 
something that OCHA is working very hard on now to roll down different ways. NGOs 
probably have a lot more than we have, and the actual mechanisms that we are doing in the 
field are more ad hoc. We do have sort of hotlines for any, like, specific complaints. But 
normally we are talking about five or six serious complaint that are exploitations of these. 
Ideally, these would also be used to issue [complaints] with actual government 
implementations, selection of beneficiaries or whatever it is (Informant 2). 
 
Being a cluster lead is voluntary and comes on top of the mandate from the host organization. 
There are minimum standards that are expected from the cluster leads, but there are no 
possible sanctions if the cluster lead does not lead up to the expectations. From the cluster 
evaluations in 2010, it was stated that: 
 
[a]n effective accountability relationship requires standards against which to assess behavior, 
information about relevant actions and the possibility to reward or sanction them. The cluster 
approach conceptualizes accountability predominantly as hierarchical accountability between 
cluster lead organizations and the Humanitarian Coordinator (Steets et al. 2010:44). 
 
Additionally, according to the synthesis of evaluation phase II, “interaction with and 
accountability to Humanitarian Coordinators remain minimal in most cases” (Steets et al. 
2010:12). 
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6.4 Summary of Chapter 6 
In this chapter the cluster approach in practice in Myanmar and Haiti have been presented. 
The relation between the formal organization of the cluster approach and how it works in 
practice in Myanmar and Haiti will be discussed in the analytical chapter.  
 
The cluster approach in practice seems to have key features of multi-level governance; there 
are both strong vertical and horizontal formations. The cluster specializations seem to strongly 
self-regulate at each level of realization. They also seem to be flexible with some of the 
clusters differing from global clusters. This may be shown by the example of the food cluster 
that was implemented in both Myanmar and Haiti. In the case of Haiti, there were some 
already existing clusters, however they were not activated until 2008. 
 
The cluster specializations are implemented by tasks and professions (Gulick 1937). The 
empirical findings indicate that the coordination were both vertical (global, national, regional 
and local) and horizontal at each level. The cluster specializations may seem to be loosely 
coupled, and the silo effect is strongly present in both cases. The inter-cluster coordination 
appears to be based on information sharing (Boston & Gill 2011). The empirical findings may 
indicate that information sharing is one coordination response tailored to befit the special 
needs of the affected population, which will be accordant with Kettl’s (2003) “contingent 
coordination”.  
 
The coordination structures differed between Myanmar and Haiti. In Myanmar the strategic 
coordination was through the TCG; in Haiti there were many parallel coordination structures 
which created challenges for the cluster coordination. In both countries it was stated that there 
were multiple coordination forums which lead to high meeting frequency.  These took time 
and resources from the organizations.   
 
The lead agency model of Provan and Kenis (2007) seemed to describe the cluster leadership 
in both Myanmar and Haiti. The cluster leadership was organized by cluster lead agencies. 
However, in Myanmar co-leadership was introduced as a success, which was not necessarily 
the case in Haiti. Accountability to the cluster lead agencies and the HC was found weak in 
Myanmar, however the informal accountability to peer clusters had increased. In Haiti there 
was a focus on hierarchical accountability rather than peer accountability.   
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The main findings of the cluster approach in practice may be summed up by this table. 
 
Cluster Approach in Practice 
 
 Specialization 
 
Coordination Leadership Accountability 
Myanmar 1. Eleven clusters 
implemented at 
national, sub (5-6 
sub regions) and 
township level 
based on tasks and 
professions.  
 
2. Strongly self-
regulated and 
autonomous clusters 
which led to the 
“silo effect”.  
 
1. Coordination 
loosely coupled 
with informal 
information sharing 
as coordination 
mechanism.   
 
2. Contingent 
coordination with 
good cooperation 
among the 
stakeholders 
through the TCG.  
 
3. High meeting 
frequency, weak 
link between 
Yangoon and 
townships.  
 
1. Cluster lead 
agencies were 
responsible for 
respective clusters.   
Recruitment was 
challenging at the 
township level due 
to lack of resources 
and time.  
 
2. Co-leadership 
Listed as a success 
factor. 
 
3. Personal 
commitment of HC 
leadership has been 
crucial for good 
leadership and 
coordination.  
1. Cluster leads lack 
of knowledge of the 
cluster approach and 
their role.  
 
2. Lack of vertical 
accountability to 
lead agency and the 
HC. 
 
 
3. Increased 
informal horizontal 
accountability 
among peer clusters.  
Haiti 1. Some already 
existing clusters that 
were formally 
activated in 2008 in 
preparation for the 
season, however, in 
total there were 
eleven clusters 
activated at national 
and local levels 
based on tasks and 
professions. 
 
2. Strongly self-
regulated and 
autonomous cluster, 
“silo effect”. 
 
 
1. Coordination 
loosely coupled 
with informal 
information sharing 
as coordination 
mechanism.   
 
2.Parallel and 
multiple structures 
where the cluster 
approach was not 
formally taking part 
to the existing 
structures.  
 
3. High meeting 
frequency and 
multiple 
coordination 
forums.  
 
 
1. Cluster lead 
functioned as 
facilitator and 
service providers, 
rather than decision 
makers. 
 
2. Confusion of 
roles and 
responsibilities with 
already existing 
structures. 
 
3. Strong, critical 
and committed 
cluster members. 
 
1. Focus was 
strongly on formal 
hierarchical 
accountability 
mechanisms rather 
than horizontal 
accountability 
mechanisms. 
 
2. Although 
focusing on formal 
accountability, there 
was an absence of 
formal and informal 
accountability 
mechanism. 
 
3. HC lacked 
necessary  
information in order 
to hold the cluster 
leads accountable. 
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7.  Analysis  
In this chapter the main empirical findings will be summarized, interpreted, and possible 
variations will be explained according to the theoretical framework presented in chapter 4. 
The interpretation of the cluster approach will be discussed in the view of the instrumental 
and institutional perspectives. This chapter consists of mainly three parts. The first section 
will summarize and discuss the main findings in the formal organization of the cluster 
approach and how it is practiced. The second part of this chapter will discuss the cluster 
approach in the instrumental and institutional perspective. The last part will discuss the 
impact of using the instrumental and institutional perspectives.  
 
 
7.1 Summary of the Main Findings of the Cluster Approach in Formal and in Practice 
In the following, the findings from the empirical data presented in chapter 5 and 6 will be 
emphasized. In comparing the formal organization of the cluster approach and how the cluster 
approach was applied in the aftermath of the mentioned disasters of 2008, we found that there 
are variations between how the cluster approach is intended to work and how it is practiced. 
There are especially four findings that are interesting in order to describe and understand the 
formal and practical cluster organization. In the following these main findings will also be 
discussed from a theoretical perspective.  
 
First, it was found that the cluster approach may be described as multi-level governance 
structure both in terms of the formal organization and how it is applied in practice. Sørensen 
and Torfing’s (2005) definition on governance is also in accordance with the cluster approach 
organization. As shown in chapter 5 and 6, the cluster approach consist of a) horizontal 
couplings of mutual dependent, autonomous clusters, b) strongly self regulated clusters with a 
cluster lead that facilitates and coordinate activities, c) the cluster leads are set by the Inter-
Agency Standing Committee (IASC) community, which can be seen as the political authority 
and d) together with the local authority the IASC are contributing to how the emergency relief 
operations are going to be lead and coordinated. The empirical findings from chapter 6 show 
that the cluster members are emphasizing the personal commitment of the Humanitarian 
Coordinator (HC) and the cluster leads in the cluster leadership. The personal qualities that 
are pointed out are felt obligation (Boston & Gill 2011) and commitment, their capacities and 
field experiences. It may therefore be useful to add an additional element to Sørensen and 
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Torfing’s definition on governance -personal commitment- in order to define governance 
structure in the cluster approach, as we will further explore in the institutional perspective on 
leadership.  
 
The management of the cluster approach both in formal and how it is practiced can best be 
described by using the lead agency model (Provan & Kenis 2007). The empirical data from 
both chapter 5 and 6 indicate that the cluster lead responsibility is voluntarily for all key 
sectors at each level, the cluster responsibility is additionally to their original mandate from 
their organization and program implementation. The cluster leads are organizations which 
have sufficient resources and legitimacy to play the role, and can be both UN and non-UN 
professionals. The activities in the cluster are being administered, coordinated and facilitated 
by the cluster lead and the clusters are represented by the cluster lead in the inter-cluster 
meetings and in the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) meetings. The cluster leads may be 
seen as a mean for both the clusters by stating the clusters interest and goals, and to the HC by 
implementing common interests and goals of the cluster approach in to the clusters.  
 
As seen in the formal organization, the cluster approach anticipates numerous stakeholders 
both vertically and horizontally, the cluster approach may therefore be seen as a structure to 
handle tensions and opposite interests of these stakeholders at all levels. Vertically the levels 
range from global, regional (in specific circumstances), national and local, at each level the 
cluster specializations are organized horizontally. These cluster organizations are operating 
with each other and are influenced and affected by each other in the clusters. The empirical 
findings from chapter 6 show that the structure of the cluster approach consists of hundreds of 
independent but mutual dependent NGO/INGO and UN agencies and organizations. Each 
organization involved vary in size, services, the way of organizing (hierarchical or non-
hierarchical) and vary in degrees of accountabilities. Challenges can be that each organization 
has different goals, professions and hierarchy. In practice as shown in chapter 6, the multiple 
meetings at different levels take too much time and resources from the small organizations 
(Christensen, Fimreite & Lægreid 2013, Pollitt 2003). On the basis of these findings, the loose 
couplings of the organizations combining both hierarchical and horizontal organizational 
structure, may strengthen the argument on describing the cluster approach as a multi-level 
governance structure.   
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Second, realizations of the cluster approach in Haiti and Myanmar may pose questions 
regarding whether the cluster approach leads to a fragmentation rather than the intended 
integration. The cluster specializations are intended according to the formal organization to be 
flexible when practiced depending on the needs of the specific disaster situation. Additionally 
the cluster specializations are intended to be operational autonomous and self-regulated. The 
cluster specialization in the formal organization may be described by using Gulick’s (1937) 
principle of task. The specialization should be done in order to utilize resources where there 
are gaps in the emergency response, for example in Myanmar and Haiti there was a gap in 
food distribution
23
, the solution both in Haiti and Myanmar was to introduce a new food 
cluster. This may explain why the cluster approach structure of specialized clusters might 
differ in each disaster, depending on the needs of the affected country and population. Given 
that, it can be proposed that the implementation of clusters in the intended formal organization 
is flexible, since their flexible in which cluster specialization to implement according to the 
crisis context.  
 
However, the strong principle of task/sector may cause some challenges of coordination since 
the specialized sectors are focused on self-interest and activities within the sectors rather than 
the larger goal of the organization (Fimreite & Lægreid 2005). Findings from Myanmar and 
Haiti show that that the clusters are very strong on self-regulations. These elements may give 
possible consequences. First, having strongly operational and self-regulated cluster 
specializations may increase the possibility of the “silo effect” (Christensen, Fimreite & 
Lægreid 2013), which is shown in both the cases of Myanmar and Haiti. Second, the silo 
effect may cause more fragmentation then integration (ibid) and be a hinder for inter-cluster 
coordination (Fimreite & Lægreid 2005). The cluster approach is intended to integrate the 
different humanitarian sectors together, thus in the cases of Haiti and Myanmar it was found 
that the inter-cluster coordination was rather weak, especially in Myanmar where the silo-
effect was strongly present. This can be explained by Christensen and Lægreid (2008) who 
claims that too much specialization may hinder coordination.  
 
Third, the empirical findings indicate that the Humanitarian Country Teams (HCT) and inter-
cluster coordination meetings are meetings regarding informal information sharing rather than 
intended strategic decision making. According to the formal presentation of the cluster 
                                                 
23
 Food is not a part of the original global clusters. 
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approach, the cluster leads together with the affected Government, the members in the HCT 
and the HC/RC should make strategic decisions on emergency response. The empirical 
findings show that in both cases of Haiti and Myanmar these meetings were focused on 
updating on what they call the 3Ws (Who does What, Where) in order to discover gaps and 
avoiding duplications in the emergency response. Information sharing is seen as a crucial 
coordination mechanism in emergency response. The information sharing updates all the 
organizations on who is doing what. The empirical findings may indicate that information 
sharing is one coordination response tailored to befit the special needs of the affected 
population, which will be accordant with Kettl’s (2003) “contingent coordination”. The 
findings also show that the coordination structures in practice are functioning as loosely 
coupled information units, rather than tight and intense coordination of the inter-governmental 
work (Boston & Gill 2011). Horizontal coordination like this often requires a participatory 
process in order to reach a mutual understanding of the overall common goal (Fimreite & 
Lægreid 2005), and this may explain why the emphasis on the HCT meetings have been 
information sharing. Mutual adjustments, agreements in an informal meeting (Mintzberg 
1979) among the cluster members may therefore be an adequate description of the 
standardization of coordination in the cluster approach. The loosely coupled units may also 
indicate the need for negative coordination (Scharpf 1994), as to minimize conflict among the 
cluster members.  
 
Horizontal coordination requires both time and resources (Christensen, Fimreite & Lægreid 
2013). The empirical findings from the cases of Myanmar and Haiti show that there is a high 
level of meeting frequency, and not just from the cluster approach structure. The cluster 
approach meetings are not the only coordinating forum. The representatives of the 
organizations in the clusters also attend other governmental or regional coordination forums, 
in addition to the cluster approach meetings. This is especially evident in the case of Haiti, 
where there were parallel coordination structures. The cluster approach will then be an 
additional forum for coordination along with national and regional structures. The same 
organizations go to multiple meetings discussing many of the same issues, in small 
organizations the same person attends all the meetings. These findings might indicate that 
multi-level governance coordination may hinder efficient emergency response. For example, 
in Haiti the members went to parallel coordination forums, which increase the chance of 
duplication of work. Even though the HCT meetings are being used as information sharing 
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arenas and not strategic decision making arenas, it’s evident from the empirical data that the 
national organizations are increasingly being given the chance to participate.  
 
Fourth, accountability in the cluster organization in practice may be described as the problem 
of “many hands” (Bovens 2007, Thompson 1980) rather than the intention on clarifying 
hierarchical lines of accountability. The empirical findings from Myanmar and Haiti point out 
the challenge regarding felt obligation and accountability for the cluster leads. Additionally, 
there are no minimum criteria for coordination in the formal organization of the cluster 
approach. This may possibly cause a challenge for the cluster coordination in practice since 
the coordination activity is up to the cluster leadership to decide. The accountabilities in the 
cluster approach may be characterized by both professional (vertical/hierarchical and lateral) 
and social (downward) accountability (Bovens 2007, Humphries 2013), these types of 
accountability mechanisms may possibly increase the felt obligation (Boston & Gill 2011) of 
the cluster members and the cluster leads. In the hierarchical accountability (Bovens 2007) the 
cluster leads will be supervised by the HC, host organization, global clusters and IASC 
community. Laterally they will be supervised by peer clusters. The affected population will 
hold the clusters accountable, which may also have the characteristics of shared accountability 
(Boston & Gill 2011). A poor end result will have a negative effect on the cluster approach as 
well as the UN and underlying organizations.  
 
In practice, since the cluster lead is assigned voluntarily the cluster approach risks to have a 
lead agency that may be in a conflict between loyalty to own program implementation and 
cluster activities. Bovens’ (2007) and Thompson’s (1980) problem of many hands are here of 
interest in order to describe and understand the accountability in the cluster approach. The 
lines of accountability are unclear in the formal organization, this is by Pollitt (2003) a well-
known problem for managing network forms of governance. This may cause challenges in 
both coordination and leadership, if the leadership of the clusters do not follow the 
responsibilities, which may have an impact on the peer clusters and the overall emergency 
response. The responsibility of the cluster approach’s activities and results are jointly shared 
(Boston & Gill 2011) by the cluster participants. In downward accountability there were 
found formal mechanisms such as accountability committees in Myanmar and complaints 
mechanisms in the field both in Haiti and Myanmar.  
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According to Bovens (2007) accountability is a relation between actor and forum. This 
relation consists of three elements, information, interrogation and the possibility of sanctions. 
In the cluster approach the information goes to the HC in order to monitor and control, this 
means that the cluster lead person/organization that is held accountable are being reported 
upwards in the UN organization. The UN has no formal sanctions in circumstances where the 
responsibility of the person/ organizations has not been followed up. It can therefore be 
questioned if the cluster approach has more responsibilities than accountabilities, since the 
responsibilities involves a felt obligation or duty, and that the person/organization is not 
necessary answerable for their actions. 
 
As a preliminary conclusion, the cluster approach can be described and defined as a multi-
level governance structure. The cluster approach may also be described using Sørensen and 
Torfing’s (2005) definition on governance by adding an additional element; personal 
commitment. The steering of network governance may be in accordance with the lead agency 
model by Provan and Kenis (2007). As can be shown in the empirical findings there are 
variations in the intended formal organization of the cluster approach and the organization in 
practice in Myanmar and Haiti. The cluster approach intended integrated cluster 
specializations, however in practice the organization has been characterized by the silo effect. 
Additionally, the intended use of the HCT coordination forums as strategic meetings were 
rather practiced as information sharing meetings.  Furthermore, the cluster accountability is 
intended to be strengthened through the cluster specializations integration and clear 
hierarchical line of accountability. However, the responsibilities have the characteristics of 
being shared and may be described with Thompson’s (1980) problem of “many hands”. In 
joint-working and inter-agency cooperation the possibilities of pulverization of 
accountabilities are present (Boston & Gill 2011), which is confirmed in the findings. The 
challenges are that the accountability is shared by all cluster members, and does not belong to 
one specific actor. This may show the specific complexity of responsibility relations in multi-
level governance of emergency response in the aftermath of a crisis.  The main variation 
between Haiti and Myanmar are that in Myanmar there was a clear coordination structure 
through the TCG, which coupled the Myanmar Government, the humanitarian community and 
ASEAN. In Haiti, on the other hand the cluster approach operated parallel of the Haitian 
Government. Cooperation with host governments may impact on setting common goals, clear 
leadership, and map responsibilities, and may explain some of the variations on the cluster 
implementations.  
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In this thesis specialization, coordination, leadership and accountability are independently 
studied in the cluster approach in the aftermath of natural disaster in Myanmar and Haiti. 
These elements are crucial in order for the cluster approach to be realized successfully, 
however all these variables are connected to each other, and are dependent on each other for 
success. Strongly independent and self-regulated clusters may hinder coordination (Fimreite 
& Lægreid 2005). Coordination is one of the main elements of the cluster approach. Being a 
governance and multi-level governance structure may pose specific challenges both in 
specialization and leadership. Strong horizontal structures also affect accountability 
mechanisms by a pulverization of accountability. This study has shown that accountability 
was one of the weak points of the cluster approach, the lack of minimum coordination criteria, 
along with the lack of knowledge and the view of the cluster approach as rocket science may 
all combined contribute to the weak point of accountability.  
 
 
7.2 Main Findings and Theoretical Reflections  
Two theoretical perspectives are used in this thesis in order to try to explain the variations that 
have been found in the empirical data, namely: instrumental and institutional perspective. The 
perspectives were introduced in chapter 4, along with expectations on empirical findings on 
each variable specialization, coordination, leadership and accountabilities. These perspectives 
are used complementary in order to understand and explain the cluster approach from 
different angles. Using different perspectives allow observation of different parts and different 
angles of how the cluster approach is operating.  
 
 
7.2.1 The Instrumental Perspective  
Three elements are important in order to explain behavior of the organization in the 
instrumental perspective, these are: 1) decisions and actions are based on consequences and 
results, 2) the organization is a mean in order to reach the goals of the organization, 3) change 
is possible through rational adaption (Christensen et al. 2004). The instrumental perspective 
includes two variations; the hierarchical and negotiations. In both orientations we view the 
cluster approach members as rational actors that use the cluster approach as an instrument to 
reach its goal. The dependent variables, specialization, coordination, leadership and 
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accountability will be discussed based on the expectations presented in the theoretical 
framework up to the empirical data that was presented in chapter 5 and 6. 
 
Specialization  
From the hierarchical orientation it was expected that the cluster specializations in the formal 
organization were based on rationality according to the most likely potential needs of the 
affected population. It was expected that the cluster approach when practiced would be 
organized by the rationale of the cluster approach formal organizational structure in order to 
best help the people in need. On the other hand, in the negotiation orientation it was 
anticipated that the formal organization of the cluster approach to be flexible from crisis to 
crisis. According to this view the specialization in practice would then be more fragmented 
and heterogenic rather than similar to the formal organization.  
 
In the formal organization of the cluster approach the expectations of negotiation orientation 
matches the empirical findings. The cluster specialization is flexible according to the intended 
formal organization structure, however, the 11 cluster specializations also have characteristics 
of the hierarchical orientation, they are decided upon as the rationale of possible needs in the 
affected population.  
 
The expectation from the negotiation orientation may be confirmed in how the cluster 
approach works in practice in both Myanmar and Haiti. These findings indicate that the 
cluster specialization is flexible relating to the intended formal organization structure. In 
practice not every cluster was replicated from the global clusters’ formal structure. In 
Myanmar 11 clusters were activated and implemented. For example the camp coordination 
and camp management (CCCM) cluster was not activated and there was an additional cluster, 
namely food cluster, which is not represented at the global level. From this perspective, in 
Myanmar, the clusters were activated and implemented based on needs and gaps in 
emergency response. Also in Haiti, the cluster specialization was not a replication of clusters 
at the global level. In Haiti, the emergency telecommunication and CCCM clusters were not 
activated, however the food aid
24
 cluster was an additional cluster implemented in Haiti.  
 
 
 
                                                 
24
 In Myanmar it was called food cluster, in Haiti it was called food aid cluster.  
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Coordination  
From the hierarchical orientation it was expected that the coordination of the formal cluster 
approach organization was coordination by hierarchy and that coordination will be used as an 
instrument to reach the organization’s goals and as a steering mechanism. It was also expected 
that this would be tightly coupled with the cluster approach in practice. In the negotiation 
orientation it was expected that the coordination would be dominated by conflict between the 
cluster members. Therefore in the formal cluster organization it was expected to find decision 
making forums in order to handle these tensions through the HCT. This was also expected to 
be found in the cluster approach in practice.  
 
The empirical findings indicate that the negotiation orientation may explain more how the 
cluster approach works in the formal organization. Thus, the cluster coordination architecture 
may indicate that there is a coordination hierarchy in the formal cluster approach 
organization. However, it put a lot of emphasis in the formal organization of the HCT as a 
decision making-forum in order to bring the cluster lead agencies together along with the 
hosting government, the HC and the cluster coordinators. The strategic decisions on the 
national level are intended being made in the coordination meetings between the humanitarian 
community and the affected government who will set the overall short term and long term 
goals, vision and leadership. This will affect how the cluster approach operates since these 
meetings will set the goals for what the needs are and what needs to be covered by the 
humanitarian community. Also, as previously mentioned, the HCT is supposed to work as a 
strategic forum for the cluster approach. In the guidelines for the cluster approach it states that 
the goals depend on the needs in the affected population, these goals will therefore be up to 
the leadership to decide upon in the field. This indicates a trust in the leaders as rational actors 
who decide the goals, supports view of the instrumental perspective on cluster coordination 
and leadership. These findings might indicate that the cluster approach structure is dealing 
with possible tensions from the different stakeholders in the cluster approach structure.  
 
The empirical findings regarding how the cluster approach worked in Myanmar and Haiti are 
contrasting. In Myanmar one may explain the empirical findings with a mix between the 
hierarchical and negotiation orientation. On the other hand, in Haiti the negotiation orientation 
might explain the complexity of the cluster approach implementation. The expectations on the 
emphasis on decision making forums are inconsistent with the theoretical expectation.  In 
Myanmar, it was rather the regional coordination platform TCG that was important for 
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decision making rather than the HCT. The decision making forum being at top level, may 
indicate coordination by hierarchy, the TCG was established in order for the cluster approach 
(through the HC), the Government of Myanmar and the ASEAN to make strategic decisions 
from the top level, pointing out directions for the humanitarian emergency response to the 
Cyclone Nargis. They were discussing both short term and long term development goals and 
resilience. This resulted in that both Government of Myanmar and the cluster approach had 
agreed upon common grounds and goals of how the emergency response was going to be 
coordinated. These findings may therefore from this point of view be in accordance with the 
negotiation orientation. The clusters in Myanmar did meet regularly on inter-cluster meetings 
and HCT meetings discussing and updating information which is important for coordination. 
A plausible explanation for the weaker horizontal coordination may be explained by the fact 
that the cluster approach having strong, self-regulated, specialized sectors. Having strong 
specialized sectors as mentioned may give special challenges for coordination (Christensen 
and Lægreid 2008).  
 
However, in the case of Haiti, the empirical findings may be consistent with the expectations 
on the negotiation orientation.  In Haiti, several parallel coordination systems existed 
simultaneously. For example, the government and the international humanitarian community 
may be looked as two parallel worlds of coordination, and the study shows that these two 
communities did not communicate well with each other. In Haiti the clusters of humanitarian 
aid were not included in the already existing governmental coordination structures, and this in 
turn left the clusters outside governmental coordination. As a consequence, such duplications 
of coordination structures may counteract the workings of the cluster approach. To make it 
even more complex, MINUSTAH which was present ahead of the cluster implementation had 
previously introduced another coordination initiative “table approach” which had the exact 
same goals and coordination structures as the cluster approach. The cluster approach had to 
operate along with the table approach. This double coordination structure led to several 
coordination challenges: first, it was stated that the coordination was too labor intensive 
(Christensen, Fimreite & Lægreid 2013) one example was that there were too many 
coordination meetings the same NGO had to go to multiple coordination meetings due to the 
parallel coordination structures. Second, the lack of a common strategic goals from the top 
management, made the coordination even more complex as would be expected in the light of 
negotiation orientation. The different stakeholders had different interests and goals. Also, this 
may explain the confusion of coordinating roles both with the government and the table 
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approach. As a plausible consequence negative coordination (Scharpf 1994) may be needed in 
order to minimize conflict in the strongly individual clusters. 
 
From the negotiation orientation a positive aspect with opening up the cluster approach is that 
is opens up for a more broad decision making forums (Christensen et al. 2004), which allows 
the humanitarian organizations to express their opinions, share information, negotiate, 
participate in network activities and influence the cluster approach coordination. The 
challenge may be combining all the structures together with the cluster approach. There are as 
many organizational structures, and interests as there are organizations in the humanitarian 
community, which may lead to conflict of emergency coordination structures. 
 
Leadership 
It was expected in the hierarchical orientation that the process of decision making in the 
formal organization of the cluster approach to be agreed upon, since the decisions are made 
on the organization goals and by rationality. The leaders in practice were expected to make 
rational calculations where the cluster members and leaders know the goals of the cluster 
approach. From the negotiation orientation it was expected that the process of decision 
making in the formal organization was fragmented, since self-interest, compromises and 
negotiations may be different than the overall goals. In practice, the relative strength of the 
cluster lead in the network would depend on the resources of the cluster members, it was also 
expected that the lead agency would strongly influence in the decision making.  
 
In the formal organization of the cluster approach the overall goal is to improve outcomes for 
the affected population, which will differ in each crisis and disaster. The goals for each crisis 
will therefore be decided upon by the leaders in each crisis. Therefore the negotiation 
orientation may be better in order to understand the formal organization of the cluster 
approach. The cluster lead agencies are given responsibilities in additional to own program 
activity, such as coordination of cluster activities, support the HC, act as provider of last 
resort. The responsibilities give the cluster lead agency the possibility of influencing the 
decision making. The cluster lead agency is representing the cluster members in a cluster, 
there is therefore the possibility for the cluster lead to impose own self-interests and agendas 
in the decision making forums.  
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The expectations in the negotiation orientation may be contrasting with the findings in the 
research of the cluster approach in practice. Empirical findings show that the cluster lead 
agencies in Myanmar, felt they were not given the proper information needed in order to lead 
the cluster approach. This may challenge the leadership in the cluster approach, since in order 
for an organization to function optimally according to intended goals, the members of the 
organization needs to first, know the goal and mission of the organization (Christensen et al 
2004), second, have the time and resources, horizontal coordination takes time and resources 
(Christensen, Fimreite & Lægreid 2013), which can also be stated from the practical 
perspective in the cluster approach. The expectation from the hierarchical orientation on that 
the cluster members and leaders know the goals of the cluster approach may therefore not be 
confirmed and the possibilities for more power struggles and negotiations are assumable more 
present. In order to make rational decisions, all possible outcomes and consequences must be 
calculated. Lacking knowledge on how the cluster approach is functioning and lacking of 
understanding in how to implement the cluster approach may therefore hinder rational 
decision making and also lead to possible conflicts of interests. In the case of Haiti, the lack of 
sufficient knowledge about the cluster approach goals and the high turn-over may explain the 
confusion of roles and goals of the cluster approach.  
 
It was not found sufficient evidence in the empirical data to confirm the expectation on 
fragmented leadership and cluster leads influencing decision with own agendas. Since the 
HCT meetings were mainly used as information sharing arena’s both in Myanmar and Haiti 
the relative strength of strategic decision making members among the cluster leadership is 
hard to identify.  The voluntary cluster lead responsibilities may lead to a fragmented 
leadership, since the cluster lead agencies’ priorities may be of the host organization and not 
on cluster coordination activities. Also, there is a possibility that the cluster lead agencies are 
influencing the decision making forums through the HC with own agendas; however there has 
not been found evidence for this in the empirical findings. 
 
Accountability  
From a hierarchical orientation, it was expected that the accountability was formalized 
through hierarchy based on routines and rules, the authority was expected to be delegated and 
administrative and political accountability were expected to be central. From the negotiation 
orientation it was expected that there was a small degree of control, since the clusters were 
expected to be joint working. It was expected that the formal organization of the cluster 
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approach would be formalized on horizontal accountability, where there would be equal 
authority and responsibility. The formal and practical structure of the cluster approach was 
expected to be tightly coupled.  
 
The empirical findings from the formal organization of the cluster approach may support the 
expectations from the hierarchical orientation. There are formally hierarchical accountability 
(Bovens 2007) in the formal cluster approach organization. Such for example, the cluster 
members are accountable to the cluster leads and the global clusters, the cluster leads are 
responsible to the HC and the HCT, the HC/RC is responsible to the ERC. This vertical line 
of accountability seems to be clear; it states the reporting and authority line. The roles and 
responsibility are cleared out in Terms of References and in cluster approach guidelines. In 
the empirical findings in the formal organization of the cluster approach it could also indicate 
an administrative accountability (Bovens 2007), where it was stated that the HC assisted by 
OCHA plays a crucial role in monitoring the overall response. Since the instrumental 
perspective is also concerned with the consequences of the decisions of its members, it could 
also therefore be expected that there are sanction opportunities in the organization. 
People/organizations are held accountable if or when their responsibilities are not fulfilled. 
Thus the empirical findings from the formal organization of the cluster approach may indicate 
that the authority is delegated in horizontal accountability, having cluster lead agencies for 
each sector of response, which may consist with the negotiation orientation. The cluster leads 
are responsible for the ensuring effective assessment and responses in their respective 
clusters. Additionally, there is a shared accountability to the affected population, and the 
clusters are to collective work and contribute to enhance the cluster approach.  
 
In the case of Haiti the focus of the cluster leadership was on formal accountability, however 
this failed due to the system of diverse and independent actors. From the empirical findings of 
the cluster approach in Myanmar, the informal accountability among peer clusters was 
increasing, and the cluster members did not feel accountable toward the cluster leads rather to 
the Humanitarian Coordinator (vertical). Also, the follow up and monitoring was not being 
done systematic. These findings may not consistent with the expectations from the negotiation 
orientation. The findings indicate that there was small degree of control and there was 
horizontal accountability. On the other hand, the focus of the cluster leadership was on formal 
accountability mechanisms. As stated from the cluster approach evaluations phase II on Haiti, 
the reason for a “disappointing performance could be the cluster approach’s focus on formal 
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mechanism for accountability, which are difficult to implement within a system of diverse and 
independent actors” (Binder & Grünewald 2010:32). The focus on hierarchical accountability 
also caused that the HC was dependent on information on the cluster leads. However, the HC 
lacked this information in order to hold the cluster leads accountable. Where there is mistrust 
or the expected responsibility is not fulfilled, the reporting line goes upwards in the UN 
system, there is however no formal sanction for  the person or organization who is accused. 
Since the responsibility is voluntarily the person or organization who is responsible may 
decide upon themselves how much resources and time to spend on the cluster lead and 
coordination of the clusters in addition their own organizations program implementation.  
 
Preliminary Conclusion 
From the general empirical implications it was expected that there would be a tight coupling 
between how the formal organization of the cluster approach and how it is practiced. It was 
also expected that the negotiation orientation would be able to explain more. However, what 
has been shown is that there are variations in the intended formalized organization and how it 
has functioned in Myanmar and Haiti.  
 
 
7.2.2 The Institutional Perspective 
The institutional perspective opens up to understand the cluster approach integrated with its 
external and internal environment. Especially there are three elements to understand the 
institutional perspective, 1) the decision making process is based on logic of appropriateness, 
2) discovering goals and the process up to discover these goals 3) change is challenging due 
to historical inefficiency, the institution is  robust and slow (Christensen et al. 2004). The 
focus is on cultural orientation and opens up to understand variations in how the formal 
cluster approach organization will vary from how it operates in practice due to the 
environmental context and organizational culture. Also, it was expected that the governance is 
more process driven rather than result driven.  
 
Specialization  
The expectations regarding the specializations in the cluster approach according to the 
institutional perspective; was that the formal organization of the cluster approach would lead 
to a flexible specialization. The cluster specializations were expected to vary depending on 
the crisis context.  
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From the findings in the empirical data the cluster guidelines states that the cluster are meant 
to be flexible to the identified needs in the population. The needs then will give various types 
of specialization depending on the capacity, resources and needs of the affected country. 
These findings from the formal organization of the cluster approach may therefore be 
coherent with the expectation in the institutional perspective.  
 
Findings from the cluster approach in practice, indicate that, as already mentioned the clusters 
that were rolled out in Haiti and Myanmar were not replicating the global clusters. In both 
countries there was an additional cluster specialization, in Myanmar it was named food cluster 
in Haiti it was called food aid. When organizations are adding elements in the organizational 
structure the organization members may resist, to make sure that the new element is 
compatible with the organizational culture and identity, one may do a compatibility testing 
(Brunsson & Olsen 1990). In the empirical findings there are no signs for resistance towards 
implementing new cluster specializations in both Myanmar and Haiti. It is therefore plausible 
to assume that the new food cluster had passed the compatibility test in the cluster approach. 
The different names of the clusters across countries may also imply the flexibility and 
possibility of compatibility testing of the cluster specializations in both countries.  
 
Coordination  
From the institutional perspective it was anticipated to find that the coordination in the formal 
organization were expected to be informal information sharing forums. The cluster 
coordination was expected to be formed by the institutional environment it was operating in.   
 
The empirical findings in the formal cluster approach organization indicates that even though 
the formal cluster specializations are loosely coupled units, the coordination structures are 
through formal HCT meetings and the inter-cluster meetings. In the inter-cluster meetings the 
cluster coordinator are to meet and discuss the emergency response, both at the strategic and 
operational level. Additionally, the cluster leads are stated to be obliged to interact with each 
other. This may imply that informally information sharing forums are not meant to be taken 
place in the formal organization of the cluster approach. The expectation on the cluster 
approach on coordinate through informal information sharing forum may therefore not be 
consistent with the empirical findings in the formal organization of the cluster approach.  
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The empirical findings from the cluster approach in both Myanmar and Haiti, are in 
accordance with the expectation on that the coordination structures are used as more informal 
information sharing forums. Also, the cluster approach was not the only coordinating forum. 
Information sharing is a crucial coordination mechanism in emergency response, the 
information sharing updates all the organizations on who is doing what, discovering gaps and 
may help to hinder duplications which may improve the overall emergency response. 
 
The empirical findings from Myanmar may be coherent with the expectation on adaption of 
crisis context. In Myanmar, at the time the cluster approach was implemented, there was a 
strict hierarchical military regime, and the military regime was skeptical letting in 
international humanitarian aid workers. The UN was present ahead of the disasters, however 
then it was a focus on developmental problems, the issues when the cluster approach was 
implemented then was that the path of development cooperation with the Myanmar 
government which continued in the cooperation of humanitarian aid. Also, in the case of 
Myanmar, the regional TCG was created in order for the international community and the 
Myanmar government to agree on the humanitarian aid. Creating a new regional coordination 
structure may be a symbol of cooperation among the Myanmar government and the 
international humanitarian aid community. This type of common agreement may have 
impacted how the members viewed and acted in the coordination practices. The common 
agreement may then have given an impression of a common vision and a common goal, create 
a common organizational culture, which could then lead to the expectation that the 
coordination of the clusters were highly integrated, even though the issue of “silo effect” was 
present.  
 
Haiti is also coherent with the expectation on that cluster coordination is expected to be 
formed by the institutional environment it is operating in. As mentioned, already existing 
governmental coordination structures were in place ahead of the cluster approach was 
implementation. From the empirical findings the government had clear divisions on 
coordination of humanitarian aid, which may seem that the cluster approach was set a bit to 
the side. It was stated in the empirical data that the cluster approach did not participate in 
these coordination foras. Even though the cluster approach was left outside the government 
coordination mechanism, the cluster approach gave an information sharing platform for both 
international and national NGOs in Haiti, which may have led to an integrated coordination 
among the national and international organizations. The similarity of goals may have led to 
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confusion of the cluster approach’s role and meaning in Haiti. These two approaches were 
seen as complementary to each other; however it can be debated if these duplication of 
coordinating structures may have given signals to the cluster members that the cluster 
approach might have been redundant.  
 
Leadership 
It was expected according to the institutional perspective that in formal organization the 
leadership process driven and “infused by values” (Selznick 1957). It was expected that the 
cluster approach had committed leaders, who understood the approach and were determined. 
The leaders were also expected to represent, promote and defend the internal cluster interests 
and to cooperate with other clusters in order to minimize conflicts.   
 
In the formal organization of the cluster approach the leadership may be in accordance with 
the expectations on a process driven leadership. The processes are defined through the many 
statements and cluster leadership guidelines, handbooks and Terms of References. When 
practiced, the cluster members and cluster leads state that they feel they don’t have sufficient 
knowledge of the cluster approach prior going to the field. The cluster leads’ roles are 
described in very detail in various UN and IASC-guidelines, ToRs, courses and handbooks of 
the cluster approach, and the empirical findings in chapter 6 show that the leaders had to take 
multiple courses and read hundreds of pages prior going to the field. According to the 
empirical data, in order for the cluster leadership and coordination to function optimally the 
cluster leads and cluster members need to know first what the cluster approach is, what the 
goals are, how it is organized and how to solve the problems in emergency response. One of 
the informants stated that the cluster approach is portrayed and understood as “rocket science” 
by some cluster members. This mindset may portray the cluster approach as something more 
complex than it is perceived, while others understand it as “just working together towards a 
common goal”. The common understanding of the cluster approach as “rocket science” may 
have had an impact on how the leadership of the cluster approach was practiced. The cluster 
approach guidelines may have been abstract, and the practice of implementation of the cluster 
approach may therefore be explained to have varied due to the different understandings of 
what leadership of the cluster approach was and how to adapt to the specific disasters which 
may explain the variations of leadership in Myanmar and Haiti.  
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In both Myanmar and Haiti, the role of the HC was emphasized, and was seen as crucial for 
the emergency response. These findings may be consistent with the expectation on the 
importance of the leaders’ commitment, understanding and determination. The HC role was 
also essential in the making of the cluster approach and it seems that their role and 
responsibilities have remained as it was formed in the formal organization of the cluster 
approach. The personal commitment of the HC was seen as critical in order for the emergency 
response to be coordinated and led in a satisfying manner. The HC’s personal experience, 
background, knowledge and personality were mentioned to be of importance in the success of 
the cluster approach, this was especially in Myanmar. There is a strong reliance on the HC 
and his/hers ability to lead the emergency response. The cluster approach ToRs and guidelines 
for the HC gives the HC detailed instructions and gives and impression of the cluster 
approach as a process driven approach. However, in the empirical cases of Myanmar and 
Haiti, it may seem that the HC and his/hers commitment and the results may be over greater 
importance.  
 
The cluster leads both in Myanmar and Haiti were according to the empirical data consisting 
of mainly UN agencies and organizations
25
. The fact the cluster leads were mainly UN 
agencies and organizations, may have an impact on how they were lead. Each cluster lead was 
representing their cluster members and activities in the HCT meetings and inter-cluster 
meetings. As can be seen in both Haiti and Myanmar, most of the cluster leads have been UN 
organizations, which historically come from hierarchical organizations. In Haiti 9 out of 11 
clusters
26
, and in Myanmar 10 out of 11 clusters
27
 were lead by either a UN 
agency/programmes/fund/organization. The organizational culture, routines and roles may be 
different depending on the different organization. Coming together in the cluster approach, 
this may have caused fragmented decision making processes.  
 
Accountability 
In the formal organization of the cluster approach it was expected that Bovens’ (2007) social 
and professional accountability would be of subject. Multiple accountabilities (Pollitt 
2003:93) were expected to be found in the formal cluster approach organization. It was also 
                                                 
25
 See Appendix IV and V for tables with cluster lead agencies in Myanmar and Haiti.  
26
 Logistics cluster was co-led by ATLAS 
27
 Education cluster was co-led by Save the Children, Health cluster was co-led by MERLIN and Nutrition 
cluster was co-led by GOUM.  
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expected from an institutional perspective that soft factors (Boston & Gill 2011) would be 
prominent mechanisms for the cluster approach in accountability in practice.  
 
In the formal organization of the cluster approach it was found multiple accountabilities 
through the enactment of responsibilities to the cluster lead agencies and the HC. The 
responsibilities for the cluster lead agencies are voluntarily and on top of their responsibilities 
in host organization, in addition there were found no minimum criteria for coordination. It is 
put much trust in the cluster leaders to pursue the goals of coordination. In order to build trust 
it may be indicated from the empirical data to be used soft factors (Boston & Gill 2011) such 
as delegating responsibilities and authorities to the cluster leads (power), building teams in the 
clusters and leadership. The expectations on social and professional accountability about 
whom is rendered accountable (Bovens 2007) may be in accordance with the empirical 
findings of the formal organizations of the cluster approach. It is clearly stated that the cluster 
approach is a mechanism in order to improve accountability to the affected population. The 
downward accountability is collected accountability of all cluster leaders and member 
organizations of their implemented actions to the affected population. Although the 
accountability to affected population has been cited as one of the most critical areas for 
improvements in the cluster approach this has been one of the weakest part of accountability, 
especially in concrete accountability standardized mechanisms to the affected population.  
 
However, these findings from the formal organizations of the cluster approach are not in 
accordance with the findings from the cluster approach implementation in Myanmar and 
Haiti, the accountability to the affected population was found weak. There were no 
standardized accountability mechanisms, however both in Myanmar and in Haiti, ad hoc 
mechanisms were taken place such as accountability committees and complaints mechanisms. 
The work of the cluster did not promote participatory approaches and their work did not focus 
on their impact of the affected population (Steet et al 2010).  
 
The accountability mechanisms may seem to be explained due to differences in people in 
charge and the trust and commitment they have to their responsibilities, different interests and 
needs, tacit knowledge and loyalty to host lead agency programs. The leaders govern based on 
the trust that is given them and that they will govern in the most appropriate way, without 
being controlled or followed up. Time and resources have especially come up as challenges, 
this is visible in the case of Myanmar where the same cluster lead agencies, were expected to 
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coordinate as cluster leads at both national and local level. The trust in the cluster leads will 
and ability to perform coordination activities may make it more difficult to detect if the cluster 
coordination is where it is supposed to be. This may have had an impact on the host lead 
agencies programs to implement own activities. A loyalty to own organizations interest may 
cause conflict for the cluster lead responsibility, especially if the cluster leads’ goals is 
contested with the cluster approach’s coordination activities. Also, in time constraints own 
activities may be put as a higher priority rather than cluster lead responsibilities. It was also 
stated by one of the informants, that being a cluster lead was not something that was 
necessarily desired, but at the same time, if someone is doing the job, it might as well be them 
in charge. The organizational culture around responsibilities and accountabilities may 
therefore be suggested as essential for the cluster approach in order for the 
persons/organization to follow up on their responsibilities. In the light of the institutional 
perspective these challenges may explain why there were variations of accountability 
mechanisms both from the formal organization and how it is in practice.  The clusters have 
also shown horizontal accountability through developing strategies for exchanging lessons 
learned and best practices (Steets et al. 2010).  The Sphere Handbook helps to define 
horizontal accountability by defining minimum standards of relief. These standards have 
increasingly been adopted both in Myanmar and Haiti.  
 
Preliminary Conclusion 
In the general empirical implications it was expected that the formal organization of the 
cluster approach and how it works in practice would be loosely coupled. The institutional 
perspective opens up to understand the cluster approach integrated with its context and its 
organizational culture. The institutional perspective seems to especially give plausible 
explanations on the variations coordination and accountability, variations may be explained 
by the environmental context, culture, path dependency and identities.  
 
 
 
7.3 Impact of Using the Instrumental and Institutional Perspective 
The instrumental and institutional perspectives give us possible explanations based on using 
different “goggles” analyzing the cluster approach. In this section I will try to map out the 
where the perspectives are complimenting each other. Each box will contain either low, 
medium or high, this will say something about the strength of explanation of the perspectives.  
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It is expected a strong coupling by the formal organization and how it works in practice in the 
instrumental perspective, and it’s expected a louse coupling in the institutional perspective.  
 
 Explanatory Strength of the Analytical 
Perspectives 
Variables Instrumental  
Strong Coupling 
Institutional  
Loose Coupling 
Specialization High Medium 
Coordination Medium High 
Leadership Weak High 
Accountability Weak High 
 
As we can see from the table above the strength of coupling were various depending on the 
perspective. In the instrumental perspective the cluster specialization was strongly coupled in 
cluster specialization. Although, the institutional perspective could also explain the variations 
of cluster specializations, the guidelines intended the cluster specialization to be flexible. 
There was a loose coupling between how the coordination was intended and it was in practice. 
It varied depending on the crisis context and the governmental structures for emergency 
response in Haiti and Myanmar. However, it was also depending on the different organization 
structures that were combined. The coordination mechanism in the HCT meetings on 
information sharing is contrasting the intention on the HCT as decision making meetings. In 
cluster leadership there was a loose coupling between the formal organization and how it was 
in practice. The personal commitment and determination was seen as crucial for the cluster 
leadership. In accountability, the institutional perspective could explain the variations in how 
the formal cluster accountability was and how it was in practice.  
 
In this analysis it may seem that there was loose coupling between how the formal cluster 
organization is and how it is in practice, which is in accordance with the institutional 
perspective. However, the instrumental perspective gives a complementary explanation for 
variations in the formal organizations and the way it has worked in Myanmar and Haiti. The 
two perspectives are dynamic and in a complex relation to each other.  The members in an 
organization are rarely one dimensional (Christensen et al. 2004:200). It’s therefore important 
to view the relation between these two perspectives, for example in the relation between 
instrumentality and culture, is the possibility to change informal norms and values through 
organizational structures, or that cultural traditions may influence on the decision making 
(Christensen et al. 2004).  In an organization there may be complex relations between planned 
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strategies and path-dependency, these complex relations may reinforce interaction or opposite 
to counteract each other depending on the given situation. By using the perspectives 
complementary one may analyze these relations in the phenomenon that is studied 
(Christensen et al. 2004).  
 
The strengths and weaknesses in the perspectives presented in the table are based on the 
empirical reasoning in the theoretical framework. This means that the reasoning that was 
presented in chapter 4 will influence on how much explanatory strength the different 
perspectives has. This is due to the fact that the perspectives offer two different reasoning’s 
and therefore could offer different explanations of empirical findings. It could also mean that 
both the institutional context along with the organizational structure interact on the 
environment the clusters are operating in. Additionally, the different variables interacting with 
each other, it might be thinkable that the strong coupling on instrumental perspective on 
specializations, along with the medium strength on loose coupling in the institutional 
perspective might explain why the coupling in coordination was loose. The way an 
organization is specialized may have an impact on coordination.  
 
The different perspectives influence each other and open up new windows, but they also limit 
the possibilities. This will be further discussed in the next chapter under theoretical 
implications by using these two perspectives. 
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8. Conclusion 
 
8.1 Summary: Research Questions and the Answers 
This study has been build around the following research questions:  
1) How is the formal cluster approach organized and how does it work in practice 
after natural disasters in Myanmar and Haiti, with a focus on specialization, 
coordination, leadership and accountability? 2) How can possible variations in the 
formal organization of the cluster approach and how it works in practice be 
explained? 
 
The research question is two-fold, first, to describe the cluster approach both in its formal 
organization and in practice. Second, to examine and explain variations in the formal 
organization and the cluster approach in practice, using Myanmar and Haiti as examples. It’s 
evident that there are variations in how the cluster approach was intended to be implemented 
and how it worked in Myanmar and Haiti. There are especially four findings that are 
interesting in order to describe and understand the formal and practical cluster organization.  
 
First, multi-level governance theory has shown to be reasonable to describe the complexity of 
the cluster approach both in its formal organization and how it has worked in practice. 
Sørensen and Torfing’s (2005) definition on governance may seem to describe the cluster 
approach structure in a useful way by adding an extra element on personal commitment. The 
steering of the network governance, both formally and practically can also be described by 
using the lead agency model by Provan and Kenis (2007). Second, the empirical findings 
from the realizations of the cluster approach in Haiti and Myanmar may pose the question on 
whether the cluster approach leads to a fragmentation rather than an intended integration. 
Third, the empirical findings of the cluster approach in Haiti and Myanmar indicate that the 
Humanitarian Country Team meetings are in fact meetings on informal information sharing 
rather than the intended strategic decision making. This may indicate that the coordination 
structures are loosely coupled information units, rather than tight and intense coordination of 
the inter-governmental work as it was intended (Boston & Gill 2011). Fourth, accountability 
in the cluster organization may indicate that there is a problem of many hands (Bovens 2007, 
Thompson 1980) since there are no minimum criteria for coordination. The empirical findings 
from Myanmar and Haiti point out the challenges regarding felt obligation (Boston & Gill 
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2011) and accountability for the cluster leads. The challenge may seem to have lead to a 
pulverization of accountability.   
 
The instrumental and institutional perspective are used complementary to explain variations 
between the formal organization of the cluster approach and how it was applied in the cases of 
Myanmar and Haiti. When it comes to specialization, the empirical findings put forward in 
chapter 5 and 6 are largely in consistence with the instrumental perspective; the cluster 
specialization is strongly coupled between what is intended in the formal organization and 
how it is in practice, since the guidelines intended the specifics of the cluster specialization to 
be flexible. In terms of coordination, the empirical findings from Haiti and Myanmar indicate 
that there is a loose coupling between how the coordination was intended and how it was 
practiced. These findings may indicate that the coordination varies depending on the 
institutional context and the governmental structures for emergency response, which may also 
explain why the coordination structures of the emergency response in Myanmar and Haiti was 
significantly different.  
 
Another point to notice was that the emergency responses in these two countries were 
dependant on the existing and multiple organization structures that were combined with the 
emerging cluster organization. The study shows that in terms of cluster leadership, there was a 
loose coupling between the formal organization and how it worked. The personal commitment 
and determination of the persons in charge of the cluster leads was seen as crucial for the 
cluster leadership in contrast to rules and procedures as the primary mechanisms to ensure 
good cluster leadership. When it comes to accountability, the institutional perspective can 
explain the variations in how the formal cluster accountability was intended and how the 
accountability worked in the two cases. The institutional perspective may seem to explain a 
large degree of the variations of the realization of the cluster approach in the two cases of 
emergency response examined in this study. However, some of the findings open up to 
multiple explanations, and the instrumental perspective gives a complementary explanation 
for several of the variations in the formal organizations and the way it has worked in 
Myanmar and Haiti. 
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8.2 Placing the Findings in the Literature 
There is a limited amount of research in the field of organization theory on the cluster 
approach as a multi-level governance structure. This study may therefore hopefully contribute 
to a greater theoretical understanding of the cluster approach as a complex organization, and 
how to manage such complex networks in disasters. The aim for this study is also to be a 
contribution to the theoretical field and understanding of multi-level governance structure in 
disasters, including the challenges of complex and hybrid relations on specialization, 
coordination, leadership and accountability.  
 
The findings in this thesis may provide relevant input to the research field where the emphasis 
is on governance structures operating in crises. This may especially be the case where the 
empirical focus is on compounded organizations (Trondal et al. 2010), with multiple 
stakeholders at multi-dimensional levels (supranational, national and local) and with a 
cooperation between hierarchical and network arrangements.  The empirical findings from 
this thesis indicate that the specific structure and organization of the cluster approach is 
important in order to provide a proper response to a given disaster. The specific structure and 
organization may facilitate both vertical and horizontal coordination and leadership in 
emergency responses.  Additionally, paying proper attention to the structure may facilitate the 
possibility for cross-national organizations, supranational agencies and national organizations 
working together. As mentioned, the institutional and instrumental perspectives coexist and 
shed light on different characteristics of the specific organization of the emergency response. 
The empirical findings of this thesis also indicate that when the cluster approach’s 
organizational structure face different institutional factors it will adapt to the specific 
institutional context, in other words the structure will be influenced by the culture it’s 
implemented in.  
 
In addition, the cluster approach is a governance structure that was created by the UN in order 
to play a key role in responding to a humanitarian crisis, where challenges include 
negotiations and tensions between member states’ interests and agencies with specific crisis 
tasks. The findings in this thesis may therefore be of interest to other cross-national 
governance agencies and structures that aim to play a key role in preventing and responding to 
crises, for example the European Union. Where the international crisis management has to 
negotiate tensions between crisis management requires and members states interests (Boin, 
Busuioc & Groenleer 2013:2).  “The EU developed all of this capacity in a punctuated and 
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fragmentary manner: with each crisis, member states invested additional authority in the 
Union’s budding crisis management apparatus. There is, in other words, no institutional 
blueprint” (Boin, Busuioc & Groenleer 2013:2). The empirical findings in this thesis are 
related to the lead agency model (Provan & Kenis 2007). Pulverization of accountability 
(Boston & Gill 2011) may be especially interesting topics for research in comparing EU crisis 
management and the cluster approach. 
 
The questions that arise from this study may also be interesting to future research on the 
dynamic relationship between the supranational and the national levels. In order to analyze 
the behavior and to understand the complexity of these relations in compounded 
organizations, there are four complementary behavior dynamics; intergovernmental, 
supranational, departmental and epistemic dynamic (Trondal et al. 2010:12). There is a 
tension between supranational and national organizations, and to make it more complicated 
each of these organizations have a specific set of behavioral and role perceptions (Trondal et 
al. 2010:12). The tensions just mentioned may be confirmed by the findings in this thesis, 
where the institutional perspective to a large degree may explain the variations of the 
realization of the cluster approach in the cases of Haiti and Myanmar. As shown in the 
empirical data, there is a great heterogeneity among the organizations that make part of the 
cluster approach, and such heterogeneity and strong self-regulation may have caused greater 
institutional differentiation and thus a different organization all together.  
 
The empirical findings in this thesis may also confirm several of the assumptions of the 
already existing theories put forward in chapter 4. It may therefore give a deeper theoretical 
understanding of for instance the relations of accountability in multi-level governance 
structures with supranational and national actors, especially on lateral accountability 
(Humphries 2013), or what Boston and Gill’s (2011) defines as shared responsibility. Boston 
and Gill (2011) propose that shared accountabilities may cause many problems in joint 
working arrangements and inter-agency collaborations. The lines of accountability may be 
unclear and sanctions for poor performance may be difficult to apply. The empirical data of 
how the cluster approach is practiced gives an example of shared accountabilities and how it 
may have led to a pulverization of responsibilities in the organization of the emergency 
responses in question. This also confirms Bovens’ (2007) and Thompson’s (1980) problem of 
many hands, which has been a relevant theory in order to describe and understand the 
114 
 
accountability mechanism in the governance of complex organization, i.e. it may be a 
challenge to deal the accountability to one actor or organizations.  
 
 
8.3 Theoretical Implications 
The classifying theory that has been used in this thesis in order to describe the complexity of 
the cluster approach is multi-level governance theory. This study has pointed on some of the 
challenges that the cluster approach faces being organized as a multi-level governance 
structure. The cluster approach is a structure with both strong hierarchical and horizontal 
formations. The cluster organization is multi-dimensional and one may find in the cases of 
Myanmar and Haiti they are complex in practice, and as shown in chapter 6 there are 
variations in the application of the cluster approach in the respective countries. Compounded 
systems are based on the assumption of “mobilization of multiple complementary sets of 
institutions, actors, interests, decision-making arenas, values, norms and cleavages” (Trondal 
et al. 2010:11, Olsen 2010). These compounded systems are seldom one-dimensional, 
however they are multi-dimensional organizations which are dynamic and with constant 
tensions between the entities, as mentioned above (Trondal et al. 2010).  
 
These tensions are also inflected in the empirical focus in this thesis, which in turn is analyzed 
in terms of specialization, coordination, leadership and accountability. These variables have 
been used in order to structure and classify the cluster approach. As shown in chapter 7, these 
variables are connected, and the interaction between these variables and how they influence 
each other make the cluster approach even more complex to manage. In the empirical findings 
from the cluster approach in Haiti and Myanmar we have seen that the variables are hard to 
explain in isolation, since they interact substantially. In particular, there is a difficult trade off 
between specialization and coordination. For example, the strong horizontal formations of the 
cluster specializations may have consequences on distribution of accountability and may 
cause challenges for horizontal coordination. Coordination of the cluster approach is also a 
responsibility of the cluster leadership, which makes also these two variables hard to separate. 
Furthermore, good coordination may have an impact on how the leadership is portrayed and 
vice versa. Interestingly, in practice one may find that the loosely connected cluster 
specializations actually created a need for information sharing as a coordination mechanism, 
instead of the intended strategic decision-making forum. Another factor worth mentioning is 
the loose organizational coordination structure, which might cause challenges with placing 
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specific responsibilities on one actor, which in turn may lead to a pulverization of 
accountabilities (Boston & Gill 2011). These consequences may be argued based on how the 
cluster specialized was formed and how the cluster leadership is applied as a multi-level 
governance structure.  
 
Furthermore, in order to understand and explain how the formal organization of the cluster 
approach may differentiate from the practical realization, the instrumental and institutional 
perspective has been employed as a complementary strategy, (Roness 1997). Using a 
synthesis perspective to examine the cluster approach allow to successfully analyze both the 
structural organization and the cultural impact of the cluster approach, in both describing and 
explaining the complex multi-level challenges and seeing the cluster approach as both process 
and result oriented. This strategy has been useful in order to give an extensive explanation 
from the two perspectives, with the empirical focus on specialization, coordination, leadership 
and accountability. For example, from the instrumental perspective it was expected to find a 
strong coupling between formal organization and the actual practice and from the institutional 
perspective it was expected to find a loose coupling between the formal cluster organization 
and how it was in practice. Both perspectives ended up contributing to different observations 
of the cluster approach and provided different explanations on the behavior of the members in 
organization (Roness 1997). These perspectives also have influenced the reasoning and 
interpretation on specializations, coordination, leadership and accountability in the cluster 
approach.  
 
An alternative analytical strategy could have been using the perspectives competitive. A 
competitive strategy endorse for testing the perspectives, observing the organization from one 
side, additionally to map out strength and weaknesses, and find out which perspective 
explains more (Roness 1997).  Also, the instrumental and institutional perspective may not 
have covered all aspects of the variation in the cluster approach implementation. To 
strengthen the analytical framework other possible perspectives could have been introduced 
such as the myth and governance perspectives. A key element in the myth perspective is that 
the organizations are operating in institutional environments where there are norms and 
routines and expectations on how the institutions should behave (Christensen et al. 2004:75). 
The institutions adapt to the environment and try to incorporate and reflect the environments 
expectations, and thus becoming more and more alike on the surface (Christensen et al. 
2004:75). The myths can be introduced and understood as recipes for organizational structure 
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with components such as concepts for “good governance” (Christensen et al. 2004:78). In the 
myth perspective, one may expect that the formal organization of the cluster approach and 
how it works are loosely coupled; the isomorphism is expected to be strong. Also, according 
to the myth perspective, there is a loose coupling in the way you talk and the way you act 
(Brunsson 1989), a phenomena also known as window-dressing; the myths can spread fast 
and be imitated by the organization without having instrumental effects (Christensen et al. 
2004:76). This view on organizational change differs from the cultural perspective, where in 
the cultural perspective one can expect that organizations grow more and more apart from 
each other in time (Christensen et al. 2004). The many guidelines, references, detailed 
evaluations and reports on coordination in the empirical findings from the cluster approach, 
may indicate that coordination is seen as the magic bullet for good emergency response, and 
“the more coordination the better”. Additionally, following this line of reasoning, all the 
“recipes” for coordination may give strong action symbols to the cluster members. The cluster 
approach would thus from this perspective be seen as part of a recipe for good governance in 
emergency responses.  
 
Another alternative perspective for the analysis could be governance theory. Sørensen and 
Torfing (2005) offer an analytical framework based on the four governance theories; 
interdependent, governmentality, governability and integration theory. These four theories 
may be classified in two; the logic of action and the view of steering. In logic of action one 
may distinguish between calculation and culture. The view of steering may be distinguished 
between coordination and handling of conflicts. The interdependence theory is classified in to 
calculation and handling of conflict. In the governmentality theory one may classify the 
theory in to culture and handling conflicts. Governability theory may be classified in 
calculation and coordination. Lastly, integration theory sees culture as the logic of action and 
coordination as the steering mechanism. These governance perspectives may offer 
comprehensive reasoning for empirical findings, function as tools to understand and explain 
the cluster approach behavior, and may possibly cover some of the missing aspects of the 
variation of the cluster approach, that is not discovered using the theoretical framework 
undertaken in this thesis.  
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8.4 Empirical Implications 
The purpose of this thesis has not been to generalize the findings based on the two case 
studies of Myanmar and Haiti. However, the two case studies are used to give specific 
examples on how the cluster approach work in practice and how the clusters operate, seen by 
the lenses of what was expected using the theoretical framework on specialization, 
coordination, leadership and accountability.  
 
The focus in this study has neither been on how efficient the cluster approach structure is or if 
the cluster approach implementation has improved the overall performance of the emergency 
responses. However, it may be possible to underline some general observations from the 
empirical findings of the formal organization and how it worked in practice in Myanmar and 
Haiti. In the empirical findings from the cluster approach realization in Myanmar it’s stated 
by the Government of Myanmar, the UN and ASEAN that the emergency response was a 
success, this might indicate that the cluster approach in Myanmar may have improved the 
performance in emergency response, although one should have in mind that comparisons with 
the effects of other possible structures in such situations is methodologically a difficult task. 
As a contrast to Myanmar, in Haiti, the cluster approach was an additional coordination 
structure among many, even though the cluster approach allowed all international 
humanitarian organizations to take part in the information sharing, which might have hindered 
duplications and gaps. Based on the goal of the cluster approach which is hindering 
duplications and gaps in emergency response, the findings in cluster approach both in 
Myanmar and Haiti may indicate that the emergency response has enhanced especially on 
specialization and information sharing.  
 
The case studies of Myanmar and Haiti are set in two different institutional systems and 
regimes. The examination of the cluster approach indicates that the institutional context of the 
cluster approach implementation matters. In Myanmar the cluster approach was implemented 
in a context of a militarized regime skeptical to international humanitarian aid, while in Haiti 
there were already existing parallel coordination structures for emergency response. These 
different contexts give plausible explanations for why the cluster approach was implemented 
in different ways in the respective countries. The characteristics of the cases may thus 
influence the findings. The selection criteria for the two case studies were on similarities in 
disaster. If the two case studies were chosen based on similarity in regimes, the empirical 
findings might have given different results. However, interestingly, the cluster approach is 
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intended to be a universal approach and is intended to fit to all regimes and institutional 
designs, and this may contest that argument.  
 
Other factors that plausibly may influence the cluster approach realization are political issues, 
e.g. in the sector of protection, protection is highly sensitive. The organization of emergency 
response is a political question, and not just a logistical question or of technical matters. The 
cluster approach cannot replace political decisions. The political will and making the proper 
decisions are therefore crucial for the emergency response to be executed in accordance with 
the specific needs. The multifaceted management of the cluster approach needs to work 
together with the government, rather than be an isolated organization outside the government 
in the affected country. However, creating a coordinating platform does not automatically 
deliver the elements that improve humanitarian response (Steets et al. 2010:75). Scott 
(1998:313) uses the concept of mētis to explain “a wide array of practical skills and acquired 
intelligence in responding to a constantly changing natural and human environment” (Scott 
1998:313). This means having practical, local knowledge, for addressing the problem at hand. 
The mētis (Scott 1998) is especially important in times of disaster, in order to know which 
rules to follow, what to be applied in which order and when to improvise. Knowing what is 
best, making the best out of limited resources and adapting quickly after unpredictable events 
such as natural disasters, are skills that are hard to standardize and formalize in to an 
approach, such as the specifics of the formal organization of the cluster approach. What the 
empirical data of the cluster approach in practice indicate is that the standardized model 
cannot give all possible problems optimal solutions, the cluster approach members therefore 
needs to be flexible and able to solve the problems at hand where they are.  
 
 
8.5 Suggestions for Future Studies 
This topic is becoming more increasingly relevant, such as the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan 
in the Philippines in November 2013. In order to optimize the coordination of emergency 
response, more research on this field is needed. A suggestion for future studies is to perform a 
systematic comparative analysis of the cluster approach implementation across countries with 
similar and different characteristics. By systematically comparing the implementation of the 
cluster approach in a multitude of countries, one may increase the possibility of predicting and 
generalizing important aspect, and challenges of the cluster approach.   
 
119 
 
The empirical findings in this thesis indicate that the institutional context for the cluster 
approach matters significantly. Also, it is plausible to believe that which type of crisis the 
cluster approach is implemented in matters, e.g. if the crisis is transboundary, expected, or 
sudden-onset. This study focuses on the cluster approach in the aftermath of natural disasters, 
for a future study it may be interesting to study the cluster approach in the aftermath of 
complex emergencies. This may give a foundation for a systematic comparison of the cluster 
approach in all types of emergencies, and possibly provide useful generalizations and 
knowledge in order to improve the formal organization of the cluster approaches. Complex 
emergencies may also add an additional challenge for multi-level governance, due to the fact 
that the crisis often is present in both the political and social arenas.  
 
Additionally, the typical organizations in emergency responses share the characteristics, they 
are; idealistic; humanitarian/development; small organizations, and where the members of the 
organizations are usually volunteers (local/international). How these organizations are 
organized may pose challenges and opportunities in multi-level governance structures and 
may affect the coordination, leadership and accountability in the cluster approach, which 
might give a more holistic understanding of the compounded organization.
 IX 
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Appendix I: Organizational Chart of the Cluster Approach, National Level 
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Appendix II: Map of Myanmar 
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Appendix III: Map of Haiti 
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Appendix IV: Cluster Lead Agencies, National Level, Myanmar. 
 
Global level clusters Cluster activated in Myanmar 
Agriculture, FAO Agriculture, FAO 
Early Recovery, UNDP Early Recovery, UNDP 
Education, UNICEF/SAVE THE 
CHILDREN 
Education, UNICEF/SAVE THE 
CHILDREN 
Emergency Shelter, UNHCR/IFRC Emergency Shelter, UNHCR/IFRC 
ETC, OCHA/WFP/UNICEF ETC, WFP/UNICEF 
Logistics, WFP Logistics, WFP 
CCCM, UNHCR/IOM  
Protection, UNHCR 
SUB-CLUSTERS: 
Child Protection, UNICEF 
GBV, UNFPA 
RoL/Justice, UNDP/OHCR 
Housing, Land, Property, UN HABITAT 
Mine Action, UNMAS 
Protection, UNHCR 
Health, WHO Health, WHO/MERLIN 
Nutrition, UNICEF Nutrition, UNICEF/GOUM 
WASH, UNICEF WASH, UNICEF 
 Food, WFP 
Table from Kaufmann & Krüger (2010:24). 
 
 
 
Titles and responsibilities in some cases evolved and changed during the first year of 
response. 
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Appendix V: Cluster Lead Agencies, National Level, Haiti. 
 
Global level clusters Cluster activated in Haiti 
Agriculture, FAO Agriculture, FAO 
Early Recovery, UNDP Early Recovery, UNDP 
Education, UNICEF/SAVE THE 
CHILDREN 
Education, UNICEF 
Emergency Shelter, UNHCR/IFRC Shelter and non-food items, IFRC 
ETC, OCHA/WFP/UNICEF  
Logistics, WFP Logistics, WFP/ATLAS 
CCCM, UNHCR/IOM  
Protection, UNHCR 
SUB-CLUSTERS: 
Child Protection, UNICEF 
GBV, UNFPA 
RoL/Justice, UNDP/OHCR 
Housing, Land, Property, UN HABITAT 
Mine Action, UNMAS 
Protection, UNHCR/MINUSTAH HR 
SUB-CLUSTERS: 
Child Protection, UNICEF 
GBV, UNIFEM 
Health, WHO Health, WHO 
Nutrition, UNICEF Nutrition, UNICEF/GOUM 
WASH, UNICEF WASH, UNICEF 
 Food, WFP 
Table from Binder and Grünewald (2008:21). 
Titles and responsibilities in some cases evolved and changed during the first year of 
response. 
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Appendix VI: Questionnaire to informant Global Public Policy 
Institute  
1) Can you please elaborate on what is your position and what are your main 
responsibilities in this position? 
2) How will you describe the cluster approach? 
3) In your words, does this differ from previous organization of emergency relief? (If so- 
how?) 
4) How would you describe leadership in the cluster approach? (- does the leadership 
vary in the different levels?) 
5) In your own experience working with the clusters, do the clusters have a clear division 
of specialization?  
6) From your background working with the clusters, do the clusters have a clear division 
of responsibilities?  (if so - how?) 
7) Have you seen accountability mechanisms in the cluster approach? (If so -which 
accountability mechanisms have you seen?) 
8) From observing in the field, which coordination mechanisms have you seen in the 
cluster approach? (- How are the different levels coordinated? – are there any 
challenges?) 
9) In your experience observing have you experienced any challenges implementing the 
cluster approach? 
10) According to Sørensen and Torfing (2005:15) governance can be defined as a 
relatively stable horizontal coupling of mutual dependent, but operational autonomous 
actors. The actors interact and try to influence each other through negotiations, as in an 
institutionalized community. They are self-regulating within the frames they are 
operating, this frame is usually set by political authority. In the end, in a broad sense 
they are contributing to the public steering (Sørensen & Torfing 2005:15). According 
to this definition would you describe the cluster approach as a governance structure?  
11) If so/not so, how and why do you see it like this?  
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Appendix VII: Questionnaire informants Myanmar 
1) Can you please elaborate on what is your position and what are your main 
responsibilities in this position?  
2) Can you please describe some of the context the UNOCHA and the clusters are 
operating in Myanmar?  
3) How was Myanmar Government prepared for a disaster like this? 
4) How will you describe in your own words the organization of the cluster approach in 
Myanmar? 
5) All of the clusters were rolled out and on different levels (national, sub-level and 
townships). Can you please explain how these levels were functioning?  
6) In your experience working with the clusters, do the clusters have a clear division of 
specialization? 
7) From your own experience, which were the key coordination activities taking place of 
the clusters (at various levels)? 
8) How would you describe leadership in the cluster approach? 
9) Where there any accountability mechanisms taking place in the clusters? (vertical, 
lateral, downward) 
10) According to Sørensen and Torfing (2005:15) governance can be defined as a 
relatively stable horizontal coupling of mutual dependent, but operational autonomous 
actors. The actors interact and try to influence each other through negotiations, as in 
an institutionalized community. They are self-regulating within the frames they are 
operating, this frame is usually set by political authority. In the end, in a broad sense 
they are contributing to the public steering (Sørensen & Torfing 2005:15). According 
to this definition would you describe the cluster approach as a governance structure?  
11) If yes, or no, why? 
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Appendix VIII: Questionnaire informant Haiti 
1) Can you please elaborate on what is your position and what are your main 
responsibilities in this position? 
2) Can you please describe some of the context the UNOCHA and the clusters are 
operating in Haiti?  
3) How was Haitian Government prepared for a disaster like this? 
4) How will you describe in your own words the organization of the cluster approach in 
Haiti? 
5) All of the clusters were rolled out and on different levels (national/capital and local). 
Kan you please explain how these levels were functioning?  
6) In your experience working with the clusters, do the clusters have a clear division of 
specialization? 
7) In your own experience, which were the key coordination activities taking place of the 
clusters (at various levels)? 
8) From the evaluation, phase II, it is mentioned parallel coordinating structures, do youh 
have any experience with this? (if so -can you please explain in your own words how 
this was operating?) 
9) How would you describe leadership in the cluster approach in Haiti? 
10) Where there any accountability mechanisms taking place in the clusters? (vertical, 
lateral, downward) 
11) The cluster approach was already introduced in 2006 in Haiti, do you think this may 
have had an effect in the way the cluster approach was organized in 2008? 
12) According to Sørensen and Torfing (2005:15) governance can be defined as a 
relatively stable horizontal coupling of mutual dependent, but operational autonomous 
actors. The actors interact and try to influence each other through negotiations, as in 
an institutionalized community. They are self-regulating within the frames they are 
operating, this frame is usually set by political authority. In the end, in a broad sense 
they are contributing to the public steering (Sørensen & Torfing 2005:15). According 
to this definition would you describe the cluster approach as a governance structure?  
13) If yes, or no, why? 
 
 
